Nixon-In-China Takes Center-Stage In Vancouver

March 4, 2010 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Culture, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

A giant pillar is prepared for the set of Nixon In China, which will kick off the 2010 season of the Sydney Opera House.

John Adams’s opera will inaugurate in the backdrop of the 2010 Winter Olympics and the golden anniversary of the Vancouver Opera House, a perfect tribute to city at this time, opera house General Manager James Wright says, because of its themes of “internationalism” and “cultures moving closer together.”

Opera is known for being larger than life, but set designer Erhard Rom has never had to make a Boeing 707 land on-stage before.

In the opening scene of Nixon in China, he’ll do just that. A replica of the Spirit of ’76, the presidential jet that carried Richard Nixon on his 1972 diplomatic mission to Beijing, will touch down on a giant runway with its nose pointed toward the audience.

“I feel the landing of the 707 has to feel like an absolutely stunning moment,” says the artist, who’s helping design the new production for its Canadian premiere by the Vancouver Opera, which runs this Saturday (March 13) to March 20 at the Queen Elizabeth Theatre. Speaking from his New Jersey home, Rom explains that he worked from actual plans of the airplane—and then enlarged it a bit “so it feels like the Titanic arriving”. “What struck me,” says Rom, “is that, in some ways, the piece is almost Wagnerian in scale—almost epic.”

The opera he’s speaking about, composed by John Adams to a libretto by poet Alice Goodman, is often described as a minimalist masterpiece. But there is nothing minimalist about Vancouver Opera’s mounting to mark both its golden anniversary season and the Vancouver 2010 Cultural Olympiad.

Vancouver Opera general manager James Wright admits it’s a big investment to commission a new production—not to mention one that has a chorus of 40. But Nixon in China, he says, seemed perfect for this city at this time, with the world gathered here.

“It’s about internationalism; it’s about cultures moving closer together,” says Wright, whose team is hosting an entire speaker series around the opera and Canada-China relations in the weeks before opening. “Then there is the fact that Beijing had hosted the 2008 Olympics, and the fact that Vancouver is seen as the North American centre for Asia.”

Michael Cavanagh, the acclaimed Toronto-based director Wright brought in to create the major new production, could not agree more. In fact, sitting in the rehearsal hall at the downtown Holy Rosary Cathedral, where right outside the doors people are decked out in flag gear and heading to a hockey game, he can’t help but make direct parallels with the Olympic Games.

“The show is a psychological examination of people involved in momentous events and how those can overwhelm and overtake them. And then how we need to wait and step back for history to tell us what it all meant,” Cavanagh says. “These couple of weeks in Vancouver are all about huge moments. This is one of the biggest events in this city’s history. But how is it going to be remembered?”

The show, he stresses, is much more than a dry chronicling of the historic visit between Nixon and Mao Zedong (sung by baritone Robert Orth and heldentenor Alan Woodrow, respectively) and the opening of the Far East. Yes, the opera depicts actual events: the arrival of Nixon and his cortege, the first uncomfortable meeting in Mao’s study and the huge banquet that followed it, as well as Pat Nixon’s tour of rural China. But it is just as much about the personalities and personal histories of the main players, not just Richard and Pat Nixon and Mao and his wife Chiang Ch’ing, but their advisers Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai.

The result defies the one-note image of Nixon as the Watergate crook, or even as the aloof apologist of the recent film Frost/Nixon. “This piece definitely does not treat him like a villain,” Cavanagh says. “This opera is a fantastic opportunity for us to get to know the giddy Nixon, the playful Nixon, the contemplative Nixon, the jokester, and the romantic. And it’s the same with Mao: at the time of the visit, Mao was kind of doddering.…But the opera gives us a chance to see Mao as a young man, doing a silly little jig at one point; he’s also romantically involved, even sexually involved—because he was a sensualist as well as a great thinker. They were complex—we’re all complex people.”

Just as the events go beyond the literal, delving into the psychologies of the characters, the design is stylized—beyond that initial jet landing, that is. The perspective and scale are exaggerated, with the characters lined up in front of huge triangular pillars painted with their portraits by the third act. The colour palette is a bold red, white, and blue. “We visit locations in a literal way, but the scope of the piece is so large, we wanted to go more abstract,” says Rom, who used architecture and news photos, among other things, in designing the production. “And then by the third act, you’re really into abstraction, because now we’re really all the way into the land of these people’s minds.”

Throughout the opera, a TV film crew captures the action on-stage, with the video replayed at key moments. “The great unblinking eye and the reductive power of television was something that Richard Nixon was all too aware of,” Cavanagh comments

China Mourns The Passing Of Al Haig

February 23, 2010 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Nixon Administration, Nixon Administration figures, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

Just one day before the thirty-eight anniversary of RN’s historic trip to China, Gen. Alexander Haig passed away. Today the Chinese are remembering him for his work in strengthening Sino-American relations:

BEIJING: China on Monday expressed “deep condolence” over the death of former US Secretary of State Alexander Haig for his “positive contribution” to the China-US relationship.

“We deeply mourn over General Haig’s death and express sincere condolences to his family,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said Monday.

“General Haig has always endeavored to promote the China-US friendship, and has made positive contribution for the development of the bilateral relations,” Qin said.

The veteran politician passed away at 85 on February 20 at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, from complications associated with an infection.

Haig, who was born in December, 1924, is a retired Army four-star general and served as the State Secretary under President Ronald Reagan form January 22, 1981 to July 5, 1982. He also has served as a top adviser to former presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.

On January 1972, Haig paid his first China visit to make preparation for Nixon’s historic visit to China.

In 2009 when China and the United States commemorated the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, Haig reportedly said he had visited China for more than 50 times since 1972 and would like to be a supporter of the development of China-US relations.

Follow The Money–It’s Going To China

February 19, 2010 by David R. Stokes | Filed Under Asia, Barack Obama, China, Cold War, Economic issues, George W. Bush, History, International Affairs, Middle East, Money, National Security, Nixon Administration, Obama administration, Presidents, Richard Nixon, U.S. History | 1 Comment 

The other day, President Barack Obama met with the Tibetan Dali Lama in the White House—doing so in the Map Room as opposed to the Oval Office in an apparent attempt to mute any “official” aura for the meeting. It was sort of like trying to kowtow to one audience while powwowing with another. Likely the nuance was lost on the government in Beijing. Of course, past presidents have received the Tibetan leader—a man who has become a symbol for freedom and a persistent reminder of the oppression of his people at the hands of the Chinese regime.

It was 38 years ago this week that President Richard Nixon played the historic China Card—a geopolitical masterstroke during the Cold War. It was all part of a strategic view of the world and effectuated from a position of strength. We were powerful; they were backward—technologically, culturally, and with obvious political deficiencies. That moment remains a high water mark in Nixon’s presidency—a moment in time that even the most determined critics concede positively to his legacy.

But what would Mr. Nixon think now?

These days, admittedly, the whole issue of U.S.-China relations is a sticky one for our current President. It is one of many examples of how different things are when you are governing as opposed to campaigning for office—although it is hard to tell which is which in Washington these days. Mario Cuomo famously talked years ago about politics being “poetry” and governing “prose.”

Dealing with potential adversaries—and even some friends—is always best when you do so from a position of strength. It’s true in military and national defense (“peace through strength”) and it’s true in economics, as well. The scriptures remind us, “The borrower is servant to the lender.” And when one party is deep in financial debt to another a certain measure of leverage is ceded to the lender.

How this dynamic will play out in the immediate future is anyone’s guess, but owing nearly $800 billion to the Chinese should raise a flag—a red one. And it should come as no surprise if and when those to whom we owe such copious amounts of money begin to squeeze us on the international stage.

President Obama has been making great pains to try to change our image before the world, one that he believes George W. Bush perpetuated and that has led to our virtual “blackball” by many nations. But in fact, what he really should be concerned about is not “blackball,” but rather “blackmail.” The Chinese dumped $45 billion of T-bills a couple of months ago—wave of the future? And why shouldn’t one nation operating out of its own interests use such leverage? We would.

In fact, we have.

In 1956, there were two hot spots with the potential of blowing up into World War III, a revolution in Hungary—and a crisis in the Middle East involving the Suez Canal. Seen now in hindsight against the backdrop of the Cold War and as the moment when the last vestiges of old world colonialism gave wave to complete bi-polar hegemony pitting the United States against the Soviets, the Suez Crisis was as much about the exercise of economic clout as it was a diplomatic-military affair.

Gamal Abdel Nassar had emerged as a leader in Egypt as part of a 1952 coup overthrowing King Farouk and by 1954 he was firmly in place as that nation’s maximum leader. He immediately undertook a complete transformation of his country with massive public works and the progressive nationalization of industry. He was enamored of the Soviet system and soon it became clear that his nation would be taking that side in the Cold War. One project near and dear to his heart was the building of the Aswan Dam, which America at first agreed to help fund. But when Nassar sold arms to Soviet satellite Czechoslovakia and then recognized the People’s Republic of China, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles withdrew our dam dollars.

In reaction to this, Nassar announced on July 26, 1956 a Nationalization Law freezing all the assets of the Suez Canal—in effect, a seizure of that vital passageway.

Opened in 1869, this 119-mile long man-made waterway connects the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Originally financed by the Egyptians and French, Britain became a major stakeholder and stockholder in 1875, and eventually the canal became part of the United Kingdom’s imperial portfolio in the region. Following World War II, and with the decline of the U.K.’s empire, the canal gradually became a diplomatic football—not to mention thorn. And the creation of the nation of Israel in 1948 caused tensions about the vital waterway to further increase.

In the aftermath of Nassar’s July 26 speech, Britain—led by Prime Minister Anthony Eden—and France, represented by Eden’s counterpart, Guy Mollet, began to plot how to ensure their access to the Suez Canal. Eventually, and in an alliance with Israel (a nation with the most to lose if the canal was closed to them), military action was planned and initiated.

Follow the money.

Meanwhile, the American President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in the midst of a reelection bid, had already had a rough year in 1956—physically and politically. And shortly following election to a second term in the White House, he played some power politics of his own. Now, I should state here that I am not of the number in agreement with what he did in the Suez matter, anymore than I am about how we abandoned the freedom fighters in Budapest earlier that summer. I am simply using this story to describe a reality in all of life and politics—like it or not.

There is a golden rule in geo-politics: He who has the gold makes the rule.

Mr. Eisenhower did not want Britain, France, and Israel—all stated allies of the United States—creating a situation that might not play well with the Soviets and that had the potential to instigate a larger war. Here was the hero of Normandy putting the pressure on British Prime Minister Eden—a man who had worked closely with Ike while serving in Churchill’s War Cabinet.

“The borrower is servant to the lender.”

To apply pressure on Eden’s government to cease and desist, Eisenhower instructed U.S. Treasury Secretary, George M. Humphrey, to begin to sell off some of our government’s British bonds. Some of these bonds were holdovers from the U.K.’s World War II debt; others had been sold to us to help that nation’s economy rebound after the war. Eden’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, future P.M. Harold Macmillan, told him that the results would be devastating to the British economy.

Checkmate.

