The National Interest’s Man In Kurdistan

March 9, 2010 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Iraq War, Nixon Center, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

Joost Hiltermann — a Middle Expert at the International Crisis Group — reports for the Nixon Center’s National Interest on developments in the Kurdish north of Iraq, where voters just participated in national elections:

Iraq’s elections are still too early, and too close, to call, but here in Kurdistan enough is clear that one party is exultant and another distressed. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani appears to have bounced back from the brink of political extinction following the rough beating it received from a group of former party cadres in Kurdistan’s regional parliamentary elections last July. Calling in particular for an end to corruption, these former party officials coalesced into a reform movement called Goran, or “change,” which walked away with 25 percent of the vote in those polls.

For now, however, the PUK can heave a sigh of relief as early returns show that the party held its own against Goran. The PUK ran in alliance with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of regional President Masoud Barzani, while Goran ran alone. In Sulaimaniya governorate, the heartland of both the PUK and Goran (and where Goran trounced the PUK in July) the PUK appears to have won everywhere except in the city of Sulaimaniya itself. In the town of Koya, where Talabani was born, the PUK squeaked out a victory after its humiliating defeat there seven months ago. And Goran activists acknowledge that the PUK far outpaced them in the important governorate of Kirkuk.

Observers attributed Goran’s relatively poor showing to a number of factors. The main one may be that Kurdish voters like the idea of reform, and trust Goran deputies, who have stood up in the regional parliament and challenged the ruling parties with a zeal previously unknown in Kurdistan, to produce it. But that’s inside the Kurdistan region. In the federal parliament in Baghdad, they prefer their representatives to present a unified nationalist Kurdish front unspoiled by unruly Goran politicians seeking to distinguish themselves from their rivals and possibly even—gasp!—making separate deals with Arab parties on issues of Kurdish national interest.

Goran will therefore have to go back to the drawing board and start building a popular movement that reaches beyond its narrow base in the Suleimaniya urban professional class. Its next challenge will be provincial elections in the Kurdistan region at the end of October.

As for the PUK, it dodged a bullet. Long an equal to the KDP, the PUK has seen its influence wane over the past couple of years owing to internal dissension and a looming crisis over who will eventually succeed Talabani. Ever since an internecine conflict in the 1990s, its relationship with the KDP has been defined by a secret strategic agreement that provides for an equitable sharing of power and wealth. As the PUK began to falter, however, some in the KDP began to question this agreement’s utility and had spoken of cutting their partner loose. Such a move could have serious consequences for the region’s stability, which is far from assured. For now, the strategic agreement holds, but the succession crisis remains and Goran is waiting for the next opportunity to strike again.

HAK: Don’t Take Iraq Off The Table

February 4, 2010 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Iran, Iraq War, Nixon Administration figures, Richard Nixon | 1 Comment 

In the Washington Post, RN’s National Security Adviser and Secretary of State writes that the Obama administration should keep Iraq at the forefront of its policy discussions as the fledgling democracy will be a key factor in how the United States approaches Iran:

Before the war, the equilibrium between Iraq and Iran was a principal geopolitical reality within the region. At that time, the government in Baghdad was a Sunni-run dictatorship. The Shiite-dominated, partly democratic structure that has emerged from the war has not yet found the appropriate balance among its Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish components. Nor is its long-term relationship to Iran settled. If radicals prevail in the Shiite part, and the Shiite part comes to dominate the Sunni and Kurdish regions, and if it then lines up with Tehran, we will witness — and will have partially contributed to — a fundamental shift in the balance of the region.

The outcome in Iraq will have profound consequences, above all, in Saudi Arabia, the key country in the Persian Gulf, as well as in the other Gulf states and in Lebanon, where Hezbollah, financed by Iran, is already a Shiite state within the state. The United States therefore has an important stake in a moderate evolution of Iraq’s domestic and foreign policies.

The Obama administration is stalemated in negotiations with Iran to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whether the nuclear issue is settled by diplomacy or other evolutions, the stability of the region will be crucially affected by the ability to bring about a political and strategic equilibrium between Iran and Iraq. Without such an arrangement, the region runs the risk of living indefinitely on top of a heap of explosives toward which a smoldering fuse is burning.

