Pit Bulls And Attack Dogs

November 18, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under Nixon Center, Obama administration | Leave a Comment 

Washington blogger and former Nixon Center executive director Steve Clemons is quoted in a New York Times article about the drama attending staff and prospective Cabinet picks by “No-Drama Obama”:

“Barack Obama is bringing in all of the pit bulls and attack dogs and spear hunters into his administration,” said Steve Clemons, a fellow at the New America Foundation who also writes a blog called The Washington Note. “We all thought he was going to be a ‘tending the fields’ type.”

Two Dogs Fighting Under a Carpet

November 11, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under Nixon Center, Russia | Leave a Comment 

Winston Churchill once famously described watching Soviet politics from the outside as “like watching two dogs fighting under a carpet.”  It’s clear that something is happening, but it’s hard to tell what.  Much the same is the case today in the complex relationship between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, his predecessor and subordinate, President-turned-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and their respective supporters.

When Medvedev took office this spring, some argued that he and Putin would genuinely share power (something the Russian government also said, noting their constitutional division-of-labor).  Others suggested that the relatively liberal-sounding Medvedev could gradually rule on his own or, alternatively, that Putin would continue to dominate Moscow from his new post.  This debate had barely settled down when the Russian-Georgian war seemed to shift Russian domestic politics strongly in Putin’s favor, empowering the Prime Minister–who flew to Russia’s North Caucasus to supervise–and his supporters in the security services.  Then, again almost immediately, Russia plunged into financial crisis, with the stock market losing two-thirds of its value and many so-called oligarchs looking for the Kremlin’s version of a bailout.  And Medvedev’s market-oriented minions seemed to have regained some lost ground.

Now, Medvedev is calling for constitutional changes to extend the Russian president’s term from four to six years.  Government spokesmen claim that the change would not apply to Medvedev during his current term, but only to whomever serves the next term.  Moscow conspiracy theorists interpret this in multiple ways, but one of the leading theories is that Medvedev will remain in office only long enough to pass the measure and then resign–making Putin the acting president and almost ensuring his immediate election as president.  What’s really happening?  Who knows?  But something must be going on under there.

Bulk Up With Nixon, Barack!

November 1, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under International Affairs, Nixon Center, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

Blogger Matthew Yglesias analyzes the split endorsement of “The National Interest”’s publishers, Nixonians Bob Ellsworth and Dimitri Simes:

Clearly, this isn’t going to be the difference-maker in next year’s election. But in terms of the competition among elites and interest-groups that does a lot to shape the actual policy environment once the electoral die is cast, this is a sign of important things to come. Obama has a real opportunity to eschew the excesses of the neocon-lite wing of the Democratic Party and add the bulk of realist practitioners to his coalition. Alternatively, realists might do some work inside the Republican coalition and try to make a serious effort to retake control from the neocons.

Nixon Journal’s Chiefs Splitting Their Vote

October 30, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under American Politics, Election 2008, Nixon Center, The National Interest | 1 Comment 

Endorsement news from “The National Interest,” The Nixon Center’s foreign policy journal:

With just a few days before the presidential election, the publishers of The National Interest stand divided on who is the best choice for America. One of us, Robert Ellsworth, has already voted for Senator Barack Obama. Another, Dimitri Simes, will vote for Senator John McCain. But each of us has serious concerns about both candidates.

Before describing our reservations, however, let us state the obvious: the choice is between two truly remarkable men—one, the first African American nominated by a major party, has captivated not only Democrats but the nation with his charisma, eloquence and personification of change; the other, a genuine American hero, is a man of courage, independence and demonstrated ability to transcend party lines. The nation can be proud to have leaders of such caliber on the ballot.

Russians for Obama

October 28, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under Election 2008, International Affairs, Nixon Center, Russia | Leave a Comment 

Earlier this year, The Nixon Center organized a day-long event with three advisors to Dmitry Medvedev, who had just been elected Russia’s new president.  During the course of the day, one of the American participants asked our Russian guests whom they would like to see elected as the U.S. president this fall.  The short version of their answer is that they least favored McCain, who has been the toughest rhetorically on Russia, but did not like Hillary Clinton (then still in the race) either, because of lingering resentments from the Clinton-Yeltsin years and unhappy memories of some of her advisors.  So they supported Obama, who in their words “had not said very much” about Russia and as a younger man would ensure that the forty-something Medvedev would have a counterpart who also belongs to the internet generation.