Anthony Eden was a broken man. He fled to a vacation-exile in Jamaica, spending time at Ian Fleming’s (of James Bond literary fame) estate there, but his health quickly deteriorated. He was taking amphetamines—had been for years under doctor’s orders after a botched gall bladder operation—and the drugs magnified his problems with insomnia and unraveling mental health. Soon, Mr. Macmillan took over at 10 Downing Street, but by then the Suez episode had hastened the sunset on the British Empire—and the Cold War morphed from a multi-national tag-team match into a virtual two-nation standoff.

Follow the money.

We are potentially in big trouble as a nation. Our security is threatened not only by Islamist terrorism—but also by some who have a lien on our title deed. Certainly, throughout our history we have dealt with nations and regimes in pragmatic and realpolitik ways, even having to hold our collective noses because of the stench of tyranny and oppression on the part of some of our momentary allies in a larger cause. But we have managed, for the most part, to deal with it—ugliness and all—because of the ability to approach everything from a position of strength: morally, militarily, and economically.

Now though, we not only depend on others for much of our energy, but we also owe an astronomical amount of money (the interest alone is unfathomable) to powerful entities. We should not be surprised that other nations no longer dance on cue—nor should we ever be surprised if and when some big bills come due with humiliating strings attached.

Or worse.

Article On Ron Walker In Orange County Register

February 13, 2010 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under American Politics, China, Foundation News, Nixon Administration, Nixon Administration figures, Nixon Foundation, Nixon Library, Orange County, Presidents, Richard Nixon, U.S. History, White House, Yorba Linda | 1 Comment 

During the Nixon Administration, Ron Walker headed the White House’s advance team, working on projects ranging in scale from the thirty-seventh President’s 1972 visit to the People’s Republic of China to his visits to Washington-area schools. The concepts developed by the team Ron headed form the basis for all the subsequent advance work of American presidencies.

Today, Ron Walker is president of the Richard Nixon Foundation, and the Orange County Register has just published an article about him by Jessica Terrell. who often covers Nixon-related personalities and events for the newspaper. It contains some remarkable facts: it turns out that Ron, at the time he joined the Nixon campaign in 1968, was a registered Democrat. He also describes his ambitious plans for the Foundation, which include doubling the size of its endowment, and organizing more events to make the public aware of the accomplishments of the Nixon era in both domestic and foreign affairs.

Osborne: “Mission To China”

February 9, 2010 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, News media, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

As we come upon the the thirty-eighth anniversary of RN’s historic trip to China later this month, The New Republic has digged into their archives for John Osborne’s report on the “week that changed the world.”

“Only Nixon” Reviewed

February 6, 2010 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under Book Review, China, Nixon Administration figures, Nixon Library events, Presidents, Richard Nixon, U.S. History | 1 Comment 

The Pueblo (Colorado) Chieftain has just published this review of James C. Humes and Dr. Jarvis Ryals’s book Only Nixon, which recounts the President’s historic China trip as seen from the perspective of the Chinese who helped arrange for RN’s meetings with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. (TNN previously has posted a video about this book.)

A Gift To The American People

February 4, 2010 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

The Canadian Press reports that two giant pandas from the National Zoo in Washington are returning to their native origins as apart of a new breeding program for endangered species.

The first pandas came to Washington as a state gift from China after RN’s historic trip in 1972:

Pandas have a long, symbolic history in Washington. The first panda couple, Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing, arrived in 1972 as a gift to the American people from China after President Richard Nixon’s historic visit.

The pair lived more than 20 years at the zoo and produced five cubs – but none survived.

That is partly why Tai Shan, the first cub to grow up in the U.S. capital, is so adored.

“All the other pandas we’ve borrowed from China, but he’s ours,” said Amanda Parson, 30, who left home at 6:15 a.m. Wednesday to visit the zoo in the snow with Williston for Tai Shan’s last day on view.

The zoo’s two remaining pandas, mother Mei Xiang and father Tian Tian, are on a 10-year, $10 million loan until December.

“Nixon In China” On Bowie’s iPod

January 23, 2010 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under China, Music, Presidents, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

Over in the UK, the Guardian has a short article by David Bowie in which the onetime Ziggy Stardust and Thin White Duke describes some of the contents of his iPod. His selections, as is usually the case with him, are eclectic, ranging from current rock bands to African pop to the avant-garde disco of the late Arthur Russell. He includes one operatic selection, from John Adams’s 1987 opera Nixon In China, which in March will receive its Canadian premiere courtesy of the Vancouver Opera.

Sending The News To China

January 17, 2010 by Jon Hoornstra | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon, White House | 7 Comments 

This article is Part II of a series on how RN received the news.

Few news summaries fell below 10 pages. In normal times, a short news summary ran perhaps 15, always single-spaced, and up to as many as 30 to 35 pages – in spite of constant efforts to keep them shorter. Even though some went long, we were reminded that the President actually read them and would use them as a day-to-day management tool, well beyond just keeping himself informed. Pages that carried notations by the President were copied and dispatched to the relevant Cabinet secretaries or agencies by the White House Staff Secretary with a request for a response. Occasionally a note was meant for our office, usually a compliment. Such notes reminded us that we had to get it right every day. Mort Allin explained the work ethic in place when I arrived.

“If you make a mistake because of something I say, I’ll apologize and we’ll move on. If the President makes a mistake because of something we put in his news summary, what will we do?” His eyes made clear there was no good answer to that question. We weren’t going to make a mistake.

Getting all the broadcast network reporters’ stories right was made possible because of the elaborate video taping and two closed circuit channels run by the Army’s White House Signal Corps office. We made heavy use of their instant replay ability for the nightly newscasts from ABC, NBC, CBS networks as well as the weekly shows, including PBS.

But China was different. It was a full day and 13 hours ahead of Washington. When we began to see our network news broadcasts at 5:30 p.m., it was the next day at 4:30 a.m. in Beijing and, presumably, the President was within an hour or so of rising from a night’s sleep.

The more critical element, however, was the sheer technical capacity of communications equipment to handle a steady stream of information from the U.S. to Air Force One to make sure the Old Man had the information he needed. We shared an electronic pipeline with others, so we pared the news summaries down into 3 or 4 page documents to avoid choking the system. We focused on the stories coming out of China or originating here about the trip. The process of dispatching short summaries continued day and night until the presidential party departed China.

Nixon’s grasp of U.S. news broadcasts while standing on Chinese soil didn’t go unnoticed. While in Beijing the President attended a performance of Chinese gymnasts. We watched in Washington, of course, and duly reported in the next mini-news summary that NBC commentator Joe Garagiola had described the performance as “truly outstanding,” along with a few other words of high praise. Nixon mentioned that to a Chinese escort the next day while touring the Great Wall. Standing nearby, paying close attention, was our venerable Barbara Walters, then an NBC regular.

“Mr. President,” Walters implored, ”how do you know what Joe Garagiola said last night – he’s in New York!?”

Nixon didn’t answer. But the temptation I felt to bargain later for a free lunch from Walters in exchange for the answer was enormous.

“All This Happened”

January 4, 2010 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon, Russia, Vietnam | 3 Comments 

Conrad Black critiques President Obama’s first year with a blow-torch, and then says his agenda pales in comparison to past presidents, notably RN:

Richard Nixon entered office with a plan to open relations with China, extract the U.S. from Indochina without bringing down the non-Communist government in Saigon, and pursue better relations with the USSR, arms control, and a peace process in the Middle East. All this happened.

Preparation

December 31, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Cold War, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

In his documentary based on his book War of the World, historian Niall Ferguson shows how fastidious attention to detail paid off for RN during his historic trip to China in 1972:

Obama’s China Two-Step

December 28, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Barack Obama, China, Nixon Center, Richard Nixon, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

At The Nixon Center’s National Interest magazine, Ted Galen Carpenter writes that President Obama’s decision to send arms to Taipei indicates that he wants to strengthen a beleaguered leader cooperative with Washington, and signal to China that their recent deployment of missiles across the straight is unacceptable:

There appear to be multiple motives for announcing an arms package now, including the mundane desire to give portions of the U.S. defense and aerospace industries a boost during tough economic times. But the primary motives seem to be diplomatic. An arms sale would be a reward to Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou for pursuing policies designed to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait and, equally important, for keeping Washington in the loop regarding any initiatives Taipei might take. That behavior comes as a great relief to U.S. officials, since it is in marked contrast to the conduct of Ma’s predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, who seemed to delight in provoking Beijing and blind-siding Washington in the process.

But Ma is now under fire at home for being too soft toward China, and his political popularity has sagged badly over the past year for numerous reasons. Responding favorably to Taipei’s long-standing request for additional weapon systems would help de-fuse the domestic opposition to Ma and strengthen the political standing of a cooperative leader Washington would like to see remain in power after Taiwan’s next presidential election.

Even more important, the arms sale would convey a message to Beijing of Washington’s growing annoyance regarding various issues. One grievance is China’s failure to halt the deployment of missiles across the strait from Taiwan, despite Ma Ying-jeou’s more conciliatory posture. Beijing’s conduct could be seen as a deliberate challenge to Washington, since the missile deployments have long been the primary justification for previous U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The Obama administration might well conclude that Chinese leaders would view Washington’s continued inaction on Taipei’s request as a sign of weakness.

Farewell to “Butterstick”

December 12, 2009 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under China, Nixon Administration, Presidents, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

One legacy of the Nixon Administration that has never ceased to enjoy widespread popularity in America is the tradition of “panda diplomacy,” in which the People’s Republic of China sends giant pandas to the National Zoo, to the delight of visitors of all ages.

This saga began some weeks after President Nixon’s visit to the PRC in 1972, when Chinese leader Mao Zedong sent two pandas, Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing, to the National Zoo. They were the Zoo’s most popular attractions by far until they died in the 1990s, the two oldest pandas to survive in captivity. During their decades in Washington, efforts were made to breed them, but all the offspring died after a few days.

In 2000, the PRC sent two pandas to replace them. Unlike Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing, which were gifts to the United States, Mei Xiang and Tian Tian are on loan to this country. For five years, the two new animals enjoyed an effective monopoly on American panda-mania.

That changed in 2005, when the black-and-white couple welcomed a son. According to Chinese tradition pandas are not given names until they are 100 days old, so it was not until then that the youngster was christened Tai Shan. But a zoo worker’s remark that the animal, at birth, weighed about as much as an average stick of butter resulted in the nickname by which the panda is far better known.

For the four years since his birth, “Butterstick” has effortlessly projected a charisma unequaled by any other Washington resident, including the current President, and each year on his birthday, thousands descend on the zoo to celebrate, lining up to wait for hours before opening time.

But all good things must, sometime, come to an end, and Tai Shan is no exception. From his birth he belonged to the PRC, under the terms of the agreement which brought his parents to the Zoo, and that nation had the right to ask for his return. This month, the Chinese government asked for his return, and so “Butterstick” must leave the zoo before long, probably at the end of next month. But he’ll be long, long remembered by a city, and a nation, for whom he provided countless hours of fascination and joy. And as he leaves, he has the distinction of being part of a great tradition founded by the two leaders who shook hands in Beijing twenty-seven years ago.

Nobel Nixon

December 10, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | 4 Comments 

During his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, President Obama credited RN with leading China to become an open society, and helping to lift millions out of poverty.

