President Richard Nixon once remarked “If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China.” Thirty years ago, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger fulfilled this vision by visiting the Middle Kingdom. Today, China has become an integral factor in many facets of American life. Some Americans see China as a potential threat to America’s power. But a closer relationship between China and the United States historically enhanced the economy of the United States, exposed China to democratic values and will continue to promote America’s national interests.

In 1979, the U.S. entered a painful stagflation — high inflation coupled with a high unemployment rate. The outcry against the Vietnam War and Watergate Scandal further shook Americans’ confidence in the nation’s political leadership. But the U.S. economy quickly rebounded. From the early 1980s to the 2000s, the U.S. created the largest economic expansion in recent history as the DOW increased from 1,000 to more than 14,000 points. The rise of China played a crucial role in this recovery.

In 1979, Deng Xiaoping led China out of Soviet style communism and boldly initiated a policy of global integration and economic reform. Since then, China’s GDP grew by 8,200 percent. As a result, 300 million people were lifted of poverty.

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The venerable British journal The Economist has a new article assessing the reasons for the Nixon surcharge (which was to a great degree the brainchild of then-Treasury Secretary John Connally) and showing why its purpose, and the effects it had on the world economy at the time, do not necessary show that a tariff on Chinese goods would benefit the American economy now:

China’s foreign-exchange reserves now total $2.4 trillion, of which about 70% are thought to be in dollars. In 1971 the central banks of America’s trading partners had amassed a rather smaller hoard, of about $40 billion. But that was enough to buy the gold in Fort Knox three times over, if America upheld its commitment to sell the metal at $35 an ounce. Britain’s request to exchange dollars for gold on August 13th 1971 was the last straw. “Although the US government attached no great importance to the gold as such, a run on this gold would have been a sorry spectacle,” wrote George Shultz and Kenneth Dam, two prominent economic officials in the Nixon administration, in their book “Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines”. On August 15th Nixon, in effect, announced that America was now unwilling to do what it would soon be incapable of doing—converting dollars into gold at the agreed exchange rate.

Messrs Shultz and Dam argue that the import surcharge was intended as “an attention-getter and a bargaining chip”. It allowed John Connally, Nixon’s treasury secretary and a Texan, to stride down the corridors of international finance “with both guns blazing”. In the face of this bravado America’s trading partners duly backed down. By December they agreed to let the dollar fall (by a trade-weighted average of 6.5%) and the surcharge was removed. Nixon was able to present the humbling of the dollar as a political victory. But were Barack Obama to emulate him, would he really enjoy the same result?

The obvious difference is that in 1971 America was locked into a system of fixed parities. By pegging to the dollar, a currency was automatically fixed to everything else. Since July 2008 China has pegged the yuan to the greenback. But over that period its currency has swung up and down against those of its trading partners and competitors. On a trade-weighted basis the yuan is back to where it was when the financial crisis started. Indeed, compared with China’s emerging-market competitors in its big export markets, the yuan is about 12% more expensive today than it was before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, according to a measure (the “third-country” effective exchange rate) calculated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. By this indicator China’s currency is about 25% above its level in 2005.

The second difference is related to the first. Because everybody was pegged to the dollar in 1971, everybody had to pay the surcharge. Nixon dismayed everyone but discriminated against no one. China’s critics today, on the other hand, urge Mr Obama to slap a tariff on Chinese goods alone. This will reduce the demand for Chinese imports, which constitute about 15% of America’s total. But there is no guarantee that customers will switch from Chinese goods to American ones instead. They are more likely to buy from China’s rivals in Asia. The surcharge may change the composition of America’s trade deficit, without necessarily changing its size.

A giant pillar is prepared for the set of Nixon In China, which will kick off the 2010 season of the Sydney Opera House.

John Adams’s opera will inaugurate in the backdrop of the 2010 Winter Olympics and the golden anniversary of the Vancouver Opera House, a perfect tribute to city at this time, opera house General Manager James Wright says, because of its themes of “internationalism” and “cultures moving closer together.”