Will Kirkuk Bring Down Iraq?

December 16, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Iraq War, Middle East, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

Joost Hiltermann at the Nixon Center’s National Interest:

THE FATE of Iraq may well rise or fall on Kirkuk as Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen and Christians grapple for control of the province and the safety of their people. Oil riches abound in this land that straddles the border of Arab and Kurdish Iraq. And command of these resources is the prize for the taking. As the powers that be in Baghdad fight to hold on to the tenuous peace wrested from civil war, deciding the political fate of Kirkuk is treacherous enough to bring down the state. So far, the battle has largely taken place in a never-ending political drama, but if compromise cannot be reached—and soon—bloody conflict may well be the next step.

Read more.

Military Enlistment The Highest Since RN’s Days

October 14, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under International Affairs, Iraq War, Middle East, Military, Richard Nixon, Vietnam | 2 Comments 

Enlistment rates are at their highest levels since RN was Commander-in-Chief.

The Washington Post is reporting that military recruiters have posted their best year since 1973, bringing in nearly 170,000 new troops in 2008, 3 percent above their stated goals. The Post credits the ballooning civilian unemployment for a surge in enlistment rates.

But Pentagon officials are crediting the declining violence in Iraq for the upswing, which can ultimately be credited to Washington’s moment of truth in fighting small wars of attrition, and innovative Generals like David Petraeus and Ray Ordierno who sought a responsible exit from what seemed interminable just three years ago.

Similarly, RN insured an honorable exit from Vietnam, all while conducting groundbreaking diplomatic efforts in China and Russia, effectively reestablishing American prestige on the World stage.

When Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird declared the end of the draft in January 1973, 75 percent of Americans approved of RN’s handling of Vietnam, a sweeping mandate that also reflected the youth’s revived fervency for volunteerism.

The Wrong Point Man

July 13, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under International Affairs, Iraq War, Obama administration | 1 Comment 

Foreign Policy’s Peter Feaver thinks that President Obama’s decision to appoint the man (Vice President Joe Biden) who as a Senator was resolved to divide Iraq to help lead political reconciliation may be a mistake:

The recent Kurdish gambit on a separate constitution is precisely the sort of thing I was worried about in making Vice President Biden the point man on Iraqi political reconciliation. When he was running for president, Biden sought to distinguish himself on the Iraq issue by prominently embracing the plan proposed by Peter Galbraith for forcibly dividing Iraq into three regions. This plan was popular with the Kurds — no surprise, Galbraith was a long-time supporter of Kurdish interests — but with no one else in the region (although the Iranians may have secretly liked it). It was panned by independent experts, and the American media generously avoided taking it seriously.

The Kurds may have taken it seriously, however, and their recent actions would seem drawn from the Galbraith-Biden playbook. Of course, one cannot blame Biden for Kurdish obstreperousness, but it is undeniably awkward to have America’s point man on the issue criticizing the Kurds for doing what for years he claimed was the only long-term solution for Iraq.

Biden is hardly the first political leader to be caught undermining his own campaign rhetoric on vital matters of national security. President Bush, himself, campaigned against the idea of using the military for nation-building and then committed the military to two massive nation-building projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. But Biden’s predicament is especially thorny, because to accomplish his new assignment, he must go beyond the pedestrian political hypocrisy of saying one thing and doing another. He must also somehow persuade the Iraqis that he no longer believes what he once emphatically said. And he must accomplish this at a time when American prestige and leverage (what the Iraqis call wasta) is steadily diminishing in Iraq.

Pivotal Player: The Iraq Effect And Ali al-Sistani

June 23, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Iran, Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

It is being reported by the EurasiaNet civil society that as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rasfanjani plots against his nemesis Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the Holy City of Qom, he is also ganering the support of Iraq’s most senior cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani:

Now that Ayatollah Khamenei has become inexorably connected to Ahmadinejad’s power grab, many clerics are coming around to the idea that the current system needs to be changed. Among those who are now believed to be arrayed against Ayatollah Khamenei is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the top Shi’a cleric in neighboring Iraq. Rafsanjani is known to have met with Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s representative in Iran, Javad Shahrestani.

Now since al-Sistani was a key ally of the United States in Iraq, would his emergence have been possible if it weren’t for the fall of Saddam Hussein?