In his Nobel acceptance speech,  President Obama confers authority to RN, along with Pope John Paul and Ronald Reagan, as an architect of peace:

In light of the Cultural Revolution’s horrors, Nixon’s meeting with Mao appeared inexcusable – and yet it surely helped set China on a path where millions of its citizens have been lifted from poverty, and connected to open societies. Pope John Paul’s engagement with Poland created space not just for the Catholic Church, but for labor leaders like Lech Walesa. Ronald Reagan’s efforts on arms control and embrace of perestroika not only improved relations with the Soviet Union, but empowered dissidents throughout Eastern Europe. There is no simple formula here But we must try as best we can to balance isolation and engagement; pressure and incentives, so that human rights and dignity are advanced over time.

RN’s Trip From The Chinese Perspective

December 9, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Book Review, China, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

James Humes is the author of a new book filled with new insights on RN’s trip to China.

Former RN speechwriter, historian, author and all around polymath  James Humes was at the Nixon Library on Monday to discuss and sign copies of his new book Only Nixon: “His Trip to China Restudied and Revisited.”

Humes arrived with his co-author Dr.  Jarvis Ryals, and was introduced by the President’s younger brother Ed Nixon, who helped inspire the book when he joined the authors on their trip to China in 1999.

“Only Nixon” is a unique study of RN’s 1972 trip, Humes argues, because it tells the story through the Chinese perspective and addresses key information neglected by scholars and historians.

Humes sat down with Nixon Foundation Vice President Sandy Quinn to discuss his new insights on this latest episode of TNN TV:

Courtesy of TNN contributor and radio talk show host David Stokes, a podcast of Humes full remarks will soon become available.

Pacific President, Ctd.

December 1, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Asia, China, Richard Nixon, Vietnam | Leave a Comment 

Former New York Times military correspondent Richard Halloran posted an article over the weekend in which he asserts repeatedly that President Obama’s Asia policy — hinting at a carefully and competently molded  Obama Doctrine — is poised to weld cross-Pacific relations and reinvigorate U.S. power in the region after decades of decline.

Halloran — naively and very absurdly — cites RN’s Guam Doctrine (Nixon Doctrine) as the source of declinism:

In contrast, President Obama has reversed course in meetings in Asia with the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and nine other Southeast Asian nations, and with the leader of India in Washington this week. The president is scheduled to see Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia in the White House on Monday. With all, the president has reaffirmed America’s security commitments. In addition, he had a frosty visit with leaders of a potential adversary, China, in Beijing.

After the Nixon Doctrine had been decreed, the US withdrew in defeat from Vietnam, let the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization wither, and forsook Taiwan to recognize China. Okinawa was reverted to Japan with restrictions on US forces, New Zealand was booted from a treaty with the US and Australia in a dispute over nuclear arms, and US bases in the Philippines were abandoned after a volcanic eruption.

RN’s aims were just the opposite. He would re-affirm all security commitments, and provide allies with a nuclear deterrent should they get bullied by a major nuclear power. He would also help furnish economic and military assistance for nations willing to accept the responsibility for their own security, a strategy that is working in Iraq and would have proven successful in Vietnam, if not for Congress’s decision to cut off aid and leave the South vulnerable to a conventional invasion from the North.

Unfortunately for Halloran’s argument, RN was the one accused by his critics of prolonging the war in Indochina. Halloran is in fact right that RN would end the war, but peace in Asia was conducted on his terms, and would be artfully correlated with the rise of American prestige in the world that culminated during his historic trip to China in 1972.

RN was fully aware of the interminable misinterpretations of his speech in Guam (p.394-395):

The Nixon Doctrine announced on Guam was misinterpreted by some signaling a new policy that would lead to total American withdrawal from Asia and from other parts of the world as well. In one of our regular breakfast meetings after I returned from the Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield articulated this misunderstanding. I emphasized  to him, as I had to our friends in the Asian countries, that the Nixon Doctrine was not a formula for getting America out of Asia, but one that provided the only sound basis for America’s stating in and continuing to play a responsible role in helping the non-Communist nations and neutrals as well as our Asian allies to defend their independence.

RN’s Asia policy — most notably his diplomatic triumph in China — would establish strong bonds and allow America to further its interests in the region.

When diplomatic relations were formally restored in 1979, bilateral trade rose to $2.4 billion from zero in 1971. A three year Chinese-America trade relations agreement was also signed, each side granting one-another favored nation status. By the mid 1980’s, China was ready to engage the rest of the world.

It would also bring the Soviets back to the peace table and fasten the end of the Cold War, establishing the United States as the sole surviving superpower by the end of the Reagan administration.

In a joint press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, President Obama said: “I intend to make clear that the United States is a Pacific nation.”

As he brought the Vietnam war to a close, RN would fulfill his legacy after proclaiming similar words:

the United States is a Pacific power and should remain so.

Professionals Hour At The White House

November 24, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

RN and HAK: “partners in reliability, precision, and finesse.”

In yesterday’s edition of The Daily Beast, Leslie Gelb undresses the Obama White House, exposing the President’s recent Asian trip as “clumsy,” “displaying amateurishness,” and failing “to carve out America’s new leadership role” in “one of the world’s most dynamic regions.”

For Gelb,  such amateurishness can be attributed to the failure to  gauge the pulse of the region and prepare suitably for potential breakthroughs:

Presidents take trips like this one only when they need breakthroughs and accomplishments on certain issues that can’t be agreed on without the pressure of an impending presidential visit. In fact, most presidents wouldn’t even commit to trips abroad without knowing that key deals would be finally agreed on and announced during the visit itself. The prospective visit is the power jackhammer to nail down the deals. Just take a gander at trips planned for Richard Nixon by Henry Kissinger or for George H. W. Bush by James Baker.

RN was adept in understanding America’s moment of truth. In an October 1967 Foreign Affairs article titled “Asia After Vietnam,” he signaled a future — and substantive — shift in U.S. policy in the region, especially towards China:

For the short run, then this means a policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be serbed only by accepting the basic rules of international civility. For the long run, it means pulling China back into the world community — but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.

In his memoirs, Dr. Kissinger described the process of engaging China as an “intricate minuet (Horne 68),” RN said he and his foreign policy team proceeded “carefully and cautiously” to establish “a sufficiently strong foundation.” RN in his own words:

Messages and signals had been going back and forth for more than two years. We had proceeded carefully and cautiously through the Yahya and Romanian channels. Now Kissinger and I agreed that we had reached a point at which we had to take the chance of making a proposal, or risk slipping back into another long round of tentative probing. I decided that the time had come to take the big step and propose a presidential visit.

On May 10, therefore, Kissinger called in Ambassador Hilaly and gave him a message for Chou En-lai via President Yahya. It stated that because of the importance I attached to the normalizing of relations between the two countries, I was prepared to accept Chou’s invitation to visit Peking. I proposed Kissinger undertake a secret visit in advance of my trip in order to arrange an agenda and begin a preliminary exchange of views.

The die was cast. There was nothing left to do but wait for Chou’s reply. If we had acted too soon, if we had not established a sufficiently strong foundation, or if we had overestimated the ability of Mao and Chou to deal with their internal opposition to such a visit, then all our long careful efforts would be wasted. I might even have to be prepared for serious international embarrassment if the Chinese decided to reject my proposal and then publicize it. (page 550-551)

Extensive preparation assuaged the wost of fears. On June 2, 1971, a message arrived from the White House through the Pakistani Embassy from the PRC: Chairman Mao had accepted RN to Peking for direct talks.

Less than a year later, RN and Mao were ready “to turn a page in history,” said Dr. Kissinger.

But he warned not to rest easy as our  dealings would “require reliability, precision, and finesse.”

Who Was America’s First “Pacific” President?

November 21, 2009 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under Asia, Barack Obama, China, Presidents, U.S. History | Leave a Comment 

George Will’s latest column in Newsweek discusses President Obama’s much-disputed claim, during his just-concluded trip to Asia, that he is America’s “first Pacific President” because he was born in Hawaii and raised there and in Indonesia. Other pundits in recent days have discussed twentieth-century Chief Executives in this regard – Richard Nixon’s status as a California native, William Howard Taft’s years a century ago as governor of the Philippines, Herbert Hoover’s years as a mining engineer in Australia and China. But Will looks into the relationship of nineteenth-century Presidents to Asia.

Now, it is true that, from the very earliest days of the Republic, the nation’s leaders have had Asia in mind, long before any American territory had a Pacific coastline. George Washington was often in communication with businessmen like Robert Morris about trade with China. Thomas Jefferson took the step of acquiring the Louisiana Purchase territory from Napoleon so that the United States could one day develop ports from which ships could cross the Pacific without bothering, in those pre-Panama Canal days, with Cape Horn.

But, as Will indicates, the resident of the White House who really undertook the first sizable effort to establish America as a significant power in the Pacific was Millard Fillmore. The thirteenth President has, of course, long been a figure of fun, perhaps best known to some Americans for lending his name (with the Millard changed to Mallard) to the web-footed right-wing journalist in Bruce Tinsley’s comic strip.

But Fillmore was a man of several considerable achievements. Born, like Lincoln, in a log cabin in upstate New York, he pursued his education in country schools and law offices, and worked his way up the ladder of the legal profession in Buffalo. A few years before being elected Vice-President on the ticket headed by Gen. Zachary Taylor, he founded a college which ultimately became the State University of New York at Buffalo, now the biggest school in the biggest higher-education establishment in the nation.

(It was for this achievement, as well as his deeds as President, that Oxford University wanted to award Fillmore with an honorary doctorate of laws degree when he visited England after leaving office in 1855. But Fillmore declined the honor on the grounds that his achievements and educational attainments did not merit it. He also said that he had never learned Latin and felt that a man should not accept a degree that he could not read himself. As we all know, President Obama was quick to say his achievements to date did not merit a Nobel Peace Prize, but that’s not stopping him from receiving it next month.)

Just after Fillmore took office, California joined the Union, followed soon after by Oregon. With trade to China increasing, Fillmore decided, in 1852, that the time had come for the nation of Japan to emerge from nearly two centuries of isolation in which it had traded only with China and the Netherlands. Therefore, he directed Commodore Matthew Perry to go to that land. Perry led his group of what the Japanese called “black ships” to the city then known as Edo (now Tokyo) and there told the Japanese emperor’s representatives that the United States wished to open relations with the nation, and would not take no for an answer.

Perry then went home, and, the next year (with Franklin Pierce now in the White House), came back to Edo to hear the Japanese government’s response. The emperor agreed to open his nation to the outside world, and thus began the process that ultimately made both nations among the world’s most important commercial powers – and which ultimately led to Hawaii, our current President’s home, becoming part of the United States.

So let’s give old Millard a little credit.

A Tough Act To Follow

November 20, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

At Foreign Policy, William Moss argues that RN raised the bar so high in terms of Sino-American relations, that its been a tough act to follow, especially for President Obama:

State visits are all about harnessing symbolism. When Henry Kissinger went to China in 1971 to negotiate for Richard Nixon’s historic visit, the Chinese agreed to time the announcement of the invitation so that the American press could hit their then-weekly news cycle. Nixon’s visit the following year symbolized the end of more than 20 years of antagonism.