This general view still seems widely held in Russia on the eve of the election.  Just this week, Konstantin Kosachev, the chairman of the Russian Duma’s foreign affairs committee (the Duma is the lower house of parliament, elected by party list and dominated by the pro-government United Russia party), was quoted in the Russian press saying “McCain got his political formation during the Cold War.  He dedicated most of his life to the fight against communism. It’s clear that to this day he still thrashes along that front without seeing any real difference between the Soviet Union and modern Russia.”  Kosachev was more positive toward Obama, saying “Obama doesn’t differ particularly in his beliefs about Russia from the Republican candidate, but he is a young politician, without prejudices and so, more ready to take on a new proposals and approaches.”

As a practical matter, however, it is not so easy to predict policy under a hypothetical Obama Administration.  Obama does not really have a policy record on Russia and even his rhetorical record is somewhat thin.  His general foreign policy instincts seem to favor engagement over confrontation, but his instincts alone are unlikely to drive policy.  Several other factors would also shape decisions, including the views of advisors and senior officials, attitudes in Congress, and perspectives of major political constituencies focused on the relationship (many of which are skeptical toward Russia).  In an environment of widespread negative views toward Russia after the war in Georgia, Obama might find it quite difficult to build a strong political coalition supporting engagement.  Whether Obama would be willing to risk attacks for being “soft” on Russia — from not only McCain, but also Democrats like Richard Holbrooke — even as he moves to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq is also an interesting question.  From this perspective, McCain would have a certain “Nixon-goes-to-China” credibility if he were to decide to reach out to Moscow as president.  Obama could lose some liberal interventionist Democrats in engaging with Russia and his success with such an approach might end up depending heavily on winning the support of realist/pragmatic Republicans.  Alternatively, Obama-the-political-pragmatist might win out over Obama-the-foreign-policy-pragmatist and a harder line might result, leaving today’s Russians for Obama disappointed.

Before The Paleocons, The Neocons

October 27, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under Election 2008, International Affairs, Nixon Center, Republican Party | Leave a Comment 

Washington Note’s Steve Clemons, our former Nixon Center colleague, says it’s all well and good for Sen. McCain to complain about conservatives who pressured him to pick Gov. Palin over his friend Sen. Lieberman. But beyond that, there’s the matter of McCain’s much earlier drift toward neoconservatism in foreign policy. Clemons references this Financial Times article quoting The Center’s Dimitri Simes:

Then there are the “realist” Republicans who worry that Mr McCain has been captured by neoconservative advisers, such as Randy Schuenemann, his chief foreign policy guru, who has helped shape the candidate’s relatively hardline stance on Russia, Iran and other issues.

This has combined with Mr McCain’s tendency to view foreign policy as a kind of “morality play” in which there are people who oppose America and people who do not, they say. Foreign policy was a key reason why Colin Powell, the former secretary of state, chose to endorse Mr Obama on Sunday.

“I don’t know of anybody, anywhere other than John McCain who thinks Mikheil Saakashvili is a ‘great leader’ of Georgia – it is an absurd evaluation,” said Dimitri Simes, head of the Nixon Centre in Washington. “John tends to see the world emotionally through characters he knows. And once he has decided who the good guys are and the bad guys are, then facts and context won’t affect him.”

Global Political Transformation On Back Burner

October 9, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under International Affairs, Nixon Center, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

“The National Interest”’s Ximena Ortiz wonders whether the economic crisis is making Sen. McCain a foreign policy realist again:

With polls indicating that concerns over the economic crisis preponderantly outweigh concerns over national security and terrorism, it makes political sense for McCain to ratchet down the brinkmanship and the possibility of more costly foreign adventures. But there is more at issue here than a shift in Americans’ focus and of McCain’s tone. Indeed, the current economic crisis seems to undercut some fundamental principles of neoconservatism.

How Hank Greenberg Gets AIG Back: He Buys It

October 2, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under Economic issues, Nixon Center, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

AIG’s legendary former chairman and CEO (and Chairman of The Nixon Center) talks to “National Interest” editor Justine Rosenthal:

Obviously the big investment [Greenberg's companies] had in AIG has been hammered, very, very sharply. But with mark to market now pushed aside, AIG should really have a renaissance in how they value their assets. They should not have the same need for the same amount of money they had to borrow from the Fed.