Laughing Matters

June 12, 2009 by Frank Gannon | Filed Under Comedy, International Affairs, Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

On Wednesday night’s broadcast of the Colbert Report from Camp Victory in Baghdad, Steven Colbert interviewed  Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh.  The Deputy PM’s academic training was in the UK; he spent some time in Washington as spokesman for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.  He rolls with the Report’s quirky flow, nicely touches all the bases, and makes a strong impression.

Laughing Matters

June 9, 2009 by Frank Gannon | Filed Under Barack Obama, Comedy, Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

This week the Colbert Report is broadcasting from one of Saddam Hussein’s palaces in Baghdad.  Last night’s first show is worth watching.  

A highlight is the interview with General Ray Odierno, the Commanding General of the Multi-National Force–Iraq, and the amusing (and skillfully executed and edited) turn it takes.

The Answer To Immigration Woes

May 28, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Immigration, Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

Max Boot opines on a USA Today profile of Forat Aldawoodi an Iraqi citizen turned American soldier:

There are lots of people like Aldawoodi around the world who have great respect for America and would be eager to join our armed forces for a chance at citizenship. If we facilitate that process — as the armed forces are starting to — we will in return get many valuable members of the military and of society in general.

I am not much swayed by diatribes about how Rome fell because of its supposed overreliance on mercenaries. That’s not true and even if it were it’s of no relevance today because I am not suggesting turning over our defense to mercenaries. All I am suggesting is that we supplement our existing soldiery with more foreign-born volunteers who, like many illustrious predecessors, aspire to become Americans. One of Rome’s strengths was actually its ability to assimilate foreigners and that is one of America’s strengths as well — one we should do more to take advantage of.

Gates Is Right To End The Raptor Program

April 21, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Afghanistan, Iraq War, National Security | Leave a Comment 

Two weeks ago I was in Torrance, California home to a division of Honeywell International, a multinational supplier of engineering and defense related products. One of their main partners, Lockheed Martin, sent representatives to talk with employees in a rally for the F-22 Raptor, the most sophisticated fighter in the U.S. Air Force and currently on the chopping block for the 2010 Pentagon budget. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has been aiming for a year now to roll back future combat systems (FCS) in order to fight “today’s wars,” marking the first time COIN (Counter-Insurgency) experts “will have a seat at the table” proportional to 10 percent of total spending.  Hence, only 4 more of the $350 million dollar jets will be earmarked for fiscal 2010 with the program completely phased out by 2011.

I don’t believe for a moment that Secretary Gates discounts the capabilities of the F-22. the Raptor is nothing short of a marvel in modern aviation. Sitting in the virtual demo at Honeywell, it was plain to see that U.S. Air Force pilots – in the Raptor — possess unparalleled maneuverability and a field of vision that extends beyond the cockpit window.  In the fifth generation fighter pilots can effectively manage the airfield in a single battlefield display, allowing them to communicate information and grasp the position of wingmen, while absorbing the intent of enemies on the air and ground. It can be armed with internal weapons systems for air to air and air to ground roles, including: two 1,000 pound-class Joint Direct Attack Munitions for “smart” precision guided bombs, six medium range AIM-120C missiles, and two short-range AIM-9 missiles, the close-range M61A2 20mm rotary cannon and a globally positioned GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb for ground threats.  While frustrating and defeating enemies, the Raptor avoids detection with its reduced sound, heat, turbulence, and radar signatures.

Despite its unsurpassed capacity, air dominance, and the currently volatile global context, Secretary Gates is right when he says the Raptor has got to go. For the United States, “today’s wars” are primarily irregular, and therefore the military needs to meet its objectives with lower cost weapons systems and a population-centric approach.

Critics of the newly proposed Pentagon budget overlook that at $534 billion it is 4 percent more than the $513.3 billion earmarked for 2009. Critics also overlook the fact that the United States still dominates global defense spending. David Kilcullen from The Center For A New American Security (CNAS) notes that total U.S. defense spending comprised 54.5 percent of all nations in 2007 (70 percent including Iraq War funding). It stands to reason that, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, any rational enemy won’t engage American forces with conventional weapons, nonetheless dogfight against a F-22 in open air. It’s no wonder why the F-22 has proven useless in both countries.

