TNI: PRK Unstable

April 7, 2010 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Nixon Center, North Korea, The National Interest | 1 Comment 

Douglas Bandow — a Senior fellow at the Cato Institute — writes in the Nixon Center’s National Interest that “we are no longer sure” that the possibility of a peninsular war is low:

The Republic of Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, has attempted to dampen speculation by announcing his intention to “look into the case in a calm manner.” But the possibility that Pyongyang committed a flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremors through the ROK. Seoul could ill afford not to react strongly, both to protect its international reputation and prevent a domestic political upheaval.

All economic aid to and investment in the North would end. Diplomatic talks would be halted. Prospects for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear.

Moreover, Seoul might feel the need to respond with force. Even if justified, such action would risk a retaliatory spiral. Where it would end no one could say. No one wants to play out that scenario to its ugly conclusion.

The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”—which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang’s behavior.

Nevertheless, the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and the United States.

Now we are no longer sure.

Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach for power, and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the North and spilling outward seems real.

Such an outcome would be in no one’s interest, including that of China. So far the People’s Republic of China has taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Beijing has pushed the DPRK to negotiate and backed limited United Nations sanctions. But the PRC has refused to support a potentially economy-wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea.

There are several reasons for China’s stance. At base, Beijing is happier with the status quo than with risking North Korea’s economic stability or the two nations’ political relationship. Washington doesn’t like that judgment. However, changing the PRC’s policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest differently. The Yellow Sea incident could help.

Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. Speculation is rife about the reason: to request more food aid, promote investment in the North, respond to Beijing’s insistence that the DPRK rejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else?

Continue Reading.

Christmas Coming In From The Cold

December 24, 2009 by David R. Stokes | Filed Under Afghanistan, Cold War, History, Intelligence, International Affairs, North Korea, Russia, U.S. History, Vietnam | 1 Comment 

On Christmas day 20 years ago, Nicolae Ceausescu – long time dictator of Romania – was, along with his wife Elena, executed by firing squad just days after fleeing Bucharest, while his tyrannical regime unraveled before the eyes of a watching world. His demise and the surrounding events are etched in the memory of those of us who watched it all unfold via various news reports.

The look on the once strong-man’s face as a massive crowd began to boo during a speech on December 21st, was one of the defining moments of the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. The scene of his helicopter flying him out of the city and his preoccupation during the interim with looking at his watch (which had been equipped with a tracking device for his security people, the gadget – unbeknownst to him – having been disabled by his captors) – these events moved with breakneck speed two decades ago this week.

And while much of the world rekindled almost forgotten traditions of faith and family, due to fresh-found freedom that Christmas of 1989, many Americans celebrated with televisions left on (volume muted), so as not to miss a story that was so compelling.

The Cold War was, in fact, ending.

It was a fitting season of the year for yet another piece of compelling evidence that the schemes of Marx, Lenin, and so many others, were indeed bankrupt and bore the fruit not of promised utopia, but rather tyrannical horror. One reason for this calendar-driven appropriateness was the irony that so many important Cold War stories had Christmas season components.

The French, following a World War II exile from their imperial hegemony in Indochina, landed there once again just before Christmas in 1945. That didn’t work out so well for them in the long run. Come to think of it, it didn’t help us much either.

Just in time for Christmas in 1968, and as astronauts prepared to send a Biblical message of peace to all of us on “the good earth,” 82 Americans were rejoicing in their freedom, though with bodies still racked by torture-produced pain. They had been “guests” of the “Democratic” People’s Republic of Korea for about 11 months. The men of the USS Pueblo had been taken captive that previous January and were hostages to Cold War politics and diplomacy. I had a conversation a while back with Harry Iredale, whose cover on the Pueblo (an intelligence gathering vessel) was his work as an oceanographer. He talked to me in great detail about the seizure of the ship and their brutal treatment.

On Christmas Eve, 1979, the Soviets invaded a place called Afghanistan, to prop up a faltering Communist regime in that neighboring nation. That didn’t work out for them, either – or again for that matter – for us. Paraphrasing Mark Twain’s quote, history may not repeat itself, but it surely rhymes.

A couple of Christmases later, in 1981, the Polish government was enforcing martial law, trying to break the back of something called Solidarity. That movement was reminiscent of what had happened in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and with the same result – a Soviet inspired crackdown. But there was something different about what was going on in Poland. Maybe, many thought, this was the beginning of something bigger, something that might morph into real freedom.

Eight years later, the Romanian despot was dead, the Berlin Wall was becoming a lengthy pile of stone-pocked dust, and the Soviet system was on the ropes, first trying to reinvent itself; then conceding defeat with barely a whimper. And on Christmas Day in 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR, and the hammer and sickle flag was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time.

Yes, there are a lot of Cold War stories that coincide with the season that speaks of peace on earth and good will toward men.

