Outrage over the Iranian government’s violent suppression and intimidation of dissent has appropriately produced considerable concern in the United States and fueled a debate over U.S. policy toward Tehran. Many political leaders and pundits have called for more active and vocal American support of the Iranian opposition, typically on the basis of analogies to oppressive regimes of the twentieth century.

Unfortunately, the vast majority of these analogies are misleading and even dangerous if used as guides to policy. The historical cases most similar to present-day Iran should instill caution.

Some have compared Iran to the Philippines in 1986 or South Korea in 1987, both cases in which the Reagan administration lent support to domestic groups pressing for greater democracy (after a stolen election in the Philippines and in restoring direct presidential elections in Korea). These two analogies are both fundamentally flawed because both countries were American allies over which the United States had considerable leverage. To the extent either case can be compared to Iran, they are more similar to the Iran of 1979 than 2009.

Others warn that Iran is headed toward a situation similar to 1989’s Tiananmen Square. This implicitly suggests that the George H. W. Bush administration could have prevented the Chinese government’s decision to crack down on China’s pro-democracy protesters, which seems doubtful but is ultimately unknowable. However, the focus of this comparison is typically criticism of the Bush administration’s post-Tiananmen engagement with China. Either way, there has thankfully been no event on this scale in Iran. Partially motivated by the collapse of communism in Central Europe, Tiananmen also demonstrates the potential danger of using strategies that were successful in one place and time in a radically different environment. (Though the blame for the outcome lies overwhelmingly with the Chinese government, not the protesters.)

The bulk of the history lessons filling editorial pages have to do with America’s Cold War and modern policies toward the U.S.S.R. and former Soviet bloc countries. Some mention Hungary in 1956—when the U.S. essentially encouraged a revolt via Radio Free Europe but was ultimately unwilling to come to aid the country’s revolutionaries—or the Prague Spring in 1968, which Washington did not particularly encourage beforehand or support afterward. Both demonstrate the calculations that have led past American leaders, Republican and Democratic, to shy away from active intervention in such circumstances.

Others cite the Reagan administration’s support for Poland’s Solidarity trade union movement in the early 1980s, though few acknowledge that the Solidarity protests led to the imposition of martial law and considerably greater repression. Poland did not have a non-communist government until 1989, nine years after the first Solidarity strikes. The fact that Soviet leaders—and Polish and other Central European leaders—were no longer prepared to use large-scale violence to suppress opposition was decisive in the largely peaceful revolutions of 1989.

Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution is another popular case, doubtless because it is a recent example of electoral fraud akin to Iran’s and because American political intervention was important to Viktor Yushchenko’s eventual installation as president. Yet “revolution” is clearly an overstatement of the degree of change in Ukraine and its subsequent governments have been quite unstable. Actually, the country’s recent history is an illustration less of the success of U.S. pressure in producing democracy than of the fact that democracy requires much more than the ‘right’ election outcome, especially in a divided country.

Finally, many talk of the Soviet Union, especially of President Reagan standing up to Soviet leaders or Reagan and others supporting Soviet dissidents. U.S.-Soviet relations are mostly irrelevant to Iran, however. At the time of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. was the pre-eminent threat the American national security and was a global competitor. The United States subordinated much of its foreign policy to the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Few today seem prepared to afford Tehran the same role in shaping U.S. global policy and strategy, notwithstanding the real danger of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its regional support for terrorism. Moreover, America’s defense of Soviet dissidents was a long-term strategy, like support for Solidarity, not one expected to produce the immediate results for which today’s observers appear to hope.

One of the most wrong-headed comparisons between Iran and the former U.S.S.R. is the comparison to the August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin’s iconic image resisting the coup atop a tank, which has led some to complain that Mir Hossein Mousavi lacks Yeltsin’s courage. The problem with this line of thinking is that Yeltsin was already the president of the Russian Federation at that time and had the backing of Russia’s parliament. Perhaps even more important, there was a tank in front of the parliament for him to stand on because the Soviet armed forces were divided. There is scant evidence of such divisions in Iran.

Historical patterns can clearly be useful tools for thought and action in shaping policy, but in using them it is essential to avoid becoming locked in to psychologically appealing narratives that can skew expectations. It is likewise important to remember that history took a long time to happen and that most of the decisive events to which we look back were the final stages of extended processes. What does this mean for U.S. policy toward Iran? Stay calm—and don’t try to turn today’s events into something they are not.