Opera is known for being larger than life, but set designer Erhard Rom has never had to make a Boeing 707 land on-stage before.

In the opening scene of Nixon in China, he’ll do just that. A replica of the Spirit of ’76, the presidential jet that carried Richard Nixon on his 1972 diplomatic mission to Beijing, will touch down on a giant runway with its nose pointed toward the audience.

“I feel the landing of the 707 has to feel like an absolutely stunning moment,” says the artist, who’s helping design the new production for its Canadian premiere by the Vancouver Opera, which runs this Saturday (March 13) to March 20 at the Queen Elizabeth Theatre. Speaking from his New Jersey home, Rom explains that he worked from actual plans of the airplane—and then enlarged it a bit “so it feels like the Titanic arriving”. “What struck me,” says Rom, “is that, in some ways, the piece is almost Wagnerian in scale—almost epic.”

The opera he’s speaking about, composed by John Adams to a libretto by poet Alice Goodman, is often described as a minimalist masterpiece. But there is nothing minimalist about Vancouver Opera’s mounting to mark both its golden anniversary season and the Vancouver 2010 Cultural Olympiad.

Vancouver Opera general manager James Wright admits it’s a big investment to commission a new production—not to mention one that has a chorus of 40. But Nixon in China, he says, seemed perfect for this city at this time, with the world gathered here.

“It’s about internationalism; it’s about cultures moving closer together,” says Wright, whose team is hosting an entire speaker series around the opera and Canada-China relations in the weeks before opening. “Then there is the fact that Beijing had hosted the 2008 Olympics, and the fact that Vancouver is seen as the North American centre for Asia.”

Michael Cavanagh, the acclaimed Toronto-based director Wright brought in to create the major new production, could not agree more. In fact, sitting in the rehearsal hall at the downtown Holy Rosary Cathedral, where right outside the doors people are decked out in flag gear and heading to a hockey game, he can’t help but make direct parallels with the Olympic Games.

“The show is a psychological examination of people involved in momentous events and how those can overwhelm and overtake them. And then how we need to wait and step back for history to tell us what it all meant,” Cavanagh says. “These couple of weeks in Vancouver are all about huge moments. This is one of the biggest events in this city’s history. But how is it going to be remembered?”

The show, he stresses, is much more than a dry chronicling of the historic visit between Nixon and Mao Zedong (sung by baritone Robert Orth and heldentenor Alan Woodrow, respectively) and the opening of the Far East. Yes, the opera depicts actual events: the arrival of Nixon and his cortege, the first uncomfortable meeting in Mao’s study and the huge banquet that followed it, as well as Pat Nixon’s tour of rural China. But it is just as much about the personalities and personal histories of the main players, not just Richard and Pat Nixon and Mao and his wife Chiang Ch’ing, but their advisers Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai.

The result defies the one-note image of Nixon as the Watergate crook, or even as the aloof apologist of the recent film Frost/Nixon. “This piece definitely does not treat him like a villain,” Cavanagh says. “This opera is a fantastic opportunity for us to get to know the giddy Nixon, the playful Nixon, the contemplative Nixon, the jokester, and the romantic. And it’s the same with Mao: at the time of the visit, Mao was kind of doddering.…But the opera gives us a chance to see Mao as a young man, doing a silly little jig at one point; he’s also romantically involved, even sexually involved—because he was a sensualist as well as a great thinker. They were complex—we’re all complex people.”

Just as the events go beyond the literal, delving into the psychologies of the characters, the design is stylized—beyond that initial jet landing, that is. The perspective and scale are exaggerated, with the characters lined up in front of huge triangular pillars painted with their portraits by the third act. The colour palette is a bold red, white, and blue. “We visit locations in a literal way, but the scope of the piece is so large, we wanted to go more abstract,” says Rom, who used architecture and news photos, among other things, in designing the production. “And then by the third act, you’re really into abstraction, because now we’re really all the way into the land of these people’s minds.”