What has been proven useful is the agility and the manpower which corresponds with combating the lawlessness of the unconventional battlefield. A reality that many conservative hawks haven’t come to terms with (and one that many liberals won’t stomach). John Nagl, President of CNAS and author of Learning To Eat Soup With Knife: Counter-Insurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, notes that it’s the industrial will and capacity of the American Army that developed its proclivity towards total annihilation of enemy fighters. Lesser Armies lacking the alternative of overwhelming the enemy such as the British force that successfully fought in Malaya in the mid-20th Century was forced into a more population-centric approach when the “kinetic” approach proved futile. Nagl notes that in 1956 – just as the Vietcong insurgency was beginning in the South of the country – the United States Army devoted none of its study to combating insurgencies or gaining knowledge of irregular warfare. The successful British – in contrast – spent just 51 (albeit well used) out of 1042 hours for the study of combating insurgency. Accordingly, the U.S. Army’s initial strategy – counter-productive and hampered by heavy losses — was based disproportionately on indiscriminate use of firepower: heavy artillery, close air support, and B-52 strikes that ultimately didn’t provide the capacity for overwhelming a very fluid and rational enemy.

It was under General Creighton Abrams (who eventually replaced General William Westmoreland as commander in Vietnam) that Vietnam Strategy began to change.  Commissioned in 1965 to lead The Program for the Pacification and Long Term Development of South Vietnam (POVN), Abrams concluded that the continuation of “search and destroy” operations would not meet the coalitions’ objectives instead favoring a localized low intensity – secure, hold, and rebuild — approach that could win the population to the government’s side.

According to Vietnam War historian Lewis Sorley, the population-centric strategy proved fruitful. American units maintained a persistent presence with the Vietnamese Army and local authorities to secure populations and provide developmental aid at the village level.  By 1968, the Vietcong insurgency was defeated, the numbers of American troops killed in action declined precipitously, and by 1973 the South was ready to defend itself if not for Congress’s decision to cut off operational funding.

Granted, a key element of the Nixon’s Vietnamization strategy was tactical air support for the Southern army against northern invasion. But even if air support were critical to “best efforts” in Afghanistan, Iraq, potentially Iran and more “conventional” enemies (China, and Russia are too prone to asymmetrical behavior), the United States armed forces already demonstrates air dominance with its current fleet. Secretary Gates also plans to increase the amount of F-35s, the capable Joint-Strike Fighter by purchasing 513 over a 5-year plan.

The Vietnam narrative is applicable for obvious reasons. The population-centric strategy led by General Petraeus in Iraq reflected “lessons learned.” Similar to Vietnamization, tribal leaders in 2007 were emboldened to re-take their country when supported by improved U.S. counter-insurgency measures. Especially Baghdad and the once blood-soaked al-Anbar province experienced a precipitous decline in civilian deaths. There has also been a steep drop in U.S. military deaths since 2008.

Afghanistan remains to be seen. But regional developments such as the 2006 Kunar Province road project have shown enormous promise in providing economic progress, unity with Kabul, and security from Taliban and al-Qaeda forces.  Ultimately, $500 million in additional funding to assist foreign militaries for similar stability measures and a 5 percent increase for special operations are a foregone conclusion when compared to what yields from the most sophisticated – in this case futile – aircraft.

Boot: We Need An Ambassador

April 6, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

As exemplified by a string of 7 car bombs in Baghdad today, Iraq still has problems battling its insurgency, which is why I agree with Max Boot that despite Christopher Hill being among the least qualified candidates for ambassador of the fledgling country, a strong interagency effort is needed, and fast:

I have no opinion on the specifics of the allegations but I fully agree with Weston that there are a host of urgent issues to confront in Iraq — the most urgent being “a recent outbreak of fighting in Baghdad between the Sons of Iraq (a Sunni group that likely includes at least some former insurgents) and the Iraqi Army”– and that only a full-fledged ambassador can bring sufficient heft to deal with local politicos in a convincing way.

Chris Hill would not have been my first choice for the job, or my second. It would be nice if the administration had chosen someone with some Middle East background rather than a history of ineffectual and feckless negotiations with North Korea. But a second-best ambassador is better than no ambassador at all. Either Brownback et al. should swiftly reach a deal with the administration to send someone else to Baghdad or they should let Hill’s nomination proceed to the Senate floor where he will win confirmation.