When Medvedev took office this spring, some argued that he and Putin would genuinely share power (something the Russian government also said, noting their constitutional division-of-labor).  Others suggested that the relatively liberal-sounding Medvedev could gradually rule on his own or, alternatively, that Putin would continue to dominate Moscow from his new post.  This debate had barely settled down when the Russian-Georgian war seemed to shift Russian domestic politics strongly in Putin’s favor, empowering the Prime Minister–who flew to Russia’s North Caucasus to supervise–and his supporters in the security services.  Then, again almost immediately, Russia plunged into financial crisis, with the stock market losing two-thirds of its value and many so-called oligarchs looking for the Kremlin’s version of a bailout.  And Medvedev’s market-oriented minions seemed to have regained some lost ground.

Now, Medvedev is calling for constitutional changes to extend the Russian president’s term from four to six years.  Government spokesmen claim that the change would not apply to Medvedev during his current term, but only to whomever serves the next term.  Moscow conspiracy theorists interpret this in multiple ways, but one of the leading theories is that Medvedev will remain in office only long enough to pass the measure and then resign–making Putin the acting president and almost ensuring his immediate election as president.  What’s really happening?  Who knows?  But something must be going on under there.

This general view still seems widely held in Russia on the eve of the election.  Just this week, Konstantin Kosachev, the chairman of the Russian Duma’s foreign affairs committee (the Duma is the lower house of parliament, elected by party list and dominated by the pro-government United Russia party), was quoted in the Russian press saying “McCain got his political formation during the Cold War.  He dedicated most of his life to the fight against communism. It’s clear that to this day he still thrashes along that front without seeing any real difference between the Soviet Union and modern Russia.”  Kosachev was more positive toward Obama, saying “Obama doesn’t differ particularly in his beliefs about Russia from the Republican candidate, but he is a young politician, without prejudices and so, more ready to take on a new proposals and approaches.”

As a practical matter, however, it is not so easy to predict policy under a hypothetical Obama Administration.  Obama does not really have a policy record on Russia and even his rhetorical record is somewhat thin.  His general foreign policy instincts seem to favor engagement over confrontation, but his instincts alone are unlikely to drive policy.  Several other factors would also shape decisions, including the views of advisors and senior officials, attitudes in Congress, and perspectives of major political constituencies focused on the relationship (many of which are skeptical toward Russia).  In an environment of widespread negative views toward Russia after the war in Georgia, Obama might find it quite difficult to build a strong political coalition supporting engagement.  Whether Obama would be willing to risk attacks for being “soft” on Russia — from not only McCain, but also Democrats like Richard Holbrooke — even as he moves to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq is also an interesting question.  From this perspective, McCain would have a certain “Nixon-goes-to-China” credibility if he were to decide to reach out to Moscow as president.  Obama could lose some liberal interventionist Democrats in engaging with Russia and his success with such an approach might end up depending heavily on winning the support of realist/pragmatic Republicans.  Alternatively, Obama-the-political-pragmatist might win out over Obama-the-foreign-policy-pragmatist and a harder line might result, leaving today’s Russians for Obama disappointed.

Equally striking are two more facts. First, GM’s total worth is just one-fifteenth that of Toyota, and roughly on par with India’s Tata Motors and Russia’s Avtovaz — companies unknown to the vast majority of Americans. This is another illustration of how the once-mighty company has fallen. Second, reports on GM’s talks with possible buyers identify Indian, Russian, and Chinese firms — not the Japanese or the Europeans — as potential suitors. Expect more of the same as the balance of power in the global economy shifts increasingly in favor of these rapidly growing economies. The Russian and Indian economies are still small compared to America’s, and Russia’s in particular will probably stay that way for some time, but they are also clearly new players — and new players with high growth rates and ambitious goals. This is also cause for reflection.

Let’s do a little thought experiment.  Numerous sources have already predicted that a U.S. attack on Iran could drive oil prices as high as $200 per barrel and send gas prices to $5 or $6 per gallon.  It seems unlikely that an Israeli attack would have any less impact on prices.  In fact, one could argue that it might have a greater impact on prices–a U.S. attack would destabilize Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf, but an Israeli attack could take the rest of the Middle East along with them depending on how Israel’s neighbors, Hamas, and Hezbollah react.