All subsequent U.S. presidents visiting China have struggled with Nixon’s legacy. Some things have changed since 1972, not least the antediluvian idea of a weekly news cycle, but presidential visits to China remain more symbolic than substantive. Years of diplomatic spade work drive actual policy changes, leaving government communication offices, pundits, and journalists to construct a narrative from stage-managed vignettes, choreographed meetings, and turgid communiqués, or to pull odds and ends from the margins. Different agendas produce different narratives, and sometimes the real picture emerges from the totality of coverage, like a poster emerging from a mosaic of small photographs.

That was the case with President Barack Obama’s widely heralded visit to China. Expectations were high. China’s significance in global affairs has blossomed in the past decade. A charismatic and more multilaterally inclined U.S. president, a resurgent and confident China, and a host of headline-dominating issues including climate change, trade, and the aftermath of the financial crisis suggested a visit that, while not approaching the magnitude of 1972, could at least be substantive.

Meet James Humes

November 18, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

Historian James Humes will be at the Nixon Library on December 7^th at 7 pm to discuss his new book “’Only Nixon:” His Trip To China Revisited And Restudied.

Only Nixon is his riveting behind-the-scenes account of the circumstances that led to President Nixon’s opening to China in 1972.

In Only Nixon, Humes takes readers through the development and isolation of Communist China, RN’s reemergence on the world stage, and the diplomatic preparations for the first ever visit by an American president.

Humes notes that French President Charles de Gaulle had this advice for RN when he returned to high office: “If you are not ready to make war, make peace, but make it on a very strong basis, from strength rather than weakness.”

It was from this conversation where RN learned the word “détente,” French for “the lessening of tensions,” a diplomatic triumph that RN would not only later achieve with China and the Soviet Union but one that changed the course of history.

Humes will be introduced by the President’s younger brother Ed Nixon. His lecture will be followed by book signing.

Tickets are $8 ($6 for members). Buy them here or call (714) 993-5075

The Path That RN Blazed

November 18, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Barack Obama, China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

Nixon Center Starr fellow and TNN contributor Drew Thompson is also in Beijing this week. Today he did an interview form AMNY Magazine in which he discusses the impact of RN’s historic trip:

Obama’s trip will be one of relationship “maintenance” that “puts the bow” on negotiations done by both countries in recent years, said Drew Thompson, director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center in Washington, D.C. Nixonian breakthroughs so groundbreaking they inspire operas (as Nixon’s did in 1987) won’t be on the agenda.

Televised images of Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong meeting inside the People’s Republic of China were almost incomprehensible. Such a mission coming from another president would have been considered suspect, but everyone knew Nixon was not soft on communism. Observers say that reputation gave Nixon needed cover to famously open the door to China, exploiting divides between China and the Soviets and recalibrating the global balance of power at the height of the Cold War.

Obama will be performing to expectations; the real shock would come if he aggressively took on taboo subjects such as human rights and Tibet.

Read the whole story here.

Thinking Back On History

November 18, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

Today at The Daily Telegraph:

In 1972, Richard Nixon broke through the barriers of the Cold War and visited China on an equally cold and clear day.

“My hope is that in the future, perhaps as a result of the beginning that we have made on this journey, that many, many Americans… will have an opportunity to come here,” Nixon said in 1972, at the same steep, curving Badaling section of the wall.

Nixon hoped “that they will think back as I think back to the history of this great people, and that they will have an opportunity, as we have had an opportunity, to know the Chinese people, and know them better”.

Worth 2000 Words

November 18, 2009 by Frank Gannon | Filed Under Barack Obama, China, History, News media, Pat Nixon, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

37: February 1972

44: November 2009.
The White House ID for downloading this photo is “hero_greatwall_LJ-01-60″

Obama Follows In RN’s Footsteps

November 17, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

From USA Today’s David Jackson:

“Surely, we have known setbacks and challenges over the last 30 years,” Obama said. “Our relationship has not been without disagreement and difficulty. But the notion that we must be adversaries is not predestined. … Indeed, because of our cooperation, both the United States and China are more prosperous and more secure.”

Nixon and foreign policy guru Henry Kissinger would not be surprised at the economic and military rise of China. The potential of Chinese power is one reason Nixon and Kissinger made their approach to the communist government led by Mao Zedong.

Global politics played another role. Nixon saw a new relationship with China as a way to pressure the Soviet Union.

At the time, the Chinese and the Russians hated each other more than either hated the U.S. The Soviets became eager for a U.S. summit after news of Nixon’s visit surfaced.

While much of this was known at the time, it was still shocking for many Americans to see Nixon, of all people, in what his supporters like to call Red China.

More than a few commentators said at the time that if another president had ventured to China, the long line of critics would have been led by Nixon. Hence the political phrase: Only Nixon could go to China.

Today, the United States is seeking stronger ties throughout Asia, from India to Indonesia, in part to balance the rising power of Asia.

Obama is now the seventh president to have visited China. It’s hard to say where the U.S.-Chinese relationship will end up, whether as a growing partnership or a Cold War-like rivalry.

Consider the fact that when Kissinger asked Mao about the historical impact of the French Revolution, Mao replied it was “too soon to tell.”

“Surely, we have known setbacks and challenges over the last 30 years,” Obama said. “Our relationship has not been without disagreement and difficulty. But the notion that we must be adversaries is not predestined. … Indeed, because of our cooperation, both the United States and China are more prosperous and more secure.”

Nixon and foreign policy guru Henry Kissinger would not be surprised at the economic and military rise of China. The potential of Chinese power is one reason Nixon and Kissinger made their approach to the communist government led by Mao Zedong.

Global politics played another role. Nixon saw a new relationship with China as a way to pressure the Soviet Union.

At the time, the Chinese and the Russians hated each other more than either hated the U.S. The Soviets became eager for a U.S. summit after news of Nixon’s visit surfaced.

While much of this was known at the time, it was still shocking for many Americans to see Nixon, of all people, in what his supporters like to call Red China.

More than a few commentators said at the time that if another president had ventured to China, the long line of critics would have been led by Nixon. Hence the political phrase: Only Nixon could go to China.

Today, the United States is seeking stronger ties throughout Asia, from India to Indonesia, in part to balance the rising power of Asia.

Obama is now the seventh president to have visited China. It’s hard to say where the U.S.-Chinese relationship will end up, whether as a growing partnership or a Cold War-like rivalry.

Consider the fact that when Kissinger asked Mao about the historical impact of the French Revolution, Mao replied it was “too soon to tell.”

It’s impossible to predict history, but we can be fairly sure that Nixon’s first visit will be discussed for decades to come.

RN, China, and Bowing

November 17, 2009 by Jack Pitney | Filed Under Barack Obama, China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

The Politico has a clip of RN appearing to bow to Mao.  Jim Pinkerton comments: “This footage, at 1:24, of Nixon’s bow was not at all a bow, as Obama bowed. Nixon clearly just shook his hand, and then bowed as someone was obviously paying him a compliment. Much different. And I am not being ironic. Much different.” 

 On RN’s death, John Gardner wrote in the Harvard Crimson:  “The trip to China was a strategic gambit of vast importance. At the depth of the Cold War, Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai saw how china and America could work together. America’s involvement with China strengthened the hand of those who sought to turn away from the excesses of Maoism, including Zhou’s heir, Deng Xiaoping.”  And in an email, John adds:  “Look at :24 of the clip:  he stuck out his hand to greet Zhou Enlai very quickly, even before leaving the steps of Air Force One – widely seen and interpreted as a gesture to make up for Dulles’s refusal to shake hands with Zhou at the Geneva Conference in 1954 (when, of course, Nixon was VP).”

Communicating In Shanghai

November 17, 2009 by Frank Gannon | Filed Under China, History, International Affairs, Nixon Administration, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

On the shoulders of giants: President Obama at his town meeting in Shanghai.*

In his speech today, at his town meeting at Shanghai’s Fudan University, President Obama acknowledged the role —if not the name— of his Pacific Rim presidential predecessor who, after twenty-five years of non-communication and angry isolation, opened the door to relations between the U.S. and  China.

It was here, 37 years ago, that the Shanghai Communiqué opened the door to a new chapter of engagement between our governments and among our people.

The Shanghai Communiqué was issued on the final day of RN’s seven days in China —”the week that changed the world”— and, as he described it in RN, it represented something new and straightforward:

Our joint statement, issued from Shanghai at the end of the trip, has become known as the Shanghai Communiqué.

Following the formula Kissinger had worked out during Polo II, the communiqué broke diplomatic ground by stating frankly the significant differences between the two dies on major issues rather than smoothing them over.  Thus the text is surprisingly lively for a diplomatic document.

The first substantive section begins: “The U.S. side stated” and then details our positions on each of the major issues discussed.  This is folowed by a section that begins: “The Chinese side stated” and then covers the same ground in counterpoint.

February 1971: RN and Chou En Lai meet in Shanghai.

Here is the surprisingly lively text in full:

Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People’s Republic of China.

February 27, 1972

(Two versions of the Shanghai Communiqué were signed, one in English and one in Chinese. The American version had the US position first, whereas the Chinese version had the Chinese position at top.  The following is the US version.)

PRESIDENT Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People’s Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People’s Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest, and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi P’engfei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.” It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the cease fire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People’s Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:
–progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
–both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
–neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
–neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan, …. one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the people of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People’s Republic of China.

*If you download this photo from the White House website, the desktop file is “heroshanghaiATH-PS-0421″

Obama Is The New Nixon

November 16, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

A writer from Columbia University’s student newspaper draws a compelling comparison:

President Obama’s visit to China, much like Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972, may mark a new era of diplomatic ties between the two nations. I have heard some say that wars will break out between China and the U.S. over natural resources in the next 50 years—I beg to differ. The economic interdependence between the two nations will render such conflicts unlikely—cutting all economic ties during a war would simply deal too much damage to make such a conflict worthwhile. The future of international relations is no longer about state versus state. Rather, it is the collective states versus our common obstacles, such as global warming. As students and future leaders, we should believe in a positive outlook and actively engage ourselves in understanding the differences across cultures. Many of us are already doing so. Students in both countries have started actively engaging each other in recent years. Student-run organizations, along with academic institutions such as the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia and the US-China Institute at the University of Southern California, are spurring greater cross-cultural collaboration. International student networks such as the Columbia-based Global China Connection, which operates 37 university chapters in North America, along with campus organizations such as the Columbia University Chinese Students and Scholars Association and the Business School’s Greater China Society, are promoting substantive interactions with China. From that point of view, I see the future of U.S.-China relations looking brighter than ever before.

Ever Since RN……

November 16, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

We could workout Sino-American challenges (NY Times editorial):

Ever since Richard Nixon opened the door in 1972, all presidents have faced a balancing act with China. For President Obama, who arrived in China on Sunday, the challenge is even tougher and more urgent. He needs Beijing’s help on a host of hugely important and extremely difficult problems, including stabilizing the global financial system, curbing global warming, prying away North Korea’s nuclear weapons, and ensuring that Iran doesn’t get to build any.

Someone’s Fond Of Nixon To China Analogies

November 4, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Environmental issues, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

On his Twitter account, Senator John Kerry again invokes the watershed moment in terms of climate change:

US Chamber letter urges action on climate change, need to test whether this is a Nixon to China moment.

The Hill explains from their Twitter room:

He referenced President Richard Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China, which has lent itself to a saying meant to describe an uncharacteristic political act.