What the Fed and the Treasury have done is really a tragedy for the company. What it means, using Treasury Secretary Paulson’s words from Meet the Press, is a liquidation of AIG to pay back the government. It is an outrage to me. AIG should never be liquidated, it is a great company and we’ve had many people call us who would like to work with us to buy some of it. In the meantime, we’re going to grow.

 

Nixon On Georgia

September 17, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under International Affairs, Nixon Center, Richard Nixon, Russia | Leave a Comment 

Writing today in the Washington Times, The Nixon Center’s president, Dimitri Simes, describes posthumous and ultimately unheeded advice given to Georgia’s President by Richard Nixon:

Several years ago at a Nixon Center dinner in Mr. Saakashvili’s honor, I asked the Georgian president what he thought about a conversation years before, in 1991, between former President Richard Nixon and Georgia’s first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Mr. Nixon had gone to Tbilisi despite the strong displeasure of then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to support Georgia’s independence from the USSR. But Mr. Nixon was alarmed when Mr. Gamsakhurdia told him that not only was the Soviet Union dissolving, but Russia itself was weak, and it could be the right moment to deliver a devastating blow.

“Mr. President,” Mr. Nixon said, “there are two kinds of people in Washington you are going to encounter - those who will tell you what you want to hear and those who will tell you what you need to hear. And what you need to hear is that no matter what your friends and admirers in the United States may tell you, America is not going to go to war with Russia because of Georgia.”

Mr. Saakashvili, while visibly unhappy with my question, answered that he was no Gamsakhurdia, that he knew in which neighborhood Georgia was located, and that he understood the importance of having normal relations with Russia.

Let’s Get Neo-Real, Guys

September 3, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under International Affairs, Nixon Center, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

At “The National Interest,” Justine Rosenthal and Dimitri Simes argue that neither candidate has made the sale on foreign policy:

[I]f you try to figure out where our candidates really stand on the key challenges confronting the United States, and the kinds of decisions they would make in office, you might be out of luck. We still know fairly little—and what we know seems to offer little comfort.

The Other Biden

August 23, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under Democratic Party, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

Our former Nixon Center colleague Steve Clemons, a blogger-about-Washington, has gracious words for Sen. Biden’s wife, Jill.

Andau, South Ossetia, And Taiwan

August 12, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under Bush Administration, International Affairs, Nixon Center, Nixon Library, Richard Nixon, Russia | 9 Comments 

“Nixon At Andau” by Ferenc Daday

The analysis of Nixon Center President Dimitri Simes is the linchpin of Reuters’ assessment of limited U.S. options in South Ossetia:

“Let me say at this point that there are no good solutions. Either we have to try to remove them (the Russians) by force or accept a humiliating defeat,” said Dimitri Simes, founding president of the Nixon Center in Washington.

“It is not a happy situation, and we did not have to have this situation, and I think the (Bush) administration has considerable responsibility for that.”

Georgian forces entered separatist South Ossetia last week, trying to retake the pro-Russian enclave that broke away in the 1990s. Moscow, which supports South Ossetia’s independence, responded by sending its troops into Georgia proper.

Georgia has appealed for international intervention and pulled its battered forces back to defend the capital, Tbilisi, as Russian troops pushed deeper into its territory, ignoring Western pleas to halt.

Simes said U.S. encouragement of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, one of Washington’s staunchest allies, may have led him to believe he could get away with military action to take back control of South Ossetia.

The Bush administration has pushed hard for Georgia to join NATO, against European misgivings and Russian fury at the idea.

“Saakashvili was discouraged from attacking Russian troops in South Ossetia but he clearly never was told point blank ‘If you do it, you are on your own,’” said Moscow-born Simes, who was an informal adviser to President Richard Nixon.

The all-too-familiar images of violence and suffering from Georgia bring to mind an analogous crisis in U.S.-Russian relations a half-century ago. The nature of the regime in Moscow was different, the geostrategic dynamics almost identical. Through the Voice of America, the United States had urged Hungarian freedom fighters to rise up against their communist government. When they did so in October 1956, and Soviet forces cruelly crushed them, President Eisenhower realized that despite U.S. encouragement of the uprising, if he deployed U.S. forces he would be risking a nuclear World War III. Instead, virtually all he could do was send Vice President Nixon to meet with Hungarian refugees who had flooded over the border into Austria. The moment was captured in an heroic-style painting by Hungarian-American artist Ferenc Daday, “Bridge At Andau,” which until recently was on display at the Nixon Library, where Hungarian-Americans would sometimes come considerable distances to see it. It was taken down in January by the Library’s federal custodians.