Knowing that American voters are already angry about high gas prices–and that U.S. politicians are running scared–what Israeli Prime Minister would knowingly create a situation in which some Americans might blame Israel for $6-a-gallon gasoline?  Only a crazy one.  And whatever one thinks of Ehud Olmert, he doesn’t seem crazy.  And the political math on this doesn’t get much better after the election either: what Israeli Prime Minister would want to start a relationship with a new American President by handing him an even bigger energy crisis?

Anyone dreaming that Israel will solve the very thorny problem of Iran for us–allowing the United States to avoid making some difficult choices–needs a dose of reality.

The scary thing is that we are still five months away from the this fall’s elections and that neither prices nor the anger and political grandstanding they generate have yet to peak. What happens when they do could have a major impact on America and the international system that some of our politicians seem almost inherently unable to think about in a rational way.

Are the Saudis behaving in a friendly way toward the United States by refusing the President’s request to increase production? No, not really. Are they obliged to be friendly? No, not really. Do we have a right to buy oil at low prices? No, not really. Is there anything we can do about it? Yes — but bashing the Saudis is not the answer, especially when the U.S. is trying to engage Saudi Arabia both in helping us out of Iraq and in the Middle East peace process.

Oil prices basically have three components: high demand for a scarce resource, global uncertainty and even fear about future supply and demand, and a weak dollar that makes the prices we pay here even higher than those paid by the Europeans, for example. We can and should be addressing all three of these factors in ways that contribute to lower prices. How? By reducing our consumption of oil, acting internationally in ways that cool rather than increasing uncertainty (such as limiting rhetoric about possible military action against Iran), and working to strengthen the U.S. economy and a dollar that is at historic lows.

Some will argue that increasing U.S. domestic production could also reduce prices. I am skeptical of this as many have argued that Saudi Arabia could well reduce its own production to blunt the impact. But there is no reason not to try this too in a responsible way and with modest expectations.

The text of my testimony is available on The Nixon Center’s web site.

The first problem is that while Americans have somewhat reduced their use of gasoline with higher prices, the difference has been small.  Why?  As Robin West, Chairman of the energy consulting firm PFC Energy and others have pointed out, our communities and infrastructure force people to drive.  More and more people live in the suburbs, have long commutes, and have no viable public transportation options.

A second problem is that the technologies currently in use and in the pipeline (so to speak) also don’t make a big difference.  Hybrids help, but are rare.  Electric and fuel cell vehicles aren’t really commercially viable yet and–even when they are–will still result in significant carbon emissions because they will depend heavily on electricity generated by  fossil fuels.  Making hydrogen for hydrogen cars, which are even further away, will produce emissions too.  (Yes, we could use nuclear power, but good luck building enough plants in the necessary time frame.)

And even if we do develop a breakthrough technology, how long will it take to become widespread?  Hybrids have been available for years and still have a low market share.  It could take two decades to replace the U.S vehicle fleet.   It could take four or five decades to replace our power plants.  Consumers and companies will only do what makes economic sense and generally will not replace existing assets until they live out their useful lives.

The third problem is that according to most analysts, global oil production capacity will peak at around 100 million barrels per day.  But demand will keep growing and is expected to reach 130 million barrels per day by 2015.  (The problem isn’t the amount of oil in the ground, but our ability to get it out.)  So if you think prices are high now, you ain’t seen nothing yet.

At the same time, notwithstanding the fact that Senators Clinton, McCain, and Obama have all announced plans to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions that far exceed those of the Bush Administration, those hoping for global action to prevent climate change are likely to be disappointed.  We had a thorough discussion of some of the reasons here at The Nixon Center last week.  Technology (see above) is one.  The other two are China — which surpassed the U.S. in emissions last year, and could double its emissions in the next decade or so, far overwhelming any reductions (or more likely, any reductions in the growth of our emissions) we might make — and (ironically) Congressional Democrats.  As Washington Post reporter Juliet Eilperin noted during our session, the single biggest obstacle to major U.S. action on climate change in the Congress will be Michigan Democrat John Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.  Senator Robert Byrd — the Senate’s senior-most Democrat and a powerful advocate for coal-rich West Virginia — may also have some views on the issue.  He was the Democratic co-sponsor of the Senate’s 1997 Byrd-Hagel resolution, a 97-0 vote that effectively killed the Kyoto Protocol and persuaded President Bill Clinton not to attempt Senate ratification.