Throughout the opera, a TV film crew captures the action on-stage, with the video replayed at key moments. “The great unblinking eye and the reductive power of television was something that Richard Nixon was all too aware of,” Cavanagh comments

BEIJING: China on Monday expressed “deep condolence” over the death of former US Secretary of State Alexander Haig for his “positive contribution” to the China-US relationship.

“We deeply mourn over General Haig’s death and express sincere condolences to his family,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said Monday.

“General Haig has always endeavored to promote the China-US friendship, and has made positive contribution for the development of the bilateral relations,” Qin said.

The veteran politician passed away at 85 on February 20 at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, from complications associated with an infection.

Haig, who was born in December, 1924, is a retired Army four-star general and served as the State Secretary under President Ronald Reagan form January 22, 1981 to July 5, 1982. He also has served as a top adviser to former presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.

On January 1972, Haig paid his first China visit to make preparation for Nixon’s historic visit to China.

In 2009 when China and the United States commemorated the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, Haig reportedly said he had visited China for more than 50 times since 1972 and would like to be a supporter of the development of China-US relations.

It was 38 years ago this week that President Richard Nixon played the historic China Card—a geopolitical masterstroke during the Cold War. It was all part of a strategic view of the world and effectuated from a position of strength. We were powerful; they were backward—technologically, culturally, and with obvious political deficiencies. That moment remains a high water mark in Nixon’s presidency—a moment in time that even the most determined critics concede positively to his legacy.

But what would Mr. Nixon think now?

These days, admittedly, the whole issue of U.S.-China relations is a sticky one for our current President. It is one of many examples of how different things are when you are governing as opposed to campaigning for office—although it is hard to tell which is which in Washington these days. Mario Cuomo famously talked years ago about politics being “poetry” and governing “prose.”

Dealing with potential adversaries—and even some friends—is always best when you do so from a position of strength. It’s true in military and national defense (“peace through strength”) and it’s true in economics, as well. The scriptures remind us, “The borrower is servant to the lender.” And when one party is deep in financial debt to another a certain measure of leverage is ceded to the lender.

How this dynamic will play out in the immediate future is anyone’s guess, but owing nearly $800 billion to the Chinese should raise a flag—a red one. And it should come as no surprise if and when those to whom we owe such copious amounts of money begin to squeeze us on the international stage.

President Obama has been making great pains to try to change our image before the world, one that he believes George W. Bush perpetuated and that has led to our virtual “blackball” by many nations. But in fact, what he really should be concerned about is not “blackball,” but rather “blackmail.” The Chinese dumped $45 billion of T-bills a couple of months ago—wave of the future? And why shouldn’t one nation operating out of its own interests use such leverage? We would.

In fact, we have.

In 1956, there were two hot spots with the potential of blowing up into World War III, a revolution in Hungary—and a crisis in the Middle East involving the Suez Canal. Seen now in hindsight against the backdrop of the Cold War and as the moment when the last vestiges of old world colonialism gave wave to complete bi-polar hegemony pitting the United States against the Soviets, the Suez Crisis was as much about the exercise of economic clout as it was a diplomatic-military affair.

Gamal Abdel Nassar had emerged as a leader in Egypt as part of a 1952 coup overthrowing King Farouk and by 1954 he was firmly in place as that nation’s maximum leader. He immediately undertook a complete transformation of his country with massive public works and the progressive nationalization of industry. He was enamored of the Soviet system and soon it became clear that his nation would be taking that side in the Cold War. One project near and dear to his heart was the building of the Aswan Dam, which America at first agreed to help fund. But when Nassar sold arms to Soviet satellite Czechoslovakia and then recognized the People’s Republic of China, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles withdrew our dam dollars.

In reaction to this, Nassar announced on July 26, 1956 a Nationalization Law freezing all the assets of the Suez Canal—in effect, a seizure of that vital passageway.