The Chamber in June opposed the House’s version of climate change legislation, calling it a “job killing measure.” The business group has recently found itself between the White House’s crosshairs for its opposition to its key legislative initiatives, including the cap-and-trade climate bill.

Republicans on the EPW committee have attempted to stall the negotiations by boycotting committee hearings on the bill, saying it needs more study from experts. Chairman Boxer has said she would like her panel to pass a bill before the Copenhagen climate conference in December.

The test about which Kerry spoke may be in response to a warning from top Chamber lobbyist Bruce Josten. He wrote in the letter:

The Chamber will continue to oppose bad policies that resemble the failed climate proposals of the past, such as bills that jeopardize American jobs, create trade inequalities, leave open the Clean Air Act, open the door to CO2-based mass tort litigation, and further hamper the permitting process for clean energy.

He concluded, however:

But the Chamber believes Senators Kerry, Graham, and the other named Senators have taken a constructive and positive stand on global climate change and energy security, rising above partisan politics and opening a real discussion on how to address this important issue.

Josten’s letter also praised an October New York Times op-ed by Kerry and Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham (S.C.) that called for “aggressive reductions in our emissions of the carbon gases that cause climate change.”

The New Realpolititik?

October 23, 2009 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under Barack Obama, China, International Affairs, National Security, Presidents, Richard Nixon, U.S. History | 1 Comment 

Ever since President Obama’s took the oath of office twice last January, he’s been compared by pundits to every previous Chief Executive since Millard Fillmore or at least Chester Alan Arthur. For the last week the Nixon comparisons have flown hot and heavy; next week it may be time for “the new FDR” to have another go-round. A few hours ago, writing at the Atlantic’s site, former Congressman Mickey Edwards, a co-founder of the Heritage Foundation who made waves last year by supporting Obama’s election, has, wonder of wonders, managed to compare Obama to someone not a President. (Though an implicit comparison to a previous President’s foreign policy is made.) He argues that:

The thing about the presidency, though, is that one invariably finds issues more complicated than they might have appeared from the campaign trail. Here, while one’s heart may echo Jefferson, one’s responsibilities make Washington’s sense of caution more appealing. Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon’s Secretary of State, is known as the most prominent modern proponent of a “realpolitik” approach toward foreign policy in which, in the end, the most important factor in deciding a national approach to other nations is quite simple: “What is in America’s interest”?

That alone is a difficult question. It was once thought to be in America’s “interest” to ally itself with some of the worst dictators on the planet: we not only allied ourselves with, but embraced, the Batistas, the Somozas, the Shahs, the Noriegas, and while those short-term alliances may have been of some use in dealing with Soviet expansionism (a real threat at the time), we have clearly paid a long-term price for such narrowness of purpose. But the world is not easy. One wishes for more democracy, more freedom, more protection from abuse in all the places where these rights are in short supply. But there are other considerations and they necessarily impinge on the decisionmaking process. In that intra-cranial showdown, it now appears that it is the “hard” side, the perceived necessity of setting aside one’s empathies, that has captured Barack Obama’s thinking.

Well….this discussion of the President’s “inner Kissinger” (as the post is titled) might come as news to the Nobel Peace Prize committee, which, when defending its surprising choice of Obama as this year’s laureate, seemed to think that his handling of foreign policy suggested a Wilsonian idealism far removed from what it evidently viewed as the unspeakable savagery of his predecessor. (Whereas President Bush’s reasons for leading a war to bring democrary to Iraq, and by extension to the Mideast, were thoroughly Wilsonian, predicated on a belief that ordinary Iraqis deserved the right to self-determination.)

Edwards cites, to prove his argument, such incidents as the President’s disinclination to meet with the Dalai Lama during the latter’s visit to Washington this month, and his efforts to engage with the government of Sudan over the Darfur issue. But for every such case, there can be found one that contradicts the idea that Obama’s foreign policy is always focused, in a hard-nosed way, on America’s best interests.

It would seem, for one thing, that our best interests do not involve strengthening Hugo Chavez’s “Bolivarist” regime in Venezuela, with its habit of seeking to destabilize its neighbors. But in the last few months the State Department and the White House have sought to penalize Honduras after that nation removed its president, a Chavez ally seeking to override his nation’s constitution and serve an additional term in defiance of the country’s supreme court. This disregard of a new, pro-American government hardly suggests Realpolitik in action.

The Obama administration’s decision to remove missile defense installations from Poland and Czechoslovakia, which the Nobel committee cited as a reason to give Obama the prize for Peace (a reason heartily seconded by Russian officials), also does not conform to realpolitik in the classic tradition. When President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger made the historic move to bring the People’s Republic of China out of its isolation, they also maintained America’s defense agreements with Taiwan. The Nixon/Kissinger approach to realpolitik was to reach out to nations which had been in conflict with the United States, in order to make a world in which American interests were strengthened, while taking care to maintain productive ties to America’s allies. So far, Obama’s foreign-policy approach has produced no similar strengthening of American interests and some of our allies feel threatened and less secure as a result of the White House’s actions.

Living The Nixon Legacy

October 22, 2009 by Jimmy Byron | Filed Under China, Nixon Foundation, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

(Photo credit, Gary Byron Photography): Murals of President and Mrs. Nixon’s landmark voyage of peace to the People’s Republic of China are on display at South Coast Plaza.

I had always assumed that ping-pong was a relatively easy game –the activity that one plays at a party, more or less. Usually reserved as the place my mom puts the chips and dip when we entertain my friends, our ping-pong table does not receive much use. Boy, did I have a lot to learn… Outside of North America, table tennis is a worldwide phenomenon, even largely regarded to be the national sport of the People’s Republic of China.

In my three years with the Nixon Foundation, I have been privileged and honored to have been involved in planning and setting up Foundation events. In August 2009, Foundation VP Sandy Quinn and Marketing Director Anthony Curtis took me to one of their working lunches with Werner Escher, Director of International Marketing at South Coast Plaza. The conversation’s light banter drifted around many subjects, though the purpose of the lunch was to discuss and plan Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Rematch, to be held at South Coast Plaza in October. I presented Werner with a few press items from our enormously successful Ping-Pong Diplomacy event last summer to use for reference.

(Photo credit, Gary Byron Photography): Chinese dancers perform traditional dances in which they used fans emblazoned with the American flag.

I arrived at South Coast Plaza the early morning of October 17. What I would witness and be a part of that day would change my opinion of ping-pong and only strengthen my respect for the South Coast Plaza management and, of course, our team at the Foundation.

In a representation of the cooperation and trust between the U.S. and China, ten murals chronicling President and Mrs. Nixon’s historic 1972 trip to the People’s Republic served as a dramatic bridge in the Bloomingdales wing of the complex. I spoke to a gentleman, a spectator, who told me about his admiration for President Nixon, brought about as a result of the President’s landmark foreign policy initiatives, most significantly the normalization in Sino-American relations; Sandy Quinn began his remarks by echoing that sentiment.

The day began with traditional Chinese dances in which the decorative fans the dancers quickly snapped shut were emblazoned with an American flag pattern. It was truly a significant, remarkable, and poignant display, one that symbolized well the bond between our two nations.

(Photo credit: Gary Byron Photography): Spectators watch as table tennis champions compete.

But perhaps that bond would not have been established were it not for the U.S. Table Tennis team. At the start of his administration, President Nixon began sending subtle overtures to China, seeking better relations between the two nations. As it so happened, the U.S. Table Tennis team was competing in Japan in April 1971, during which they received invitations to compete against the Chinese Table Tennis team in Communist China, an extremely rare outreach to Americans by the Chinese government. The President’s messages had been received and China reciprocated via ping-pong, thus the term “Ping Pong Diplomacy” was coined. With both sides having indicated a willingness to cooperate, the Nixon administration was able to further its diplomatic efforts.

The four table tennis champions introduced at South Coast Plaza had all competed in the Olympics, representing the United States and China. As they began warming up, I was genuinely shocked by their methods of play: their stances, their positions around the table, the way they held their paddles. I never knew that so much went into it! The play-by-play commentator, ping-pong champ Adam Bobrow, whose humorous personality and upbeat attitude was on display throughout the day (just check out this video as a sample of Adam’s persona), would routinely explain procedures and different techniques the athletes were using.

Nixon Foundation Vice President Sandy Quinn (left) and Director of Marketing Anthony Curtis (right) greet Werner Escher (middle), Director of Marketing at South Coast Plaza.

Shoppers began appearing at the sidelines, and more stopped to watch two and three levels above the arena. All were mesmerized by the captivating back-and-forth. Over 2,000 spectators came to watch the Olympians, collegiate athletes, and youth challengers. A few were even lucky enough to “challenge the champs;” young and old took the paddles and tried their luck. Of the thirty or so who participated, one gentleman even defeated a champion!

Youth champions compete in front of large crowds.

Visitors both young and old alike challenged the ping pong champions as a part of the “challenge the champ” feature in the program.

The experience shared between the players, and the continued goodwill between America and China is proof of President Nixon’s vision of bringing East and West together. Hundreds of shoppers wandered between the murals, studying famous images of the trip that started it all, “the week that changed the world.”

Shoppers read the murals of President and Mrs. Nixon’s 1972 trip to China.

I invite you to visit the Bloomingdale’s wing of South Coast Plaza to view the murals of the President and First Lady’s historic trip on display through the first week of November.

“Seeing The Writing On The Wall”

October 17, 2009 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under China, Healthcare, Nixon family, Presidents, Richard Nixon, U.S. History | Leave a Comment 

Tony Panaccio at postchronicle.com has an article about Ed Nixon, the last of the five brothers that included the 37th President. and author of The Nixons: A Family Portrait. In the article Ed speaks of RN’s visionary health-care plan:

“My brother’s offer to address healthcare was genuine, and it stemmed from his feeling that we needed tighter regulation on the insurance industry [...] He knew back then what was on the horizon, seeing the writing on the wall three decades before the storm.”

Ed also points out that the concerns of the People’s Republic of China concerning the increased Soviet military presence in the Pacific helped make possible his brother’s groundbreaking trip to the PRC in 1972:

“While President Reagan is largely credited for ending the Cold War, the seeds were planted during the Nixon administration. This issue was of significant strategic interest to both China and the U.S. at the time, and working together to keep the Soviets in check was a key element that led to the fall of the Soviet republic. If they couldn’t expand, they would not have the economic base to support their massive military budget. When their expansion ceased, it helped hasten their fate.”

The Statue In Yorba Linda

October 1, 2009 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under China, Cold War, Nixon Library, Nixon in the News, Presidents, Richard Nixon, U.S. History, Yorba Linda | 6 Comments 

“Leader’s Exhibit:” A statue of Mao ZeDong is featured with the bronze likenesses of nine other world leaders during RN’s presidency at the Nixon Library.

Today, as is noted elsewhere at TNN, the People’s Republic of China celebrates its sixtieth anniversary. The day is being marked with celebrations throughout that nation and in Chinese communities around the world. But there are also a considerable Chinese with a profound distrust and dislike of Communism who are, here and there, registering their protests of the PRC’s policies.