The Gamble Deconstructed

March 31, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Book Review, George W. Bush, International Affairs, Iraq War | 1 Comment 

TNN’s Joshua Trevino wrote this review for Thomas Rick’s new book about the the final chapter of the Iraq War, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008. What I found particular noteworthy was Trevino’s acknowledgment that though President Bush initially went full brace on a strategy that plunged us to failure, he showed un-reluctant and unflinching commitment to a strategy change that is now bearing success:

The most surprising — and least discussed — transitional figure in The Gamble is President George W. Bush. It’s no secret that the President was tightly bound to the persons and policies he chose to trust: a sometime virtue that became, in war, too often a flaw. In this light, his decision to support the surge over the record of his own leadership, the advice of his entire uniformed military leadership (excepting Petraeus himself), and his outgoing Secretary of Defense was a profound departure from expectations. Yet once he did shift course, he adhered to it with the same tenacity with which he pursued his previous strategy. As Ricks notes, it is certainly easy and even right to fault Bush for taking three years to get things right — but he was ahead of the actual leadership of the U.S. armed forces when he did. Ricks (who is, it should be noted, no Republican) also allows the reader a glimpse into the private conduct of the former President, who comes across as more than the incurious mouthpiece of popular media portrayals. “In these meetings [on Iraq strategy,]” Ricks reports one Army officer saying, “he is masterful — good political insights, good handle on the subject.” Among The Gamble’s many contributions to the history of this era must be a credit to George W. Bush, who got so many things wrong, but got this one big thing right.

Obama Is The New Bush

March 23, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Bush Administration, Iraq War, Obama administration | Leave a Comment 

Abe Greenwald explains that there have been no changes in Iraq policy between inauguration and now:

One must remember that Barack Obama is not referring to the benefits of any change that he’s made in Iraq policy — because he hasn’t made any. He is saying that the Iraq War and the future U.S. commitment there, as outlined by the Bush and Maliki governments, have left him with the smoothest, most promising issue on his daily agenda. It turns out that with the heat of campaigning lifted, the Iraq War is finally acknowledged as what it is: a success.

Ironically, and tragically, Obama won’t use this as an issue around which to rally much needed American support. He has spent too long talking down the war to now cite it as an example of American endurance. But for the former president, sitting in Texas, this must have felt pretty good. No matter how many signing ceremonies are to follow.

The Only Risk Is Wanting To Stay

March 23, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

Iraq’s tourism industry has taken the first steps of re-branding the country’s image:

Why not? When security improved after years of civil war and brutality imposed by drug cartels , Colombia pulled it off:

CIC to USMC: “Semper Fi. Hoorah.”

February 27, 2009 by Frank Gannon | Filed Under Barack Obama, Iraq War, Military, Obama administration | 2 Comments 

(President Obama today with Marines at Camp Lejeune: “We sent our troops to Iraq to do away with Saddam Hussein’s regime – and you got the job done. We kept our troops in Iraq to help establish a sovereign government – and you got the job done. And we will leave the Iraqi people with a hard-earned opportunity to live a better life – that is your achievement; that is the prospect that you have made possible.”)

President Obama made his first speech as Commander-in-Chief at a military installation earlier today when he visited Camp Lejeune.  (The whole speech may be seen here.)

The press has focused on his announcement that American combat troops will be out of Iraq by August 2010; and the war opponents have focused on the fact that as many as 50,000 troops will be left for training and counter-terror purposes.

But the speech also included some truly important, noble, and stirring words that have, sadly, gone largely unnoticed and unappreciated.   They are worth quoting at length and deserve attention — and respect:

As a nation, we have had our share of debates about the war in Iraq. It has, at times, divided us as a people. To this very day, there are some Americans who want to stay in Iraq longer, and some who want to leave faster. But there should be no disagreement on what the men and women of our military have achieved.

And so I want to be very clear: We sent our troops to Iraq to do away with Saddam Hussein’s regime – and you got the job done. We kept our troops in Iraq to help establish a sovereign government – and you got the job done. And we will leave the Iraqi people with a hard-earned opportunity to live a better life – that is your achievement; that is the prospect that you have made possible.