Opened in 1869, this 119-mile long man-made waterway connects the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Originally financed by the Egyptians and French, Britain became a major stakeholder and stockholder in 1875, and eventually the canal became part of the United Kingdom’s imperial portfolio in the region. Following World War II, and with the decline of the U.K.’s empire, the canal gradually became a diplomatic football—not to mention thorn. And the creation of the nation of Israel in 1948 caused tensions about the vital waterway to further increase.

In the aftermath of Nassar’s July 26 speech, Britain—led by Prime Minister Anthony Eden—and France, represented by Eden’s counterpart, Guy Mollet, began to plot how to ensure their access to the Suez Canal. Eventually, and in an alliance with Israel (a nation with the most to lose if the canal was closed to them), military action was planned and initiated.

Follow the money.

Meanwhile, the American President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in the midst of a reelection bid, had already had a rough year in 1956—physically and politically. And shortly following election to a second term in the White House, he played some power politics of his own. Now, I should state here that I am not of the number in agreement with what he did in the Suez matter, anymore than I am about how we abandoned the freedom fighters in Budapest earlier that summer. I am simply using this story to describe a reality in all of life and politics—like it or not.

There is a golden rule in geo-politics: He who has the gold makes the rule.

Mr. Eisenhower did not want Britain, France, and Israel—all stated allies of the United States—creating a situation that might not play well with the Soviets and that had the potential to instigate a larger war. Here was the hero of Normandy putting the pressure on British Prime Minister Eden—a man who had worked closely with Ike while serving in Churchill’s War Cabinet.

“The borrower is servant to the lender.”

To apply pressure on Eden’s government to cease and desist, Eisenhower instructed U.S. Treasury Secretary, George M. Humphrey, to begin to sell off some of our government’s British bonds. Some of these bonds were holdovers from the U.K.’s World War II debt; others had been sold to us to help that nation’s economy rebound after the war. Eden’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, future P.M. Harold Macmillan, told him that the results would be devastating to the British economy.

Checkmate.

Anthony Eden was a broken man. He fled to a vacation-exile in Jamaica, spending time at Ian Fleming’s (of James Bond literary fame) estate there, but his health quickly deteriorated. He was taking amphetamines—had been for years under doctor’s orders after a botched gall bladder operation—and the drugs magnified his problems with insomnia and unraveling mental health. Soon, Mr. Macmillan took over at 10 Downing Street, but by then the Suez episode had hastened the sunset on the British Empire—and the Cold War morphed from a multi-national tag-team match into a virtual two-nation standoff.

Follow the money.

We are potentially in big trouble as a nation. Our security is threatened not only by Islamist terrorism—but also by some who have a lien on our title deed. Certainly, throughout our history we have dealt with nations and regimes in pragmatic and realpolitik ways, even having to hold our collective noses because of the stench of tyranny and oppression on the part of some of our momentary allies in a larger cause. But we have managed, for the most part, to deal with it—ugliness and all—because of the ability to approach everything from a position of strength: morally, militarily, and economically.

Now though, we not only depend on others for much of our energy, but we also owe an astronomical amount of money (the interest alone is unfathomable) to powerful entities. We should not be surprised that other nations no longer dance on cue—nor should we ever be surprised if and when some big bills come due with humiliating strings attached.

Or worse.

Today, Ron Walker is president of the Richard Nixon Foundation, and the Orange County Register has just published an article about him by Jessica Terrell. who often covers Nixon-related personalities and events for the newspaper. It contains some remarkable facts: it turns out that Ron, at the time he joined the Nixon campaign in 1968, was a registered Democrat. He also describes his ambitious plans for the Foundation, which include doubling the size of its endowment, and organizing more events to make the public aware of the accomplishments of the Nixon era in both domestic and foreign affairs.

The first pandas came to Washington as a state gift from China after RN’s historic trip in 1972:

Pandas have a long, symbolic history in Washington. The first panda couple, Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing, arrived in 1972 as a gift to the American people from China after President Richard Nixon’s historic visit.

The pair lived more than 20 years at the zoo and produced five cubs – but none survived.