The energy-climate picture in the coming years is a bleak one, and we would do well to start preparing for the consequences.

“I would say his world view is so established that there is not a real battle going on,” said Mr. Kagan, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “A struggle over individual policies I could imagine, but the broad view, no. People would agree on what McCain thinks. This is not one of those situations like Bush all over again, with some titanic struggle going on between different factions.”

Kagan is right: unlike the current president during his 2000 campaign (when he sounded like a convinced realist, saying he wanted a “humble” foreign policy in his race against Al Gore), McCain has a fairly long record from which one can draw certain conclusions. Also, while some of his views have evolved over time, many of them have remained fairly constant–including his tough position toward Russia, mentioned toward the end of the Times piece.

Of course, all good realists know that if John McCain should actually be elected president, what he believes (and particularly what he says to get elected) will be secondary to what he does as commander-in-chief. The hotly pursued question of which campaign advisors have more or less access to the candidate will pale in comparison to key personnel decisions by a McCain White House and to the major policy choices that follow. Speculation about these two topics is an entertaining activity inside the Beltway and in the blogosphere, but is ultimately just that–speculation.

More broadly, as President Bush has gradually discovered, maintaining a large U.S. troop presence in Iraq forces the United States to adopt pragmatic positions in dealing with other major issues and players in the international system, from China and Russia to Iran, North Korea, and authoritarian governments of the Middle East. To the extent that Senator McCain were to continue the current administration’s approach to the war, international realities (not to mention the sagging U.S. economy) would impose significant constraints on his other foreign policy options. However strong one’s beliefs, reality usually wins out in the end. Unfortunately, the longer one holds out, the higher the eventual price usually is.

The Bush Administration and other Americans supporting a MAP for each of the two countries essentially argued that they were committed to democracy, that they deserved membership in the alliance, and that their membership would help to further stabilize Europe. The problem was that many Europeans saw the issue differently, as a needless thumb in the eye to Moscow that would come on top of American plans for missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic (just endorsed by NATO in Bucharest) and recent U.S. and European recognition of Kosovo’s independence over Russian objection. Those who tire of simplistic international reporting in much of the mainstream media may be interested to know that in my own survey of major news outlets, I could find only one–National Public Radio–that took the trouble to mention not only German and French objections, but also opposition from Italy, Hungary (which actually borders on Ukraine), Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The full list deflates the often-heard argument that European dependence on Russian energy is the main driver of “soft” European policies toward Russia in that the Benelux countries do not import significant amounts of Russian natural gas or oil.

Russia was far from their sole concern, however; many also expressed reservations over Ukraine’s sharply divided public opinion on membership and Georgia’s ongoing disputes with two separatist territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (both of which are supported by Moscow). These are important concerns. A national commitment on the level of NATO membership–which would obligate Ukraine to commit military forces to defend other members, among other things, should only be taken on the basis of significant public support, if not public consensus. As far as Georgia is concerned, when bringing Central European countries into the alliance, NATO explicitly insisted that they resolve all of their territorial disputes in advance, as a condition for membership. NATO members did not want to extend the “Article 5″ mutual defense commitment to countries they knew in advance had ongoing disputes. Nor did they want to import these disagreements into the alliance, threatening its unity (those disagreements were among countries that were all aspiring for membership). If the goal of NATO enlargement is extending peace and security, it makes no sense to bring Georgia into the alliance at precisely the time when it is involved in a dispute like this.

Some have argued that failing to bring the two countries into NATO “gives Russia a veto” or “gives in to Russian blackmail”. This is not a serious argument. Russia does not have a veto over NATO decisions and never will (unless it becomes a member, which seems rather unlikely at this point). Nor does Russia even have a real voice in NATO’s decision-making process. What Russia does have, and any other country has, is a right to express its perspectives on decisions that NATO may take — just as NATO has a right to express its views on Russian decisions or actions. The U.S. and other NATO members can then evaluate those perspectives and the potential consequences of either dismissing them or trying to take them into account in some way. Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, and the others saw their own interests as more damaged by offering MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia than delaying them. The potential costs and benefits of accommodating an unpopular outgoing American president in the face of widespread public concern in their own countries likely also factored into these decisions.