As for President Nixon, he learned from the Hungarian tragedy, and especially from the anguished faces of refugees who pleaded to know why the U.S. had let them down — their expressions so memorably captured by Mr. Daday — that it’s dangerous for the United States to encourage provocations of smaller allies’ powerful neighbors when we’re not in a position to help when the shooting starts. This seeming bit of common sense underpins the “enlightened realism” view of foreign policy enunciated by The Nixon Center and its journal, “The National Interest.” The U.S. prides itself on being on the side of truth and righteousness, freedom and justice. But if our encouragement of Georgia emboldened it to challenge Moscow, and Moscow called the bluff (knowing as well as Mr. Bush does that the U.S. could realistically do almost nothing), of what value to the suffering people of South Ossetia is our commitment to truth and justice?

The question also applies to the other focus of the world’s attention this week — China. Since 1972 and the Nixon-Kissinger-Zhou-Mao Shanghai Communique, successive Presidents, President Bush most militantly of all, have extended a security guarantee to Taiwan in the event of an attack from the mainland. In the heady days before Iraq, neoconservatives sometimes sounded as though they wanted to provoke the mother of all pro-democracy confrontations in the Taiwan Strait. Pro-independence politicians in Taiwan began to act out their part, certain that the U.S. would keep its promises. How many hundreds of thousands would die in such a war? How many American families wanted to lose their sons and daughters? Thankfully, wise heads have prevailed in Taipei and Washington as well as in Beijing. No one wants the rights of people to be free and thrive to be trampled, whether in Hungary, South Ossetia, or Taiwan. On the other hand, talk — even the noblest expressions of American ideals — is often cheap, while the cost of war, especially for those who suffer, is always incalculable.

Bad Choices In Georgia

August 11, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under International Affairs, Nixon Center, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

Dimitri Simes says the U.S. has no good choices in the South Ossetia crisis but nonetheless has to take a stand:

There is no realistic way to remove Russian forces from Abkhazia and South Ossetia short of a major war with Russia, which no responsible American political leader would advocate at this point. But whatever Saakashvili’s responsibility is for the confrontation, America cannot allow an ally to be soundly defeated or especially overthrown by an insurgent Russia. Accordingly, the first priority for the United States should be to make abundantly clear to Moscow that any attempt at forceful regime change in Georgia will have severe consequences for the U.S.-Russian relationship and that the United States would help Georgia to resist on the ground.

As for U.S. choices before the crisis erupted:

Some of the angriest statements come from those inside and outside the Bush administration who contributed, I assume unwittingly, to making this crisis happen.

We Will Miss Peter Rodman

August 5, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under In Memoriam, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

Today, The Washington Post and The New York Times published obituaries of Peter Rodman, The Nixon Center’s former Director of National Security Programs (1995-2001). We greatly miss Peter, who was a wonderful colleague and friend, and have also posted a short statement at The Nixon Center’s web site.

Is Detroit Finally Doomed?

August 1, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under China, Economic issues, Energy, Environmental issues, International Affairs, Nixon Center, Russia | Leave a Comment 

Reuters and others are reporting that General Motors is seeking buyers for the Hummer brand and other assets to raise up $4 billion to keep the company afloat. The problem is that GM’s market capitalization is only $6.5 billion — which leads one to wonder how company executives think they can get $4 billion and still have much left after losses of over $50 billion in the last three years. One must also ask whether the stubborn refusal to develop and sell more fuel-efficient vehicles in recent decades may have already doomed GM and the rest of the former Big Three American car manufacturers and we just don’t know it yet because their bodies are still moving. (Note to Congressional Republicans: sometimes greater regulation can actually be in companies’ long-term interest, whether they know it or not.)

Equally striking are two more facts. First, GM’s total worth is just one-fifteenth that of Toyota, and roughly on par with India’s Tata Motors and Russia’s Avtovaz — companies unknown to the vast majority of Americans. This is another illustration of how the once-mighty company has fallen. Second, reports on GM’s talks with possible buyers identify Indian, Russian, and Chinese firms — not the Japanese or the Europeans — as potential suitors. Expect more of the same as the balance of power in the global economy shifts increasingly in favor of these rapidly growing economies. The Russian and Indian economies are still small compared to America’s, and Russia’s in particular will probably stay that way for some time, but they are also clearly new players — and new players with high growth rates and ambitious goals. This is also cause for reflection.