That is partly why Tai Shan, the first cub to grow up in the U.S. capital, is so adored.

“All the other pandas we’ve borrowed from China, but he’s ours,” said Amanda Parson, 30, who left home at 6:15 a.m. Wednesday to visit the zoo in the snow with Williston for Tai Shan’s last day on view.

The zoo’s two remaining pandas, mother Mei Xiang and father Tian Tian, are on a 10-year, $10 million loan until December.

Few news summaries fell below 10 pages. In normal times, a short news summary ran perhaps 15, always single-spaced, and up to as many as 30 to 35 pages – in spite of constant efforts to keep them shorter. Even though some went long, we were reminded that the President actually read them and would use them as a day-to-day management tool, well beyond just keeping himself informed. Pages that carried notations by the President were copied and dispatched to the relevant Cabinet secretaries or agencies by the White House Staff Secretary with a request for a response. Occasionally a note was meant for our office, usually a compliment. Such notes reminded us that we had to get it right every day. Mort Allin explained the work ethic in place when I arrived.

“If you make a mistake because of something I say, I’ll apologize and we’ll move on. If the President makes a mistake because of something we put in his news summary, what will we do?” His eyes made clear there was no good answer to that question. We weren’t going to make a mistake.

Getting all the broadcast network reporters’ stories right was made possible because of the elaborate video taping and two closed circuit channels run by the Army’s White House Signal Corps office. We made heavy use of their instant replay ability for the nightly newscasts from ABC, NBC, CBS networks as well as the weekly shows, including PBS.

But China was different. It was a full day and 13 hours ahead of Washington. When we began to see our network news broadcasts at 5:30 p.m., it was the next day at 4:30 a.m. in Beijing and, presumably, the President was within an hour or so of rising from a night’s sleep.

The more critical element, however, was the sheer technical capacity of communications equipment to handle a steady stream of information from the U.S. to Air Force One to make sure the Old Man had the information he needed. We shared an electronic pipeline with others, so we pared the news summaries down into 3 or 4 page documents to avoid choking the system. We focused on the stories coming out of China or originating here about the trip. The process of dispatching short summaries continued day and night until the presidential party departed China.

Nixon’s grasp of U.S. news broadcasts while standing on Chinese soil didn’t go unnoticed. While in Beijing the President attended a performance of Chinese gymnasts. We watched in Washington, of course, and duly reported in the next mini-news summary that NBC commentator Joe Garagiola had described the performance as “truly outstanding,” along with a few other words of high praise. Nixon mentioned that to a Chinese escort the next day while touring the Great Wall. Standing nearby, paying close attention, was our venerable Barbara Walters, then an NBC regular.

“Mr. President,” Walters implored, ”how do you know what Joe Garagiola said last night – he’s in New York!?”

Nixon didn’t answer. But the temptation I felt to bargain later for a free lunch from Walters in exchange for the answer was enormous.

Richard Nixon entered office with a plan to open relations with China, extract the U.S. from Indochina without bringing down the non-Communist government in Saigon, and pursue better relations with the USSR, arms control, and a peace process in the Middle East. All this happened.

There appear to be multiple motives for announcing an arms package now, including the mundane desire to give portions of the U.S. defense and aerospace industries a boost during tough economic times. But the primary motives seem to be diplomatic. An arms sale would be a reward to Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou for pursuing policies designed to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait and, equally important, for keeping Washington in the loop regarding any initiatives Taipei might take. That behavior comes as a great relief to U.S. officials, since it is in marked contrast to the conduct of Ma’s predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, who seemed to delight in provoking Beijing and blind-siding Washington in the process.

But Ma is now under fire at home for being too soft toward China, and his political popularity has sagged badly over the past year for numerous reasons. Responding favorably to Taipei’s long-standing request for additional weapon systems would help de-fuse the domestic opposition to Ma and strengthen the political standing of a cooperative leader Washington would like to see remain in power after Taiwan’s next presidential election.