Probably the largest number of active protesters are associated with the Falun Gong movement, but there are also some whose animosity toward the PRC’s institutions is very personal and heartfelt. One of these people is Kai Chen. Chen is a 56-year-old resident of Los Angeles in the real-estate business. He was born in the People’s Republic, into a family associated to some degree with the Kuomintang party of Chiang Kai-shek, who had, in 1949, been forced to leave the mainland for Taiwan. This status meant that Chen’s family suffered considerably in the Cultural Revolution, and that he was, as a teenager, denied a university education and sent to work in the countryside.

However, it happened that by the age of fifteen, Chen had reached the height of six-foot-seven, quite unusual for a Chinese, and, around the same time, discovered the game of basketball. By this time the Cultural Revolution was moving toward its final stages and the PRC’s premier, Zhou Enlai, envisioned basketball as one of the sports that might enable his country to end its twenty years of comparative isolation and reach out to the world.

Of course, the big breakthrough in this area came when the PRC’s ping-pong team, after playing against its US counterpart in Japan, invited the Americans to China, which dovetailed with behind-the-scenes diplomatic overtures and helped make possible President Nixon’s historic trip to China in February 1972. But although it would take a few more decades before players like Yao Ming became NBA superstars, the Chinese basketball team, on which Chen played for a time, played a significant part in the 1970s and 1980s in building friendly relations between the PRC and the West.

In 1981, Chen moved to Los Angeles to further his education. After obtaining his degree from UCLA, he went into business in California, found success in his field, and raised a family. But his memories of his mistreatment in the China of Mao Zedong have remained, and, as such interviews as this one (and his 2007 autobiography One In A Billion) show, he feels that not only was he exploited as an athlete for the political purposes of a regime he has long detested, but that Beijing has continued to use sports in the same way to the present, most spectacularly in the 2008 Summer Olympics.

Last year, Chen visited the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace in Yorba Linda, and entered the room which features one of its most prominent and written-about exhibits. What he found there upset him, and led to the protest which he made, with several others at the Library today.

When the original staff of the Library was planning the building’s permanent exhibits two decades ago, they decided to devote one of the rooms to a set of life-size bronze statues of nine men and one woman, from around the world, whose leadership qualities had formed the subject of individual chapters in Leaders, one of RN’s most readable and fascinating books. The ten statespersons selected for the Hall of World Leaders were, alphabetically, Konrad Adenauer, Leonid Brezhnev, Winston Churchill, Charles De Gaulle, Nikita Khruschchev, Mao Zedong, Golda Meir, Anwar al-Sadat, and Shigeru Yoshida, and Zhou Enlai. In the exhibit Mao and Zhou are depicted sitting on couches, much in the way that they had talked with Nixon during his trip in 1972; the others are standing. Near the statues is this quote from the President: “They are leaders who have made a difference. Not because they wished it, but because they have willed it.”

When Chen came to the Library, he was angry that Mao, a person he regards as a mass murderer comparable to Hitler and Stalin, was featured among the other leaders, and he wrote about this to Timothy Naftali, the current director of the Nixon Library. Chen’s letter and Naftali’s response can be found here.

For a while, word of Chen’s dismay with Mao’s presence in the Hall was limited to his own website and to a handful of blogs. But yesterday the Los Angeles Times published Mike Anton’s article describing the controvery and Chen’s plan to stage a protest. In it, Chen is quoted as saying: “Mao was the biggest mass murderer in human history. His hands were dipped in the blood of American soldiers who fought in Korea and Vietnam. … How can that image be put alongside world leaders like Winston Churchill and De Gaulle? It’s a perversion of American freedom. You don’t put an anti-American symbol in a U.S. museum.” Naftali wrote to Chen that he personally was less comfortable with having a statue of Mao in the room than was the case with the other leaders, and his view of the issue, as reported in the Times article, is much the same:

“I think having a statue of a person in a museum can imply respect,” he said. “I thought there might very well be confusion among visitors. With Churchill, Meir and Sadat all in the same room, there is an equivalency there and the implication that they’re all alike. They were not all alike. Mao was a mass murderer.

“It seemed to me out of place in a publicly funded museum,” Naftali added. “I don’t think it’s the best way to teach history.”

Naftali’s remarks have met with some puzzlement and criticism from those who worked, full-time or on a volunteer basis, at the Nixon Library during the decade and a half that it was operated by the Richard Nixon Foundation before becoming a part of the National Archives group of presidential libraries a few years ago. In all that time, Foundation assistant director Sandy Quinn told Jessica Terrell of the Orange County Register yesterday, no visitor made a complaint about Mao’s being featured in the Hall. Since Chen’s correspondence with Naftali a notice has been put in the Hall saying that the presence of these ten figures in the room does not constitute an endorsement of all of their policies.

The questions that Chen’s protests raise are not that easy to dismiss. The website of the NBC station in Los Angeles played the controversy for laughs today with an article titled “Pinko, Commie Statues Shock, Offend At Nixon Library.” The piece is credited to Olsen Ebright and Joseph McCarthy (presumably not that one, returned to earth at age 101) and is illustrated with the familiar photo of RN flashing the double V at the entrance to the helicopter on August 9, 1974 – but tinted as pink as, presumably, the late Helen Gahagan Douglas’s underwear.

However, Chen is deeply serious about his complaint, and his years of trauma in the turbulent China of the 1950s and 1960s make his anger at Mao’s presence in the Hall understandable. But I don’t think the founder of modern China should be removed from his couch. Mao is in the Hall because, although he wrested power violently from the Kuomintang regime in a civil war that killed tens of millions; although his misguided ideas of a “Great Leap Forward” and a Cultural Revolution brought about the deaths of millions more; and although his troops bitterly fought United States and United Nations forces for two and a half bloody years in Korea, in his last seven years he sought, with Zhou, to set aside violence and extend the hand of friendship to the United States. President Nixon reached out as well, and, with substantial help from Dr. Henry Kissinger, Winston Lord, Dwight Chapin and Foundation president Ron Walker, and many others, the stage was set for the handshake at the Shanghai tarmac between Nixon and Zhou, and the meeting with Mao, which ended almost a quarter-century of suspicion and hostility, helped prevent the possibility of a third world war between the superpowers, and made possible ties which have been truly beneficial to both countries.

As former Library director, TNN’s John Taylor, points out here, Nixon was a lifelong anti-Communist. He spent more time face-to-face with Chiang Kai-shek than with Mao. But in his years as Vice President, he was ready to have a dialogue with the Soviet Union, in the years after it emerged from Stalin’s shadow, and so met Khruschchev and then, as President, Brezhnev. Both of those men had been part of Stalin’s savage world for decades in their early careers, but when they came to power, they proved able to move beyond that awful legacy.

And so, too, did Mao and Zhou, in the years after 1969, make their efforts to move beyond the chaos, misery and isolation of the Cultural Revolution. That’s why these four men are in the Hall of Leaders – because they met that ultimate test of leadership, to try to make a more peaceful world for coming generations.

No Realignment, Therefore No Nixon-To-China

October 1, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

At Foreignpolicy.com Patrick Clawson takes former National Security officials Flynn and Hillary Everett to task on their pro-engagement stance on Iran, arguing instead for engagement with the regime’s opposition, a strategy that might actually bear realignment:

One problem with the Leveretts’ analysis is that Iran has a vibrant opposition with its own views on U.S. engagement efforts. Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi vigorously argues that the international community should refuse to deal with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, since he stole the June presidential election. Noted dissident Akbar Ganji, in a petition signed by such notables as Noam Chomsky and Jurgen Habermas, argued that when Ahmadinejad visited the United Nations he should have been arrested for crimes against humanity.

For the United States to align itself with such a government would be to kick the opposition in the teeth. The Islamic Republic has shown that it is neither Islamic nor a republic — in the elegant phrasing of Iran’s respected “dissident ayatollah,” Ali Montazeri. And now it is running scared. The regime is afraid to kill protesters, since doing so only inflames the opposition. At the September 19 Quds Day protests, it did not even arrest them, aware of how socially explosive the accusations of retaliatory prison rape have been. In contrast, protesters were bold enough to stand next to Ahmadinejad and shout “resign, resign” when he was interviewed on state television. When a repressive regime is too afraid to kill or silence those brave enough to stand up to it, it does not bode well for that regime.

Rather than do as the Leveretts suggest and embrace Ahmadinejad, the United States must align itself with the rising alternative to the president and his thugs. Jimmy Carter once toasted the shah for running “an island of stability” a year before his overthrow. Barack Obama should not make the same mistake of presuming the ruling power will remain in control.

Another problem with the Everetts’ analysis is that Iran and the United States don’t face a common and significant threat:

But what is the common threat faced by the United States and Iran today? Al Qaeda is not a plausible candidate, given that the Islamic Republic has for years played footsie with the terrorist group, providing al Qaeda in Iraq with its most lethal weapons, for instance. Tactical cooperation against al Qaeda when Iran sees a momentary advantage is the best the United States can expect.

MSNBC: Remembering Nixon’s Visit To China

October 1, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

MSNBC is featuring archival footage on their website of RN’s historic visit and diplomatic tour de force:

China At Sixty

October 1, 2009 by Drew Thompson | Filed Under China | Leave a Comment 

Mao Ze Dong proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949.

Drew Thompson is the Director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center

China celebrates the 60th anniversary of its founding today. The massive military parade, propaganda films and genuine outpouring of pride by the Chinese people are befitting China’s growing clout and influence. I can not forget sitting up at midnight on July 1, 1997 when Hong Kong was handed over to China and a smaller parade of military vehicles crossed the border into the New Territories to establish the PLA’s garrison in Hong Kong. That day was a lavish celebration too, replete with fireworks, pageantry and testaments to the late Deng Xiaoping who successfully strategized a key component of China’s reunification. I recall editorializing at the time that it was quite a party and the first opportunity for China to celebrate since 1949.

Mao Zedong was the master of ceremonies on October 1, 1949, and he will again be front and center today, his portrait overlooking Chang An Avenue and Tiananmen Square a few feet below where he stood 60 years ago and announced the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Some of Chairman Mao’s most disastrous decisions – particularly the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution – help explain why the Chinese people had so few milestones to celebrate in the 48 years prior to Hong Kong’s return.

But there is a reason Mao’s portrait continues to enjoy pride of place on the Gate of Heavenly Peace and his face is on every denomination of China’s currency. The Communist Party’s victory in the civil war and subsequent nation-building efforts laid the foundation for modern China, earning Chairman Mao recognition as the founding father of the nation. Mao’s legacy is undoubtedly flawed and the
Party is unwilling at the moment to engage in introspection over the tumultuous years of his rule, preferring instead to recognize that he made mistakes but his contributions to the nation outweigh his misjudgments.

While that might not be satisfying to some, to others, it is fitting that the Party and people of China continue to focus on the future. I expect that spirit of forward-looking optimism to pervade the festivities and national pride felt by the Chinese people on their nation’s 60th anniversary.

Palin, 37, And 37 Years Ago

September 30, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon, Sarah Palin | Leave a Comment 

An overlooked part of former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin’s speech in Hong Kong earlier this month notes that a constructive Sino-American relationship is predicated on what 37 accomplished thirty-seven years ago:

Nothing of what I am saying should be seen as meaning conflict with China is inevitable. Quite the contrary. As I said, we welcome China’s responsible rise. America and China stood together against fascism during World War II, before ravages took over in China – we were ready to stand together with China to shape international politics after World War II. Much has been accomplished since President Nixon’s fateful visit. And again, we stand ready to work with what we hope will be a more open and responsible China on the challenges facing the 21st century.