Nixon In Cuba

July 29, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under International Affairs, Nixon Center, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

Here’s gavel-to-gavel coverage of the New America Foundation’s panel discussion in Washington Monday on the question of what RN would’ve done about U.S.-Cuba relations. Among the panelists: Dimitri Simes, Nixon Center President and Publisher of The National Interest.

Next Stop, Havana?

July 22, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under International Affairs, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

The New America Foundation is asking, “What Would Nixon Do on U.S.-Cuba Relations?” Nixon Center President Dimitri Simes is among the speakers next Monday in Washington. (’Course, in his last book in 1994, RN called for normalization.)

No Israel to the Rescue

June 20, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under American Politics, Economic issues, Election 2008, International Affairs, Israel and Palestinians, National Security, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

News that Israeli military exercises may have been practice-runs for air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have generated considerable buzz, even contributing to an increase in the price of oil.  Personally, I think that anyone hoping for Israel to rescue the United States from its Iran dilemma–especially before the presidential election–is engaging in naive wishful thinking.

Let’s do a little thought experiment.  Numerous sources have already predicted that a U.S. attack on Iran could drive oil prices as high as $200 per barrel and send gas prices to $5 or $6 per gallon.  It seems unlikely that an Israeli attack would have any less impact on prices.  In fact, one could argue that it might have a greater impact on prices–a U.S. attack would destabilize Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf, but an Israeli attack could take the rest of the Middle East along with them depending on how Israel’s neighbors, Hamas, and Hezbollah react.

Knowing that American voters are already angry about high gas prices–and that U.S. politicians are running scared–what Israeli Prime Minister would knowingly create a situation in which some Americans might blame Israel for $6-a-gallon gasoline?  Only a crazy one.  And whatever one thinks of Ehud Olmert, he doesn’t seem crazy.  And the political math on this doesn’t get much better after the election either: what Israeli Prime Minister would want to start a relationship with a new American President by handing him an even bigger energy crisis?

Anyone dreaming that Israel will solve the very thorny problem of Iran for us–allowing the United States to avoid making some difficult choices–needs a dose of reality.

High Prices, Hot Tempers

May 28, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under Economic issues, Election 2008, International Affairs, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

Testifying last week in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the foreign policy consequences of high oil prices, I was most struck by the visible anger from Committee members–on a bipartisan basis–toward Saudi Arabia. One after another, they condemned Saudi Arabia for “humiliating” the United States by forcing President Bush to “beg” King Abdullah to increase oil production, which the King refused to do, arguing that Saudi experts do not see sufficient sustained demand to justify it. One member of Congress wanted to find a way to “throw [their oil] back in their faces” and another suggested cutting off arms sales (perhaps emotionally satisfying, but ultimately a big gift to Russian arms manufacturers).

The scary thing is that we are still five months away from the this fall’s elections and that neither prices nor the anger and political grandstanding they generate have yet to peak. What happens when they do could have a major impact on America and the international system that some of our politicians seem almost inherently unable to think about in a rational way.

Are the Saudis behaving in a friendly way toward the United States by refusing the President’s request to increase production? No, not really. Are they obliged to be friendly? No, not really. Do we have a right to buy oil at low prices? No, not really. Is there anything we can do about it? Yes — but bashing the Saudis is not the answer, especially when the U.S. is trying to engage Saudi Arabia both in helping us out of Iraq and in the Middle East peace process.

Oil prices basically have three components: high demand for a scarce resource, global uncertainty and even fear about future supply and demand, and a weak dollar that makes the prices we pay here even higher than those paid by the Europeans, for example. We can and should be addressing all three of these factors in ways that contribute to lower prices. How? By reducing our consumption of oil, acting internationally in ways that cool rather than increasing uncertainty (such as limiting rhetoric about possible military action against Iran), and working to strengthen the U.S. economy and a dollar that is at historic lows.

Some will argue that increasing U.S. domestic production could also reduce prices. I am skeptical of this as many have argued that Saudi Arabia could well reduce its own production to blunt the impact. But there is no reason not to try this too in a responsible way and with modest expectations.

The text of my testimony is available on The Nixon Center’s web site.

Welcome Aboard, Colleague

May 20, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under News media, Nixon Center, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

        

          New editor Justine Rosenthal with PBS producer Michael Mosettig 

Globetrotting blogger Steve Clemons welcomes Justine Rosenthal, the newly-appointed editor of The National Interest, The Nixon Center’s foreign policy journal. And congratulations from your California cousins at The New Nixon, Justine!