Even more important, the arms sale would convey a message to Beijing of Washington’s growing annoyance regarding various issues. One grievance is China’s failure to halt the deployment of missiles across the strait from Taiwan, despite Ma Ying-jeou’s more conciliatory posture. Beijing’s conduct could be seen as a deliberate challenge to Washington, since the missile deployments have long been the primary justification for previous U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The Obama administration might well conclude that Chinese leaders would view Washington’s continued inaction on Taipei’s request as a sign of weakness.

This saga began some weeks after President Nixon’s visit to the PRC in 1972, when Chinese leader Mao Zedong sent two pandas, Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing, to the National Zoo. They were the Zoo’s most popular attractions by far until they died in the 1990s, the two oldest pandas to survive in captivity. During their decades in Washington, efforts were made to breed them, but all the offspring died after a few days.

In 2000, the PRC sent two pandas to replace them. Unlike Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing, which were gifts to the United States, Mei Xiang and Tian Tian are on loan to this country. For five years, the two new animals enjoyed an effective monopoly on American panda-mania.

That changed in 2005, when the black-and-white couple welcomed a son. According to Chinese tradition pandas are not given names until they are 100 days old, so it was not until then that the youngster was christened Tai Shan. But a zoo worker’s remark that the animal, at birth, weighed about as much as an average stick of butter resulted in the nickname by which the panda is far better known.

For the four years since his birth, “Butterstick” has effortlessly projected a charisma unequaled by any other Washington resident, including the current President, and each year on his birthday, thousands descend on the zoo to celebrate, lining up to wait for hours before opening time.

But all good things must, sometime, come to an end, and Tai Shan is no exception. From his birth he belonged to the PRC, under the terms of the agreement which brought his parents to the Zoo, and that nation had the right to ask for his return. This month, the Chinese government asked for his return, and so “Butterstick” must leave the zoo before long, probably at the end of next month. But he’ll be long, long remembered by a city, and a nation, for whom he provided countless hours of fascination and joy. And as he leaves, he has the distinction of being part of a great tradition founded by the two leaders who shook hands in Beijing twenty-seven years ago.

During his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, President Obama credited RN with leading China to become an open society, and helping to lift millions out of poverty.

In his Nobel acceptance speech,  President Obama confers authority to RN, along with Pope John Paul and Ronald Reagan, as an architect of peace:

In light of the Cultural Revolution’s horrors, Nixon’s meeting with Mao appeared inexcusable – and yet it surely helped set China on a path where millions of its citizens have been lifted from poverty, and connected to open societies. Pope John Paul’s engagement with Poland created space not just for the Catholic Church, but for labor leaders like Lech Walesa. Ronald Reagan’s efforts on arms control and embrace of perestroika not only improved relations with the Soviet Union, but empowered dissidents throughout Eastern Europe. There is no simple formula here But we must try as best we can to balance isolation and engagement; pressure and incentives, so that human rights and dignity are advanced over time.

James Humes is the author of a new book filled with new insights on RN’s trip to China.

Former RN speechwriter, historian, author and all around polymath  James Humes was at the Nixon Library on Monday to discuss and sign copies of his new book Only Nixon: “His Trip to China Restudied and Revisited.”

Humes arrived with his co-author Dr.  Jarvis Ryals, and was introduced by the President’s younger brother Ed Nixon, who helped inspire the book when he joined the authors on their trip to China in 1999.

“Only Nixon” is a unique study of RN’s 1972 trip, Humes argues, because it tells the story through the Chinese perspective and addresses key information neglected by scholars and historians.

Humes sat down with Nixon Foundation Vice President Sandy Quinn to discuss his new insights on this latest episode of TNN TV:

Courtesy of TNN contributor and radio talk show host David Stokes, a podcast of Humes full remarks will soon become available.

Halloran — naively and very absurdly — cites RN’s Guam Doctrine (Nixon Doctrine) as the source of declinism:

In contrast, President Obama has reversed course in meetings in Asia with the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and nine other Southeast Asian nations, and with the leader of India in Washington this week. The president is scheduled to see Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia in the White House on Monday. With all, the president has reaffirmed America’s security commitments. In addition, he had a frosty visit with leaders of a potential adversary, China, in Beijing.