(Hat Tip: Tom Van Oosterom)

In Nixon’s Spirit, “We Go To China”

September 28, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

As Tennessee State Senator Mark Norris embarks on a state trade mission to China, he remembers the “metaphor for the incredible:”

News today of the death of William Safire, speechwriter to President Richard Nixon during his 1972 visit to China, evokes memories of my early impressions of the world I am about to see.

As an undergraduate in the early 1970’s, I was a student of political science and foreign policy. It was the era of Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, the end of the Vietnam War and the “normalization of relations” with China.

“Nixon to China” became a metaphor for the incredible. That the ardent anti-Communist would be the first U.S. President to visit China in 1972 revolutionized foreign affairs.

Of China, Napolean said, “There lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep! For when he wakes he will move the world.” Nixon recognized the giant had awakened and moved toward a rapprochement that, until the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, was likely the most dramatic event of the postwar era.

He wrote about it in his treatise on the end of the Twentieth Century, “1999, Victory without War,” (Simon and Schuster, 1988) and acknowledged the metamorphosis:

“The modern world cannot afford the risk of misunderstandings and misjudgments that can occur when powerful nations fail to communicate in spite of their differences. Our estrangement from China, justified though it may have been on purely ideological grounds, was an ideological luxury neither we nor they could afford any longer.”

“In the long run the Sino-U.S. relationship will endure not because of fear but because of hope….We have nothing to lose from friendship with each other; we have everything to gain.”

It is in that spirit we now go to China.

The New Envoy To China And The Nixon White House

September 14, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Nixon Administration, Nixon Administration figures, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

Newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to China — and former Utah Governor — Jon Huntsman faces the new challenge of strengthening Sino-American ties on “big picture issues” diverse as the global economy, energy and climate change.

Aside from being the former U.S. Ambassador to Singapore, a Mormon missionary in Taiwan, and fluent in Mandarin, he is among the privileged to participate in one of the most spectacular diplomatic performances by an American President:

He also recounted his own childhood experience: how as an 11-year-old he was at the White House where his father was working as a staff assistant. It was 1971 and Secretary of State Kissinger invited him to his office and let him take his bag to his car before setting out on one of the path-breaking trips to China, which led to the re-establishment of relations in 1979.

“The part I remember best was when I said where are you going?” Mr. Huntsman said. “He said please don’t tell anyone: ‘I’m going to China.’ “

For A Long Range Future With China

August 19, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Nixon Administration figures | Leave a Comment 

Henry Kissinger — writing at the Washington Post today — says that the current economic downturn and the ongoing trade imbalance has put a strain on U.S.-China relations.

But HAK also says that we must resist Cold War tendencies in order to forge a more constructive relationship ahead:

A cooperative definition of a long-range future will not be easy. Historically, China and America have been hegemonic powers able to set their own agendas essentially unilaterally. They are not accustomed to close alliances or consultative procedures restricting their freedom of action on the basis of equality. When they have been in alliances, they have tended to take for granted that the mantle of leadership belongs to them and exhibited a degree of dominance not conceivable in the emerging Sino-American partnership.

To make this effort work, American leaders must resist the siren call of a containment policy drawn from the Cold War playbook. China must guard against a policy aimed at reducing alleged American hegemonic designs and the temptation to create an Asian bloc to that end. America and China should not repeat the process that, a century ago, moved Britain and Germany from friendship to a confrontation that drained both societies in a global war. The ultimate victims of such an evolution would be global issues, such as energy, the environment, nuclear proliferation and climate change, which will require a common vision of the future.

At the other extreme, some argue that the United States and China should constitute themselves into a G-2. A tacit Sino-American global governing body, however, is not in the interest of either country or the world. Countries that feel excluded might drift into rigid nationalism at the precise moment that requires a universal perspective.

America’s great contribution in the 1950s was to take the lead in developing a set of institutions by which the Atlantic region could deal with unprecedented upheavals. A region hitherto riven by national rivalries found mechanisms to institutionalize a common destiny. Even though not all of these measures worked equally well, the end result was a far more benign world order.

The 21st century requires an institutional structure appropriate for its time. The nations bordering the Pacific have a stronger sense of national identity than did the European countries emerging from the Second World War. They must not slide into a 21st-century version of classic balance-of-power politics. It would be especially pernicious if opposing blocs were to form on each side of the Pacific. While the center of gravity of international affairs shifts to Asia, and America finds a new role distinct from hegemony yet compatible with leadership, we need a vision of a Pacific structure based on close cooperation between America and China but also broad enough to enable other countries bordering the Pacific to fulfill their aspirations.

Nixon Now

August 18, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Republican Party, Richard Nixon, Russia | 1 Comment 

From the 1972 campaign, this commercial showcases RN’s  consecutive diplomatic successes in China and Russia.

RN went on to win 49 states and the votes of 47,168,710 Americans that November.

Becoming Nixon In Tehran?

August 18, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Iran, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

At the UAE’s Khaleej Times, Kishore Mahbubani — the Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of public policy in Singapore — advocates a Nixon-To-China style rapproachement with Iran:

It is useful to recall President Richard Nixon’s words when, prior to restoring diplomatic relations China, he visited Beijing: “We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today. What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither of us will compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.”

In engaging Iran, the West should ignore the nature of its regime. It is almost impossible for any outsider to understand Iran’s real internal politi-
cal dynamics.

Just when the world reached a consensus that Ahmadinejad was merely an instrument of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, Ahmadinejad appointed a Vice-President against Khamenei’s wishes (though he later retracted the appointment). What we do know with certainty is that the regime is divided.
These divisions will allow new forces to emerge in Iranian society. So all means should be found to reach out to Iranian society at all levels. Iranian students should be encouraged to visit and study in Asian universities, where they would discover how confident young Chinese and Indian students are about the future — which might well cause them to reflect on why young Iranians do not share that optimism.

The Fruits Of The Shanghai Communiqué

August 16, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

Writing in the Wall Street Journal today, Richard V. Allen — a top foreign foreign policy adviser to RN — describes 37’s genius in normalizing diplomatic relations and offering recognition to “one” China (while not abandoning Taiwan’s security):

When Richard Nixon conceived the strategy in 1967 to open a door to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), he had only a vague notion of how “success” could actually be measured. One major consideration: to take advantage of the raging Sino-Soviet feud to create an “offset” to the Soviet Union. His Foreign Affairs article on the subject—”Asia After Vietnam”—appeared in October 1967 and was largely ignored, dismissed by some as campaign rhetoric. In January 1968, 10 months before his election, he sent me to Japan and Korea to advise leaders of his long-range intentions.

Nixon did not expect an immediate breakthrough and knew he had to operate cautiously. Indeed, once in office, his basic instruction to the National Security Council staff was to “find a way to get in touch with China.”

At the time, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, new to the Nixon circle, thought the idea “crazy.” But Nixon was also keenly aware of the importance of not abandoning Taiwan, with which the U.S. maintained full diplomatic relations, and which had a seat on the five-member United Nations Security Council.

While Nixon knew that success in his efforts would bring important change, he could not have imagined the scope of change in the past 40 years. Nor would he have dreamed that the PRC would become America’s main creditor. While adjusting Taiwan’s status, including using Ronald Reagan as the messenger in gently dislodging it from its seat on the U.N. Security Council in favor of the PRC, he took great care to guard Taiwan’s security, continuing a token troop presence and the sale of defensive weapons.

And why the policy continues to bear fruits for latter day statesmen:

In recent years—until the 2008 election of President Ma Ying-jeou—Taiwan had become problematic in terms of U.S. policy and goals by toying with the notion of “independence” from the PRC. Such a move would run directly counter to the U.S. policy of the past 40 years, begun by Nixon, that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China; and that the U.S. remains legally committed to the preservation of Taiwan’s freedom from forcible absorption by the PRC.

An extraordinary shift in Taiwan’s policies has taken place under President Ma, including mass two-way tourism with the mainland, direct flights and shipping, dramatically increased investment by both sides, and consideration of a cross-strait free-trade arrangement. There is no more talk of Taiwanese independence and no campaign for U.N. membership.

Recently the respective presidents exchanged the first-ever direct communication. This level of realism bodes well for stability in the region. Although Beijing will not abandon its desire to “reunite” Taiwan with the mainland, it tacitly acknowledges the significance of this new era of cooperation. However, the PRC has not ruled out the use of force to accomplish reunification.

Another Nixon To China Opportunity

August 3, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Barack Obama, China, Nixon in the News, Richard Nixon, Russia | 1 Comment 

Last week Vice President Joe Biden said that a weakened Russia will bend to the United States. The "great polar bear’s" economy is essentially "withering," it has a dwindling population base, and an anemic banking sector that might not be able to withstand the next 15 years. Russia is also faced with external dilemmas in the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and less than subservient former Soviet bloc countries.

Russia also faces a China problem, and a turf war that President Obama can capitalized on. The Guardian reports:

while China and Russia have much in common, including a mutual fear of separatism and Islamic radicalism, there are also signal differences. Despite last week’s exercises, and a visit to Russia by Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, in June, politicians in Moscow harbour a deep-seated fear of China – in particular, of Chinese encroachment.

Russian TV recently claimed that Beijing has drawn up a secret plan. According to this top-secret blueprint, China is determined to grab back Russia’s remote, but vast, far east region. China’s strategy includes persuading migrants to settle in Russia, marry local women and steal or co-opt local businesses.

Russia’s far east has always been the most strategically vulnerable part of Moscow’s fissiparous imperium, in what is the world’s biggest country. Some 6,100km (3,800 miles) and an eight-hour flight from Moscow, the far east is home to just 6.5 million Russian citizens. Next door, across the Amur river in north-eastern China, there are 107 million Chinese. Given this demographic imbalance, there is a primordial fear in the Russian imagination that China will eventually try to steal back the Europe-sized far east of Russia – a region rich in mineral resources, trees, coal and fish. The salmon alone are an attractive target. A quarter of the world’s Pacific salmon spawn in the volcanic Kamchatka peninsula. According to the Russian TV scenario, Beijing is furtively plotting to undo the Russian colonisation of the Pacific coastal region, started in the 18th century by tsarist-era adventurers. The area’s original inhabitants were Chinese. These early nomads eked out a meagre living while dodging the tigers that still haunt the Sikhote-Alin mountains.

No Legitimacy, Many Problems

August 3, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, International Affairs, Iran, Nixon in the News, Richard Nixon, Russia | Leave a Comment 

Thirty-seven years ago today Congress ratified the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, in what was the culmination of a diplomatic coup crafted by President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger in visits to China and Russia.

During the Cold War, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger knew that the only course in obtaining such a peace was to establish an unbreakable framework in which legitimate governments could reach settlements at the bargaining table. Revolutionary governments — such as in Russia and the China — were to be limited in their opportunity to invoke the whimsical — if not downright irrational and maniacal — fervency of post-modern ideology in favor of a permanent peace.

According to the Hossein Askari, a George Washington University Professor writing at The Nixon Center’s National Interest magazine, the current regime of Iran has lost all tenets of legitimacy within the Muslim world, relegating itself to a military dictatorship after an evidently rigged election and violent clashes with unarmed protesters. The current regime appears to be left with little choice but effective martial law.