Realism on Energy and Climate Change

May 8, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under American Politics, China, Economic issues, Election 2008, Environmental issues, International Affairs, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

John Taylor correctly pointed out yesterday that as unpopular as high gas prices may be, they are not all bad: high prices typically encourage conservation and efficiency technologies that should help us both to limit our oil dependence and to stem the growth in greenhouse gas emissions.  Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, both of these impacts have been marginal so far in the United States and are unlikely to result in big changes before we (and others around the world) face an energy and climate train wreck.

The first problem is that while Americans have somewhat reduced their use of gasoline with higher prices, the difference has been small.  Why?  As Robin West, Chairman of the energy consulting firm PFC Energy and others have pointed out, our communities and infrastructure force people to drive.  More and more people live in the suburbs, have long commutes, and have no viable public transportation options.

A second problem is that the technologies currently in use and in the pipeline (so to speak) also don’t make a big difference.  Hybrids help, but are rare.  Electric and fuel cell vehicles aren’t really commercially viable yet and–even when they are–will still result in significant carbon emissions because they will depend heavily on electricity generated by  fossil fuels.  Making hydrogen for hydrogen cars, which are even further away, will produce emissions too.  (Yes, we could use nuclear power, but good luck building enough plants in the necessary time frame.)

And even if we do develop a breakthrough technology, how long will it take to become widespread?  Hybrids have been available for years and still have a low market share.  It could take two decades to replace the U.S vehicle fleet.   It could take four or five decades to replace our power plants.  Consumers and companies will only do what makes economic sense and generally will not replace existing assets until they live out their useful lives.

The third problem is that according to most analysts, global oil production capacity will peak at around 100 million barrels per day.  But demand will keep growing and is expected to reach 130 million barrels per day by 2015.  (The problem isn’t the amount of oil in the ground, but our ability to get it out.)  So if you think prices are high now, you ain’t seen nothing yet.

At the same time, notwithstanding the fact that Senators Clinton, McCain, and Obama have all announced plans to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions that far exceed those of the Bush Administration, those hoping for global action to prevent climate change are likely to be disappointed.  We had a thorough discussion of some of the reasons here at The Nixon Center last week.  Technology (see above) is one.  The other two are China — which surpassed the U.S. in emissions last year, and could double its emissions in the next decade or so, far overwhelming any reductions (or more likely, any reductions in the growth of our emissions) we might make — and (ironically) Congressional Democrats.  As Washington Post reporter Juliet Eilperin noted during our session, the single biggest obstacle to major U.S. action on climate change in the Congress will be Michigan Democrat John Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.  Senator Robert Byrd — the Senate’s senior-most Democrat and a powerful advocate for coal-rich West Virginia — may also have some views on the issue.  He was the Democratic co-sponsor of the Senate’s 1997 Byrd-Hagel resolution, a 97-0 vote that effectively killed the Kyoto Protocol and persuaded President Bill Clinton not to attempt Senate ratification.

The energy-climate picture in the coming years is a bleak one, and we would do well to start preparing for the consequences.

This Bud’s For You

April 28, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under American Politics, International Affairs, Nixon Center, Republican Party | Leave a Comment 

At The Nixon Center, President Reagan’s national security advisor, Bud McFarlane, says President McCain’s first year would be “neocon redux.”

More Bad News for the “League of Democracies”

April 23, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under Election 2008, International Affairs, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

Senator John McCain has energetically called for a global “League of Democracies” as a key element of his foreign policy platform, including in his high-profile speech at the World Affairs Council of Los Angeles.  Unfortunately, as many have pointed out, the world’s democracies often have different priorities from America’s.  Witness recent efforts by the Bush Administration to persuade India–the world’s largest democracy, and a country the administration has made a top priority of U.S. diplomacy–to take a harder line toward Iran, including during a visit by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to New Delhi next week.  India’s response?  The country’s foreign ministry said that it does not need “any guidance” on its relations with Tehran and that “both nations [India and Iran] are perfectly capable of managing all aspects of their relationship with the appropriate degree of care and attention”–without U.S. advice.  See Reuters for the full story.  Good luck selling that League of Democracies outside America, and maybe some parts of Europe.

W Will Nixonians D?

April 18, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under American Politics, Election 2008, Nixon Center, Richard Nixon | Leave a Comment 

Among Nixonians these days, a vote for Sen. McCain should evidently not be taken for granted.