After the Nixon Doctrine had been decreed, the US withdrew in defeat from Vietnam, let the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization wither, and forsook Taiwan to recognize China. Okinawa was reverted to Japan with restrictions on US forces, New Zealand was booted from a treaty with the US and Australia in a dispute over nuclear arms, and US bases in the Philippines were abandoned after a volcanic eruption.

RN’s aims were just the opposite. He would re-affirm all security commitments, and provide allies with a nuclear deterrent should they get bullied by a major nuclear power. He would also help furnish economic and military assistance for nations willing to accept the responsibility for their own security, a strategy that is working in Iraq and would have proven successful in Vietnam, if not for Congress’s decision to cut off aid and leave the South vulnerable to a conventional invasion from the North.

Unfortunately for Halloran’s argument, RN was the one accused by his critics of prolonging the war in Indochina. Halloran is in fact right that RN would end the war, but peace in Asia was conducted on his terms, and would be artfully correlated with the rise of American prestige in the world that culminated during his historic trip to China in 1972.

RN was fully aware of the interminable misinterpretations of his speech in Guam (p.394-395):

The Nixon Doctrine announced on Guam was misinterpreted by some signaling a new policy that would lead to total American withdrawal from Asia and from other parts of the world as well. In one of our regular breakfast meetings after I returned from the Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield articulated this misunderstanding. I emphasized  to him, as I had to our friends in the Asian countries, that the Nixon Doctrine was not a formula for getting America out of Asia, but one that provided the only sound basis for America’s stating in and continuing to play a responsible role in helping the non-Communist nations and neutrals as well as our Asian allies to defend their independence.

RN’s Asia policy — most notably his diplomatic triumph in China — would establish strong bonds and allow America to further its interests in the region.

When diplomatic relations were formally restored in 1979, bilateral trade rose to $2.4 billion from zero in 1971. A three year Chinese-America trade relations agreement was also signed, each side granting one-another favored nation status. By the mid 1980’s, China was ready to engage the rest of the world.

It would also bring the Soviets back to the peace table and fasten the end of the Cold War, establishing the United States as the sole surviving superpower by the end of the Reagan administration.

In a joint press conference with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, President Obama said: “I intend to make clear that the United States is a Pacific nation.”

As he brought the Vietnam war to a close, RN would fulfill his legacy after proclaiming similar words:

the United States is a Pacific power and should remain so.

RN and HAK: “partners in reliability, precision, and finesse.”

In yesterday’s edition of The Daily Beast, Leslie Gelb undresses the Obama White House, exposing the President’s recent Asian trip as “clumsy,” “displaying amateurishness,” and failing “to carve out America’s new leadership role” in “one of the world’s most dynamic regions.”

For Gelb,  such amateurishness can be attributed to the failure to  gauge the pulse of the region and prepare suitably for potential breakthroughs:

Presidents take trips like this one only when they need breakthroughs and accomplishments on certain issues that can’t be agreed on without the pressure of an impending presidential visit. In fact, most presidents wouldn’t even commit to trips abroad without knowing that key deals would be finally agreed on and announced during the visit itself. The prospective visit is the power jackhammer to nail down the deals. Just take a gander at trips planned for Richard Nixon by Henry Kissinger or for George H. W. Bush by James Baker.

RN was adept in understanding America’s moment of truth. In an October 1967 Foreign Affairs article titled “Asia After Vietnam,” he signaled a future — and substantive — shift in U.S. policy in the region, especially towards China:

For the short run, then this means a policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be serbed only by accepting the basic rules of international civility. For the long run, it means pulling China back into the world community — but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.