The government cannot regain any pretensions to legitimacy. Yes, it may survive for a few weeks, months, or even for a few years, not as an Islamic Republic, but as a military dictatorship. Ayatollah Khamenei cannot stay on as supreme leader with religious and constitutional legitimacy. He has lost all claims to both as a result of recent events. He could survive as the supreme head of a military dictatorship. The majority of Iranians will not accept Ahmadinejad’s presidency as legitimate.

There are three basic options for Iran. The first is to preserve the Islamic Republic; Ayatollah Khamenei would have to be replaced by a respected senior grand ayatollah, someone with no political ambitions. The constitution would have to be modified so as to afford Iranians a more direct say in the selection of their leaders. There would have to be a new presidential election. This is the preferred solution of the clerical establishment, including Hashemi Rafsanjani, who would, of course, like to be the power behind the throne.

The second, and most likely option is the emergence of an absolute dictatorship. Such a tyranny would in time be overthrown, because Iranians are unlikely to succumb to force. What makes the second option the most likely short-term solution? Religious scholars and Grand Ayatollahs have no guns. But the regime does. The two leaders, namely Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad, are fully aware that the IRGC and the Basij will not give up their privileged status easily and would fight to keep them in power. They will fight until too many Iranians have died or until the regular military turns against the IRGC. The only way that the second option can be avoided is if Ayatollah Khamenei abides by the teachings of the religion that he touts, supports the first option and resigns in favor of a new supreme leader.

The third option would be to abandon the clerical system in favor of a simple republic with a totally new constitution. This is the most unlikely option as neither the clerics nor the IRGC will go away quietly. But in my opinion, this is the option that would best serve the long-term interests of the Iranian people.

In retrospect, the late shah, after a thirty-five-year rule, most of it unpopular, had the decency to yield to the will of the Iranian people and to avoid excessive bloodshed. Unfortunately, the supreme leader and President Ahmadinejad are unlikely to follow in his footsteps.

With a more conventional enemy, this might be an incredible moment of opportunity for a diplomatic coup on the seemingly vulnerable, but armed to the teeth an apocalyptic talking regime with little options, may leave us with very little.

Sen. Kerry Wants A Nixon To China Redux

July 30, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Nixon in the News, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

Senator John Kerry (D-MA) — writing at The Huffington Post — wants to strengthen Sino-American relations on climate change and to "change the world" again just as RN did 37 years ago:

When Richard Nixon first visited China back in 1972, his journey seemed far longer than the seven thousand miles that actually separate Washington from Beijing. He was bridging the gap between two worlds separated for a generation.

President Nixon understood that such a moment demanded a dramatic signal to drive home a new diplomatic reality. To do that, he chose a simple gesture, but one laden with meaning. Zhou Enlai, China’s premier, had nursed a grudge ever since Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused to shake his hand back in 1954. And so, when Nixon walked out onto the tarmac in Beijing, he took several steps toward Zhou with his hand obviously, unmistakably outstretched. The message was clear — and powerful — and it marked a watershed in US China relations.

 

7.15.71

July 15, 2009 by Frank Gannon | Filed Under China, History, International Affairs, Nixon Administration, Nixon in the News, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

Thirty-eight years ago today, the White House asked the three networks to clear space in prime time for an important message from the President.

The request appeared to come out of the blue, and there was widespread speculation regarding his intentions —would he be making an announcement about the worsening economic situation, or would it be something to do with Vietnam?— and the reasons for requiring such a prominent venue.

RN —who took a certain pleasure in surprises— achieved one of the great surprises in American history.  Because at 9 pm that Thursday night, he announced that he had accepted an invitation from the government of the People’s Republic of China and would visit China in February 1972.

The impact, at home and around the world, was electric.  Even without the surprise element, it was a diplomatic coup of staggering proportions.  The columnist Max Lerner wrote that “The politics of surprise leads through the Gates of Astonishment into the Kingdom of Hope.”

Of course that brief mid-July announcement was the end of a long and tortuous process that RN had initiated within days of being inaugurated in January 1969.

The real turning point had come two months earlier, on 10 May, after a State Dinner for President Somoza of Nicaragua.  RN was going through some paper work in the Lincoln Sitting Room —still in his dinner suit— when Henry Kissinger came in out of breath (RN thought that “he must have run most of the way from the West Wing”).

Dr. Kissinger gave RN two sheets of typewritten paper conveying a message from Pakistani President Ayub Khan —who had been one of the  principal intermediaries with the PRC— confirming that “Chairman Mao Tse-tung has indicated that he welcomes President Nixon’s visit and looks forward to that occasion when he may have direct conversations with His Excellency the President, in which each side would be free to raise the principle issue of concern to it.”

Kissinger said, “This is the most important communication that has come to an American President since the end of World War II.”

Describing the scene in RN, RN continued:

For nearly an hour we talked about the China initiative — what it might mean to America and how delicately it must be handled lest we lose it.  It was close to midnight before we noticed the time, and Kissinger rose to go.

“Henry, I know that, like me, you never have anything to drink after dinner, and it is very late,” I said, “but I think this is one of those occasions when we should make an exceptions.  Wait here just a minute.”

I got up and walked down the corridor to the small family kitchen at the other end of the second floor.  In one of the cabinets I found an unopened bottle of very old Courvoisier brandy that someone had been given us for Christmas.  I tucked it under my arm and took two large snifters from the glass cupboard.  As we raised our glasses, I said, “Henry, we are drinking a toast not to ourselves personally or to our success, or to our administration’s policies which have made this message and made tonight possible.  Let us drink to generations to come who may have a better chance to live in peace because of what we have done.”

As I write them now, my words sound rather formal, but the moment was one not just of high personal elation, but of a profound mutual understanding that this truly was a moment of historical significance.

United By Force, Divided By Race

July 14, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China | Leave a Comment 

The Financial Times’ foreign affairs columnist Gideon Rachman thinks that China is ill-equipped to understand ethnic nationalism, a factor that helped to lead to the breakup of the Soviet Union:

According to David Shambaugh, an academic, the main lesson that the Chinese drew from studying the collapse of the USSR was to avoid “dogmatic ideology, entrenched elites, dormant party organisations, and a stagnant economy”.

It is an impressive list. But it misses out one obvious thing. The Soviet Union ultimately fell apart because of pressure from its different nationalities. In 1991, the USSR split up into its constituent republics.

Of course, the parallels are not exact. Ethnic Russians made up just over half the population of the USSR. The Han Chinese are over 92 per cent of the population of China. Yet Tibet and Xinjiang are exceptions. Some 90 per cent of the population of Tibet are still ethnic Tibetans. The Uighurs make up just under half the population of Xinjiang. Neither area is comfortably integrated into the rest of the country – to put it mildly. Last week’s riots in Xinjiang led to the deaths of more than 180 people, the bloodiest known civil disturbance in China since Tiananmen Square in 1989. There were also serious disturbances in Tibet just before last year’s Olympics.

In a country of more than 1.3bn people, the 2.6m in Tibet and the 20m in Xinjiang sound insignificant. But together they account for about a third of China’s land mass – and for a large proportion of its inadequate reserves of oil and gas. Just as the Russians fear Chinese influence over Siberia, so the Chinese fear that Muslim Xinjiang could drift off into Central Asia.

Han Chinese immigrants suffered badly in the race riots that convulsed Xinjiang. But China’s emotional and affronted reaction to the upheavals in Xinjiang is typical of an empire under challenge. With the British in Ireland, the Portuguese in Africa and many others besides, the refrain was always that the locals were ungrateful for all the benefits that had been showered upon them.

In the mid-1990s I had a conversation with an Indonesian general who was genuinely outraged by what he regarded as the ungrateful attitude of the brutalised population of East Timor, after all the lovely roads and schools that had been paid for by Jakarta.

China is especially ill-equipped to understand ethnic nationalism within its borders because many government officials simply do not accept, or even grasp, the idea of “self-determination”. Years of official propaganda about the need to reunify the motherland, and the disastrous historical consequences of a divided China, means that these attitudes are very widely shared. I once met a Chinese dissident who was strongly opposed to Communist party rule. But when I suggested that perhaps Taiwan should be allowed to be independent, if that was what its people wanted, his liberalism disappeared. That was unthinkable, I was assured. Taiwan was an inalienable part of China.

Yet the idea that Tibet and Xinjiang could aspire to be separate nations is by no means absurd. China insists that both areas have been an inseparable part of the motherland for centuries. However, they both experienced periods of independence in the 20th century. There was a short-lived East Turkestan Republic in Xinjiang, which was extinguished by the arrival of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in 1949. Tibet experienced de facto independence between 1912 and 1949.

“To Peking For Peace”

July 9, 2009 by Drew Thompson | Filed Under China, International Affairs, Nixon in the News, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

38 years ago this week, President Nixon stunned the world when he announced that he would visit Communist China.

Today, President Obama was supposed to meet President Hu Jintao in Italy, but that meeting was canceled at the last moment – but no one is worried about the consequences of a missed summit on Sino-US relations.  The announcement on July 15, 1971 that put the US and China on the road to normalized relations has achieved just that – normalcy and familiarity.  We have come so far in the US-China relationship that regular interaction at the highest levels has become commonplace.  Only a few months into the new administration, Presidents Obama and Hu have met in person, spoken on the phone several times and are already planning visits to each other’s capitols later this fall.  President Nixon’s legacy is deeply embedded in this vitally important bilateral relationship which has moved far beyond a strategic gambit to hedge against the Soviet Union.  The US now calls on China to play a conscientious role in global affairs, seeking collaboration on the most challenging issues of today, including climate change, global economic development and terrorism.

However, some things seem to have changed little 38 years.  Privately, President Nixon hoped that his meeting with China would convince Beijing to pressure North Vietnam to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict that was then raging in Indochina.  Shortly after the announcement, the North Vietnamese declared that they viewed Nixon’s visit to China as a divisive attempt by the United States to undermine Hanoi’s relationship with Beijing.  Fast forward to today and undoubtedly, one of the talking points at the planned Obama-Hu meeting was North Korea.  An amusing juxtaposition to the nuclear armed Kim Jong-il of today was Henry Kissinger’s negotiating strategy with North Vietnam, claiming that Nixon was a madman, a ferocious anti-communist liable to lose his temper and “push the button” in a bout of anger.

The July 26, 1971 edition of Time Magazine featuring a cartoon Nixon and Kissinger on a boat to China hangs on the wall of my office.  The caption reads, “To Peking for Peace.”

Kissinger: Global Mayhem If PRK Not Stopped

June 8, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Asia, Barack Obama, China, International Affairs, North Korea | Leave a Comment 

Dr. Kissinger believes that if Kim Jong-Il’s nuclear program is not stopped, a global nuclear showdown will ensue:

China faces challenges that are perhaps more complex than even those facing the United States. If present trends continue, and if Pyongyang manages to maintain its nuclear capability through the inability of the parties to bring matters to a head, the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout Northeast Asia and the Middle East becomes probable. China would then face nuclear weapons in all surrounding states in Northeast Asia and an unmanageable, nuclear-armed regime in Pyongyang. But if Beijing exercises the full panoply of its pressures without an accord with America and an understanding with the other parties, it has reason to fear chaos along its borders.

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