While The Nixon Center in Washington doesn’t take institutional positions, some of its campaign watchers wonder how much the neoconservatives have influenced the Republican candidate, leading to concerns about policies based on democracy promotion in Russia and China and military aggression in Iran. Robert Ellsworth, former Ambassador to NATO, a founding board member at The Center, and a discerning observer of the West’s struggle with radical Islamists, has endorsed Sen. Clinton.

Some closest to the late President wonder why the McCain campaign marked the 35th anniversary of his homecoming as a Vietnam POW without mentioning the President whose policies brought it about.

One exceedingly influential member of the Nixon extended family is an Obama donor.

Some who served the 37th President have decided that the GOP has permanently abandoned his policy recipe of enlightened national interest abroad and pragmatic idealism at home (Mr. Nixon’s words even before Al Gore invented the concept).  Many Nixon family members and friends remain firmly in McCain’s camp. But does this anecdotal sampling of discontent among influential Nixonians signal a potentially decisive detour by swing voters from the middle of the road into the Democratic camp in November?

Time To Boycott French Fries Again?

April 11, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under China, International Affairs, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

The Nixon Center-published “National Interest’s” Nick Gvosdev gets a plug from Andrew Sullivan for pointing out that China’s not the only country doing business with Sudan. Nick writes:

Democratic Japan–a country identified by Senator McCain as a leading power to be included in any concert or league of democracies–is Sudan’s largest export destination (48 percent)–because Sudan’s oil, to be blunt, doesn’t stink. Democratic Britain via its official trade and investment promotion agency talks up Sudan as a place for investment and business. Yes, China is Sudan’s largest provider of imports (at 18 percent) but democratic France and democratic Germany together make up 10 percent and democratic India nearly 5 percent.

Watch What I Do, Not What I Say

April 10, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under Bush Administration, Election 2008, International Affairs, Iraq War, National Security, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

The media excitement over the battle for John McCain’s foreign policy soul continues today with a long front-page article in The New York Times pitting neo-conservatives like Robert Kagan against realists including Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and Lawrence Eagleburger. Some of the quotes make for interesting reading, but despite disagreeing with most of Kagan’s foreign policy prescriptions, it’s hard for me to dispute this comment:

“I would say his world view is so established that there is not a real battle going on,” said Mr. Kagan, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “A struggle over individual policies I could imagine, but the broad view, no. People would agree on what McCain thinks. This is not one of those situations like Bush all over again, with some titanic struggle going on between different factions.”

Kagan is right: unlike the current president during his 2000 campaign (when he sounded like a convinced realist, saying he wanted a “humble” foreign policy in his race against Al Gore), McCain has a fairly long record from which one can draw certain conclusions. Also, while some of his views have evolved over time, many of them have remained fairly constant–including his tough position toward Russia, mentioned toward the end of the Times piece.

Of course, all good realists know that if John McCain should actually be elected president, what he believes (and particularly what he says to get elected) will be secondary to what he does as commander-in-chief. The hotly pursued question of which campaign advisors have more or less access to the candidate will pale in comparison to key personnel decisions by a McCain White House and to the major policy choices that follow. Speculation about these two topics is an entertaining activity inside the Beltway and in the blogosphere, but is ultimately just that–speculation.

More broadly, as President Bush has gradually discovered, maintaining a large U.S. troop presence in Iraq forces the United States to adopt pragmatic positions in dealing with other major issues and players in the international system, from China and Russia to Iran, North Korea, and authoritarian governments of the Middle East. To the extent that Senator McCain were to continue the current administration’s approach to the war, international realities (not to mention the sagging U.S. economy) would impose significant constraints on his other foreign policy options. However strong one’s beliefs, reality usually wins out in the end. Unfortunately, the longer one holds out, the higher the eventual price usually is.

NATO Says No to President Bush

April 3, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under Bush Administration, International Affairs, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

The biggest news from the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania is undoubtedly the Alliance’s rejection of President Bush’s strident calls for a so-called “Membership Action Plan” (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia. Mr. Bush has been pressing vigorously for approval of the plans, which would essentially establish a path to membership for the two countries, and went so far as to visit the Ukrainian capital Kyiv on his way to Bucharest to demonstrate his support.