This Christmas there is another such story. Though the Cold War is now a too-distant memory in light of all that has transpired since in our ever-dangerous world, there is a vital effort underway to ensure that the period from 1945-1991 is never ignominiously relegated to the ash heap of history.

The Cold War Museum began many years ago with the vision of Gary Powers. You might recognize him through his full name: Francis Gary Powers, Jr. Of course, students of the Cold War, and certainly anyone who lived through it, remember that Gary’s father, Francis Gary Powers, was flying one of our U-2 Spy planes on May 1, 1960, only to be shot down over Soviet territory. He became a prisoner, sometimes pawn, and an iconic and brave figure from that era.

In a day and age when most Americans would think of U-2 as referring to an Irish rock band, there was a time when the men who piloted those magnificent planes played a vital role in national and international security. For example, we would have found out far too late in the game about missiles in Cuba in 1962, without the reconnaissance photos taken from a U-2 aircraft.

Founded in 1996, the Cold War Museum is a very real memorial to honor Cold War Veterans and preserve the period’s history. For years, a mobile exhibit has traveled around the country and world displaying historical artifacts (more than $3,000,000 worth), including some from the Berlin Airlift, U-2 Incident, Cuban Missile Crisis, USS Liberty, USS Pueblo, and Space Race. In addition, the museum has over $500,000 worth of Soviet, East German, and former Eastern Bloc flags, banners, and uniforms.

After many years of tireless effort and various offers and negotiations, Powers recently announced the acquisition of a permanent home for the Cold War Museum at Vint Hill in Northern Virginia. The significance of this site selection was highlighted by Mr. Edwin “Ike” Broaddus, Chairman for Vint Hill Economic Development Authority:

We are pleased to offer The Cold War Museum a home. It is highly appropriate for the museum to locate at Vint Hill, the former Vint Hill Farms Station used during the Cold War, by the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the US Army to safeguard the United States against a surprise nuclear attack.

Vint Hill is part of The Journey Through Hallowed Ground national heritage area and in close proximity to the Manassas National Battlefield Park, the National Museum of the Marine Corps and the historic towns of Leesburg, Manassas and Warrenton, Virginia, existing major tourist destinations.

The Cold War Museum is a 501c3 charity, a Smithsonian affiliate, and worthy recipient of any support the public may be inclined to offer during this season of giving. This new home for the museum is, indeed, a Christmas gift to our nation’s efforts to remind and remember.

The museum’s board of directors includes some storied names reminiscent of that period in history, for example: Sergei Khrushchev (son of Nikita Krushchev), David Eisenhower (grandson of the 34th President of the United States and son in law of the 37th President), and Thomas C. Reed (Former Secretary of the Air Force).

As for Gary, he has interesting plans for 2010, involving a trip to Russia marking the 50th anniversary of the shooting down of his father’s plane. In fact, he is organizing a tour for those who might be interested (May 1-9, 2010), complete with a visit to the prison where his father (who died in 1977) was held for 21 months until his release in exchange for Soviet spy, Rudolf Abel.

As for the end of 2009, it is worthy of note that this has also been the 60th anniversary of the writing of 1984, by George Orwell, as well as the 25th anniversary of the year in the once-ominous title, one that was supposed to be synonymous with totalitarian, “Big-Brother-is-watching” government.

Blackmailed

August 9, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Nixon Administration figures, North Korea | Leave a Comment 

Nixon Secretary of State Henry Kissinger thinks that President Clinton’s trip to North Korea to rescue two American journalists was ill-advised:

Context matters. Less than six months ago, Pyongyang conducted a nuclear test and resumed the production of weapons-grade plutonium in violation of an agreement signed in February 2007 at the “six-power” conference in Beijing. Recently, North Korea refused a visit by the new U.S. envoy charged with discussing its proliferation efforts. Pyongyang has rejected various U.N. Security Council resolutions to desist from these activities and to return to the talks with the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. A visit by a former president, who is married to the secretary of state, will enable Kim Jong Il to convey to North Koreans, and perhaps to other countries, that his country is being accepted into the international community — precisely the opposite of what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has defined as the goal of U.S. policy until Pyongyang abandons its nuclear weapons program.

Already, speculation is rife that the Clinton visit inaugurates the prospect of a change of course of American policy and of a bilateral U.S.-North Korea solution. But two-party talks outside the six-party framework never made any sense. North Korean nuclear weapons threaten the North’s neighbors more than they do the United States. The other members of the six-party talks are needed to help enforce any agreement that may be made or to sustain sanctions on the way to it. These countries should not be made to feel that the United States uses them as pawns for its global designs. To be sure, the Obama administration has disavowed any intentions for separate, two-power talks. But the other parties will be tempted to hedge against the prospect that these assurances may be modified. That feeling is likely to be particularly strong in Japan, where a national election campaign is underway and where Tokyo already feels it has secured inadequate support on behalf of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.
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The pains the Obama administration has taken to cast the Clinton mission as a private, humanitarian visit and the restrained manner in which the trip was conducted demonstrate an awareness of those risks. Though the distinction between private and public is likely to prove elusive when concerning a former president who is the spouse of the secretary of state, the administration is still in a position to achieve a beneficent long-term outcome.