There are many lessons to be learned from what we’ve experienced. We have learned that America must go to war with clearly defined goals, which is why I’ve ordered a review of our policy in Afghanistan. We have learned that we must always weigh the costs of action, and communicate those costs candidly to the American people, which is why I’ve put Iraq and Afghanistan into my budget. We have learned that in the 21st century, we must use all elements of American power to achieve our objectives, which is why I am committed to building our civilian national security capacity so that the burden is not continually pushed on to our military. We have learned that our political leaders must pursue the broad and bipartisan support that our national security policies depend upon, which is why I will consult with Congress and in carrying out my plans. And we have learned the importance of working closely with friends and allies, which is why we are launching a new era of engagement in the world.

The starting point for our policies must always be the safety of the American people. I know that you – the men and women of the finest fighting force in the history of the world – can meet any challenge, and defeat any foe. And as long as I am your Commander-in-Chief, I promise you that I will only send you into harm’s way when it is absolutely necessary, and provide you with the equipment and support you need to get the job done. That is the most important lesson of all – for the consequences of war are dire, the sacrifices immeasurable.

You know because you have seen those sacrifices. You have lived them. And we all honor them.

“Semper Fidelis” – it means always being faithful to Corps, and to country, and to the memory of fallen comrades like Corporal Jonathan Yale and Lance Corporal Jordan Haerter. These young men enlisted in a time of war, knowing they would face great danger. They came here, to Camp Lejeune, as they trained for their mission. And last April, they were standing guard in Anbar. In an age when suicide is a weapon, they were suddenly faced with an oncoming truck filled with explosives. These two Marines stood their ground. These two Marines opened fire. And these two Marines stopped that truck. When the thousands of pounds of explosives detonated, they had saved fifty Marines and Iraqi police who would have been in the truck’s path, but Corporal Yale and Lance Corporal Haerter lost their own lives. Jonathan was 21. Jordan was 19.

In the town where Jordan Haerter was from, a bridge was dedicated in his name. One Marine who traveled to the ceremony said: “We flew here from all over the country to pay tribute to our friend Jordan, who risked his life to save us. We wouldn’t be here without him.”

America’s time in Iraq is filled with stories of men and women like this. Their names are written into bridges and town squares. They are etched into stones at Arlington, and in quiet places of rest across our land. They are spoken in schools and on city blocks. They live on in the memories of those who wear your uniform, in the hearts of those they loved, and in the freedom of the nation they served.

Each American who has served in Iraq has their own story. Each of you has your own story. And that story is now a part of the history of the United States of America – a nation that exists only because free men and women have bled for it from the beaches of Normandy to the deserts of Anbar; from the mountains of Korea to the streets of Kandahar. You teach us that the price of freedom is great. Your sacrifice should challenge all of us – every single American – to ask what we can do to be better citizens.

There will be more danger in the months ahead. We will face new tests and unforeseen trials. But thanks to the sacrifices of those who have served, we have forged hard-earned progress, we are leaving Iraq to its people, and we have begun the work of ending this war.

Thank you, God Bless you, and God Bless the United States of America. Semper Fi. Hoorah.

Roger Morris On Obama In Wartime

February 26, 2009 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under Afghanistan, American Politics, Asia, Barack Obama, China, International Affairs, Iran, Iraq War, Middle East, Nixon Administration, Nixon Administration figures, Nixon in the News, Obama administration, Presidents, Richard Nixon, Russia, Terrorism, U.S. History, Vietnam | Leave a Comment 

Since January 16, the New York Times has had on its site a group blog, “100 Days,” in which five presidential biographers take turns comparing the initial stages of the Obama Administration to five presidencies.  Jean Edward Smith does the comparing to the first hundred days of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Richard Reeves to John F. Kennedy, Robert Dallek to Lyndon B. Johnson, Lou Cannon to Ronald Reagan….and it falls to former National Security Council staffer Roger Morris, author of a massive book about Richard Nixon’s life and career up to 1952 (which appeared in 1991, seemingly the first of a series of volumes, but never continued), to draw parallels between the forty-fourth President and the thirty-seventh.