Media reports now suggest that NATO leaders are wrangling over the text of a statement that would make clear that the door remains open to Ukraine and Georgia. It should. Most of the objections to membership are tactical rather than strategic, in that they reflect problems which are at least in theory temporary and soluble, including both domestic opposition to membership in Ukraine and Georgia’s internal fractures. Those who really want to bring the two countries into the alliance should work on resolving those two issues in ways that do not make the third one–Russia–any worse.

Another featured piece today is Dan Drezner’s assessment of the foreign  policy battle inside the GOP between realists and neo-conservatives.  Drezner’s “Foreign Policy Goes Glam” — from the November/December issue of the print magazine — is a great look at the growing role of celebrities in our foreign policy and also a good read.

Those gathered at the American Petroleum Institute reportedly called out the now familiar refrain “no blood for oil!”, which may be a popular rallying cry but has little to do with the war in Iraq.  This recent article by Washington Post energy reporter Steve Mufson makes clear that reality is much more complex and that oil was a secondary issue at best (though some senior officials erroneously thought Iraq’s oil wealth would ensure that the country could at a minimum pay for its own reconstruction).  The many serious books on the origins of the invasion also show that the case for Iraq as a war for oil doesn’t hold water.

Ironically, even if oil had been the Bush Administration’s main reason for invading Iraq, neither Bush 43 nor his father, who first took on Saddam Hussein in 1991, were the originators of the idea that the U.S. should be willing to sacrifice its soldiers lives to guarantee secure access to energy in the Persian Gulf.  That principle–better known as the Carter Doctrine–was shaped into an enduring tenet of U.S. policy by then-National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (with an aim to deterring Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf).  Today, Brzezinski is a key adviser to none other than Senator Barack Obama, who presumably enjoys the support of the same little band of protesters in Washington today as the most anti-war candidate among the three serious contenders for the presidency.  (And like Obama, Brzezinski has been quite critical of the war in Iraq.)

There is much to criticize in the Bush Administration’s handling of Iraq, from start to finish, and both Obama and Brzezinski have done this in thoughtful ways, whether or not one agrees with them.  Protesting (non-violently) is also a legitimate way to express criticism, but anyone who wants to make a difference–rather than merely feeling better by expressing their angry opposition–would do well to put some effort into understanding what they are fighting against.

Most striking to me, however, were their comments about how Beijing even now does not always fully understand the impact that its actions can have in the United States and in the Congress in particular. For example, according to Rep. Kirk, some 90% of all of the cyber-attacks directed at the Congress’s many web sites originate in the People’s Republic of China–and, he added, every member of Congress knows this. It seems hard to underestimate the impact this simple fact can have during debates over U.S. responses to China’s military modernization, trade and currency policy, and other issues.

It is unlikely that the attacks are predominantly due to a deliberate Chinese policy decision to target Congressional web sites; on the contrary, it would be surprising if some Senate and House action on China would not provoke a reaction from angry Chinese hackers. But in a country where access to the internet is so tightly managed, it also seems rather unlikely that the Chinese government is working hard to address the problem. On the contrary, the central government may well see it as a relatively cost-free way to allow their citizens to vent some of their frustration externally rather than internally. The problem is that many things seem cost-free only because the bill hasn’t yet come, something we could learn in our own policy-making as well.

The United States and its allies need Russia as a partner to address many international challenges, including Iran, Kosovo and arms control. They must deal pragmatically with the realities of Russian power, as the administrations of Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush once did.

The editors qualify this by following it with a couple of sentences arguing that the U.S. must also continue to press for greater freedom in Russia, including at the G-8 meeting later this year. Needless to say, this is no less true than the first half of the paragraph–the hard part is in finding the right balance between these two goals.

On a related point, those who enjoy Wikipedia fights have fun reading the edits to Medvedev’s entry on the site, which has been revised well over a hundred times since March 2, including being briefly deleted and replaced with an entry that read only “wanker”. Russia has truly entered the 21st century.

Jacob Heilbrunn – like Ximena, a Senior Editor at the magazine – makes a similar point in “Pride and Prudence”, a review of recent books focused on the Nixon presidency appearing in the March/April issue of The National Interest, which will arrive in bookstores and mailboxes in the next 1-2 weeks. He concludes with the observation that Republicans grappling with the foreign policy legacy of the current president would do well to reexamine Nixon’s record. I encourage all to take a look.