The Bush Administration and other Americans supporting a MAP for each of the two countries essentially argued that they were committed to democracy, that they deserved membership in the alliance, and that their membership would help to further stabilize Europe. The problem was that many Europeans saw the issue differently, as a needless thumb in the eye to Moscow that would come on top of American plans for missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic (just endorsed by NATO in Bucharest) and recent U.S. and European recognition of Kosovo’s independence over Russian objection. Those who tire of simplistic international reporting in much of the mainstream media may be interested to know that in my own survey of major news outlets, I could find only one–National Public Radio–that took the trouble to mention not only German and French objections, but also opposition from Italy, Hungary (which actually borders on Ukraine), Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The full list deflates the often-heard argument that European dependence on Russian energy is the main driver of “soft” European policies toward Russia in that the Benelux countries do not import significant amounts of Russian natural gas or oil.

Russia was far from their sole concern, however; many also expressed reservations over Ukraine’s sharply divided public opinion on membership and Georgia’s ongoing disputes with two separatist territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (both of which are supported by Moscow). These are important concerns. A national commitment on the level of NATO membership–which would obligate Ukraine to commit military forces to defend other members, among other things, should only be taken on the basis of significant public support, if not public consensus. As far as Georgia is concerned, when bringing Central European countries into the alliance, NATO explicitly insisted that they resolve all of their territorial disputes in advance, as a condition for membership. NATO members did not want to extend the “Article 5″ mutual defense commitment to countries they knew in advance had ongoing disputes. Nor did they want to import these disagreements into the alliance, threatening its unity (those disagreements were among countries that were all aspiring for membership). If the goal of NATO enlargement is extending peace and security, it makes no sense to bring Georgia into the alliance at precisely the time when it is involved in a dispute like this.

Some have argued that failing to bring the two countries into NATO “gives Russia a veto” or “gives in to Russian blackmail”. This is not a serious argument. Russia does not have a veto over NATO decisions and never will (unless it becomes a member, which seems rather unlikely at this point). Nor does Russia even have a real voice in NATO’s decision-making process. What Russia does have, and any other country has, is a right to express its perspectives on decisions that NATO may take — just as NATO has a right to express its views on Russian decisions or actions. The U.S. and other NATO members can then evaluate those perspectives and the potential consequences of either dismissing them or trying to take them into account in some way. Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, and the others saw their own interests as more damaged by offering MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia than delaying them. The potential costs and benefits of accommodating an unpopular outgoing American president in the face of widespread public concern in their own countries likely also factored into these decisions.

Media reports now suggest that NATO leaders are wrangling over the text of a statement that would make clear that the door remains open to Ukraine and Georgia. It should. Most of the objections to membership are tactical rather than strategic, in that they reflect problems which are at least in theory temporary and soluble, including both domestic opposition to membership in Ukraine and Georgia’s internal fractures. Those who really want to bring the two countries into the alliance should work on resolving those two issues in ways that do not make the third one–Russia–any worse.

Stay-at-Home Neo-Realists

March 31, 2008 by John H. Taylor | Filed Under American Politics, Election 2008, International Affairs, Nixon Center | Leave a Comment 

The Nixon Center’s Dimitri Simes throws some Nixonian realism on the idea, explored in a New York Sun, article, that elite crossovers from the GOP to Sen. Obama presage a mass defection in November. His worry continues to be the possibility of neocon elements in Sen. McCain’s foreign policy agenda:

[Simes said] he does not foresee many Republicans or conservatives voting for Mr. Obama. “The real issue is not whether they will vote for Obama, it is whether many conservatives will vote for McCain or stay home,” he said. Mr. Simes added that Mr. McCain’s foreign policy, which he said commits America to democracy promotion and “confrontation with a number of foreign powers,” would likely end up forcing him to raise taxes, despite his pledge not to.

Watching the Foreign Policy Debate

March 27, 2008 by Paul Saunders | Filed Under Election 2008, International Affairs, Nixon Center, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

Those who are trying to follow the foreign policy debate during the presidential campaign should take a look at National Interest Online’s Foreign Policy Advisory Index, a compilation of statements by the candidates and their advisors on major foreign policy issues.  The magazine’s editors update the Index every day, and it’s a great way to keep track of what’s hot — all in one place.

Another featured piece today is Dan Drezner’s assessment of the foreign  policy battle inside the GOP between realists and neo-conservatives.  Drezner’s “Foreign Policy Goes Glam” — from the November/December issue of the print magazine — is a great look at the growing role of celebrities in our foreign policy and also a good read.