In his first post on February 4, “The President Behind The Mask,” Morris offered not much more than the usual liberal boilerplate about the contrast between the “bring us together” rhetoric of the 1968 campaign and what he views as RN’s divisive style of governance.  But in the post which went up a few minutes ago, “How Not To End Another President’s War,” Morris draws on his own experience in the NSC in 1969 and 1970. (He quit in April of the latter year because of his objections to the incursion of American forces into Cambodia.)

The overwhelming majority of media coverage of the Obama White House has focused on the stimulus bill, the new budget, and other economic and domestic initiatives, but Morris is among those who keep in mind that Obama has inherited two wars, and that the verdict of history on his presidency will, in large measure, take into account how he handles them.  So far there has been a lot of vague discussion about concentrating on the Afghan war, and today CNN reported that the President has told Congressional leaders that all combat troops will be pulled from Iraq by August 2010, with support troops to stay until the end of 2011 under the agreement the Bush Administration reached with the Iraqi government.

But Morris is aware that saying there will be a withdrawal is one thing, and being able to do it within the timetable outlined is another, especially given the unpredictable nature of Persian Gulf realpolitik.  He refers to the days of the winter of 1969-1970, when Dr. Henry Kissinger met with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris for the initial series of top-secret talks apart from the official peace negotiations in that city, and says that Kissinger’s conversations “got far nearer a settlement than any account has ever indicated.”  Morris states that the promise of these negotiations was shattered by the coup that overthrew Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia and the events that ensued.  (I have to admit that I wish Morris would explain just how such a settlement could have been reached in the days before the improvement of American relations with China and the USSR gradually pushed North Vietnam into a situation where it had to become less recalcitrant about a negotiated peace.)

Morris’s post concludes:

Exorcised or not, ghosts of Vietnam hover over the Obama foreign policy, not least in key officials like former National Security Adviser James L. Jones Jr. and the special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke — men whose formative career experiences were in Vietnam, and who have not yet told us what they think of the chilling relevance of that history to what they now face.

One comparison that is relevant here is that when America sought to extricate itself from Vietnam, it had to deal with just one opponent at the negotiating table, the Hanoi government – and that was an opponent that, for all its intransigence, was generally willing to talk.   In Iraq, the struggle for the last six years has been to not only subdue the savagery of al-Qaida, but to combat the baleful influences of Iran and Syria, which will pose a problem throughout the Obama presidency.

It’s worth mentioning that at one point Morris remarks that the Cambodian invasion of 1970 was “what a later era might call a ’surge.’”  That may be more telling than he knows. The “surge,” widely denounced by Democrats (and some Republicans) at the time, was the key to gaining the degree of peace Iraq enjoys now. The Cambodian incursion, hated though it was by antiwar activists, did neutralize the supply lines and gave a breathing space to American and South Vietnamese forces at a time when it was needed.

Holes In The Draft

February 20, 2009 by Frank Gannon | Filed Under Bush Administration, Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

Thomas Ricks, the WaPo’s military correspondent, was the author of the 2006 bestseller Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq.

He is now making the rounds promoting his new book The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008. And, giving credit where it’s due, he is a very appealing and (no pun intended) disarming guest. Not surprisingly, given his credentials, he has been widely welcomed and little challenged.

That balance is redressed today by Mario Loyola on National Review Online.

Mr. Loyola, an attorney and former Senate and Pentagon aide and speechwriter, praises Mr. Ricks’ felicitous prose style and (unlike another WaPo best-selling author) his restraint in not making up  mindsets for people he quotes.  But he has major methodological reservations:

…in the absence of archival research, this mountain of quotations fails to communicate so many critical aspects of what happened — and of how decisions were made — that it would risk incoherence if it had to stand on its own as history. Ricks solves that problem by weaving his reportage around the most familiar propositions of the conventional media narrative: 1) Rumsfeld and his senior generals stubbornly refused to implement a proper counterinsurgency strategy and nearly caused a disaster; 2) the surge has succeeded militarily but failed politically; 3) democracy is a pipe dream in Iraq, where “lots of little Saddams” have replaced the one we toppled; 4) the Iraq war has been most of all a victory for Iran; and 5) Obama will be fighting the Iraq war long into the future, with an uncertain outcome. Each of these propositions is seriously flawed if not completely wrong.