The root cause of our decade-old controversy with Pyongyang is that there is no middle ground between North Korea being a nuclear-weapons state and a state without nuclear weapons. At the end of a negotiation, North Korea will either destroy its nuclear arsenal or it will become a de facto nuclear state. So far, Pyongyang has used the negotiating forums available to it in a skillful campaign of procrastination, alternating leaps in technological progress with negotiating phases to consolidate it.

Kissinger: Global Mayhem If PRK Not Stopped

June 8, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Asia, Barack Obama, China, International Affairs, North Korea | Leave a Comment 

Dr. Kissinger believes that if Kim Jong-Il’s nuclear program is not stopped, a global nuclear showdown will ensue:

China faces challenges that are perhaps more complex than even those facing the United States. If present trends continue, and if Pyongyang manages to maintain its nuclear capability through the inability of the parties to bring matters to a head, the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout Northeast Asia and the Middle East becomes probable. China would then face nuclear weapons in all surrounding states in Northeast Asia and an unmanageable, nuclear-armed regime in Pyongyang. But if Beijing exercises the full panoply of its pressures without an accord with America and an understanding with the other parties, it has reason to fear chaos along its borders.

North Korea Is Not The New Iraq

June 1, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Barack Obama, Bush Administration, International Affairs, Military, North Korea, Obama administration | Leave a Comment 

Peter Feaver who writes at Foreign Policy’s sole conservative outlet, Shadow Government, imagines a showdown with Pyonyang without the success of the surge in Iraq:

At the broader strategic, political, and psychological levels the situation would have been bleak in the extreme. The United States would have been a defeated power, and our position in the region would be in jeopardy. Assume for the sake of argument that the situation only reached moderate-case proportions, not the worst-case scenarios that would be all-too-plausible. Assume, therefore, that the United States would merely be scrambling to reassert deterrence against a rising Iran, reassure our oil-rich allies, and honor defense commitments to Israel — set aside more dire situations like a region-wide Sunni vs. Shia conflagration.

In that world, would Obama actually have a richer menu of military options in North Korea now? Would he have the political will/capital to commit the recently defeated U.S. ground forces in the very place where the “America mustn’t fight land wars in Asia” strategic lesson was first forged? Or, to be fair to the original argument, would he at least have more leeway than he has now?

I don’t see it. On the contrary, I see him as having slightly more options now for dealing with North Korea than he otherwise might have precisely because Bush reversed the trajectory in Iraq. To be sure, the progress in Iraq is still fragile and reversible — and there are ominous signs of that reversibility with the uptick in violence in the months since Obama codified a rigid withdrawal timeline. But the success of Bush’s surge strategy (crediting, of course, the courageous efforts of General Petraeus, General Odierno, and Ambassador Crocker, not to mention the brave men and women deployed in Iraq, who actually implemented the strategy) has gone some way to restoring America’s global strategic leverage. At a minimum, it seems to me inarguable that our strategic leverage is greater now than it would have been if we continued on the old trajectory.

A Nixon Speaks On North Korea’s Nukes

May 30, 2009 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under International Affairs, Nixon family, North Korea | Leave a Comment 

Christopher Nixon Cox, the 37th President’s grandson who gained prominence last year as the New York executive director of the McCain campaign, explains at Fox News’s website why he thinks North Korea’s recent saber-rattling is primarily the result of internal political struggles in that nation.

Reconsidering The Raptor?

May 28, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Asia, Military, North Korea | Leave a Comment 

While Defense Secretary Robert Gates decision to end the F-22 program is based on his opinion that America needs to ration its defense resources to fight counter-insurgencies, the recent North Korean provocation does give heed to the conventional argument. Ironically enough, the USAF will deploy 12 Raptors to Okinawa in a move that follows the PRK’s nuclear test last Monday:

The U.S. Air Force will deploy 12 advanced F-22 Raptor fighters in the coming days to a base in Okinawa, Japan. The move had been planned in advance and was not related to recent rumblings from Pyongyang, a U.S. Forces Japan spokesman said.

The South’s largest newspaper Chosun Ilbo quoted defense sources as saying the South has been preparing for contingencies such as artillery or missile strikes near a contested sea border off the west coast of the peninsula.

There are 183 Raptors in the current fleet. Only four more will be built for fiscal year 2010.

Clemons: Patience Is Prudent

May 26, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Asia, China, International Affairs, North Korea | Leave a Comment 

Steven Clemons, who used to direct the Nixon Center, believes that Obama should continue his patience so as to avoid a stalemate with the P.R.K. during a potentially destabilizing leadership crisis.