In his memoirs, Dr. Kissinger described the process of engaging China as an “intricate minuet (Horne 68),” RN said he and his foreign policy team proceeded “carefully and cautiously” to establish “a sufficiently strong foundation.” RN in his own words:

Messages and signals had been going back and forth for more than two years. We had proceeded carefully and cautiously through the Yahya and Romanian channels. Now Kissinger and I agreed that we had reached a point at which we had to take the chance of making a proposal, or risk slipping back into another long round of tentative probing. I decided that the time had come to take the big step and propose a presidential visit.

On May 10, therefore, Kissinger called in Ambassador Hilaly and gave him a message for Chou En-lai via President Yahya. It stated that because of the importance I attached to the normalizing of relations between the two countries, I was prepared to accept Chou’s invitation to visit Peking. I proposed Kissinger undertake a secret visit in advance of my trip in order to arrange an agenda and begin a preliminary exchange of views.

The die was cast. There was nothing left to do but wait for Chou’s reply. If we had acted too soon, if we had not established a sufficiently strong foundation, or if we had overestimated the ability of Mao and Chou to deal with their internal opposition to such a visit, then all our long careful efforts would be wasted. I might even have to be prepared for serious international embarrassment if the Chinese decided to reject my proposal and then publicize it. (page 550-551)

Extensive preparation assuaged the wost of fears. On June 2, 1971, a message arrived from the White House through the Pakistani Embassy from the PRC: Chairman Mao had accepted RN to Peking for direct talks.

Less than a year later, RN and Mao were ready “to turn a page in history,” said Dr. Kissinger.

But he warned not to rest easy as our  dealings would “require reliability, precision, and finesse.”

Now, it is true that, from the very earliest days of the Republic, the nation’s leaders have had Asia in mind, long before any American territory had a Pacific coastline. George Washington was often in communication with businessmen like Robert Morris about trade with China. Thomas Jefferson took the step of acquiring the Louisiana Purchase territory from Napoleon so that the United States could one day develop ports from which ships could cross the Pacific without bothering, in those pre-Panama Canal days, with Cape Horn.

But, as Will indicates, the resident of the White House who really undertook the first sizable effort to establish America as a significant power in the Pacific was Millard Fillmore. The thirteenth President has, of course, long been a figure of fun, perhaps best known to some Americans for lending his name (with the Millard changed to Mallard) to the web-footed right-wing journalist in Bruce Tinsley’s comic strip.

But Fillmore was a man of several considerable achievements. Born, like Lincoln, in a log cabin in upstate New York, he pursued his education in country schools and law offices, and worked his way up the ladder of the legal profession in Buffalo. A few years before being elected Vice-President on the ticket headed by Gen. Zachary Taylor, he founded a college which ultimately became the State University of New York at Buffalo, now the biggest school in the biggest higher-education establishment in the nation.

(It was for this achievement, as well as his deeds as President, that Oxford University wanted to award Fillmore with an honorary doctorate of laws degree when he visited England after leaving office in 1855. But Fillmore declined the honor on the grounds that his achievements and educational attainments did not merit it. He also said that he had never learned Latin and felt that a man should not accept a degree that he could not read himself. As we all know, President Obama was quick to say his achievements to date did not merit a Nobel Peace Prize, but that’s not stopping him from receiving it next month.)

Just after Fillmore took office, California joined the Union, followed soon after by Oregon. With trade to China increasing, Fillmore decided, in 1852, that the time had come for the nation of Japan to emerge from nearly two centuries of isolation in which it had traded only with China and the Netherlands. Therefore, he directed Commodore Matthew Perry to go to that land. Perry led his group of what the Japanese called “black ships” to the city then known as Edo (now Tokyo) and there told the Japanese emperor’s representatives that the United States wished to open relations with the nation, and would not take no for an answer.

Perry then went home, and, the next year (with Franklin Pierce now in the White House), came back to Edo to hear the Japanese government’s response. The emperor agreed to open his nation to the outside world, and thus began the process that ultimately made both nations among the world’s most important commercial powers – and which ultimately led to Hawaii, our current President’s home, becoming part of the United States.

So let’s give old Millard a little credit.