He examines each of these propositions at considerable length and succeeds in raising many interesting questions.

Loving While Fighting

February 10, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

Captain Michael Few’s war and leadership essay on Small War’s Journal is a must read for those interested in the success of the surge:

One of my best commanders preached a very simple command philosophy. “Mike,” he would proclaim, “sometimes you got to give the love, and sometimes you got to give them the hate.”

To emphasize his point, he would clench both fists and extend mock punches: one representing the love and one representing the hate. This philosophy served our squadron well both in leading his airborne reconnaissance squadron and clearing Al Qaeda held safe-havens in Northern Iraq.

The premise behind this philosophy reflected many years studying the art of leadership and his straightforward assessment coupled a deep understanding in discretion and discernment tempered in the pragmatism of the complicated realities of real life mutually exclusive to the black and white moral world view preached at the academy.

In 1879, MG John Schofield declared that “the discipline which makes the soldier of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh nor tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army.” Conversely, the leadership of coddling and friendship is marked with disrespect and irreverence from one’s subordinates.

Simply put, soldiers desire neither a dictator nor buddy in a commander. They demand leadership.

Not As Bad As Iraq

February 9, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Afghanistan, International Affairs, Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

Despite pessimism and the seemingly lowered expectations of the Obama administration, Max Boot explains that Afghanistan is nowhere near the highest levels of annual violence that Iraq experienced in 2006 and 2007, where monthly carnage was obscene:

Admittedly the situation there is serious but is it really “much tougher than Iraq” as suggested by the new presidential envoy Richard Holbrooke at the Munich Security Conference? According to the Brookings Afghanistan Index, 2,118 Afghan civilians died last year. (In this Los Angeles Times article, I mistakenly gave a slightly lower figure that was only for January-August 2008, not the whole year.) That’s bad but still nowhere as bad as Iraq at the height of the violence in 2006-2007 when more than 2,000 civilians were dying each month.

Christopher Hill Nominated For Iraq

February 3, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under International Affairs, Iraq War | Leave a Comment 

Undersecretary of State Chris Hill has been nominated as Iraq Ambassador to replace the sober, knowledgeable, talented, and Arabic speaking Ryan Crocker:

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, a career diplomat who since 2005 was chief negotiator in the often difficult effort to try to persuade North Korea to end its nuclear programs, will be nominated as ambassador to Iraq, administration officials said.

He is an unexpected choice to succeed the highly regarded Ryan C. Crocker, who retired last month after a career spent largely in the Arab world.

Hill is a consummate dealmaker, but he does not speak Arabic, and his expertise lies in Europe and Northeast Asia. He was ambassador to Poland, Macedonia and South Korea and also was a top negotiator to the Dayton peace accords that ended the Bosnian war in the mid-1990s.

A consummate dealmaker? Recall his decision to accept a less than favorable deal on North Korea’s nuclear declarations last summer. James Rosen was steaming in July:

Yet in welcoming the North’s declaration last week, eight months after Hill offered his “professional judgment,” White House National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley admitted the Six-Party allies still need to “get to the bottom of this issue of the uranium enrichment…Our intelligence community has some concerns about their past activities and has some concerns about potentially ongoing activities.” And the proliferation activity? “We want to get to the bottom of that” as well, Hadley said, “to make sure there is not continuing activity going on between North Korea and Syria, or activity with respect to other locations as well.”

So it would appear that, after long delay, the Bush administration has chosen to accept — and to hail as “a good step forward,” in the words of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice — a “partial declaration” of the very sort her point man on the issue, Ambassador Hill, dismissed earlier this year as “no declaration at all.” Indeed, given the nature of the document’s omissions, and the administration’s own stated suspicions about ongoing activities, it is fair to wonder whether the declaration even rises to the level of the “80 percent or 90 percent” Hill also declared unacceptable in January. All the North Koreans were willing to say in their declaration about HEU and Syria, according to Hadley, was that “they’re not engaged in these activities now and won’t [be] in the future.” “They also have acknowledged in writing that we have raised concerns,” Hadley added, as if that were a victory for American diplomacy.

The Washington Post does note, however, that it was at Hill’s urging that the Bush Administration looked more closely at the nefarious nature of Kim Jong-Il and North Korea.

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