Anatoly F. Dobrynin, RIP

April 9, 2010 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under Cold War, Cuba, International Affairs, National Security, Nixon Administration, Nixon Administration figures, Presidents, Richard Nixon, Russia, UN | Leave a Comment 

Yesterday, the death of Anatoly Fyodorovich Dobrynin, the Soviet Union’s ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986, was announced in Moscow. He was 90.

Few diplomats served as long in Washington as Dobrynin. (One who served longer was Ernest Jaakson, who was the representative of the Estonian government-in-exile in Washington, then of the revived nation of Estonia, from 1965 until 1993, and who replaced Dobrynin as dean of the capital’s diplomatic corps in 1986, rather to the latter’s irritation.) During those three-plus decades, he served five Soviet leaders (Khruschchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev) during six Administrations (Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan).

The two most significant achievements of Dobrynin’s tenure in Washington came in 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and ten years later, when he played a central role on the Soviet side in negotiating the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. The Cuban crisis came six months after his arrival in DC, following a period serving as United Nations Undersecretary-General under Dag Hammarskjold. During the months before President Kennedy learned of Soviet missiles on Cuban territory, Dobrynin managed to establish contacts with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy that proved to be the basis of the back-channel negotiations that ultimately defused what, to date, has been the most dangerous military situation the world has faced since 1945. None of Dobrynin’s predecessors as Soviet Ambassador had shown anything approaching his diplomatic poise and skill; had he not been on the scene, events might have taken a tragic turn.

A decade later, Dobrynin, negotiating with National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger, helped to assemble the ABM treaty, which, for nearly forty years, has been the cornerstone on which the disarmament agreements between the US and USSR (and later Russia) have been built. He also considerably facilitated the process which led to the SALT I agreement of 1972, and helped further the meetings between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev which resulted in full-scale detente between the superpowers.

It should be emphasized that Dobrynin, despite his willingness to steep himself in American culture and his genial persona, was always a loyal representative of the Soviet regime and its ideology. When faced with the human-rights stance of President Carter, he gave no ground, and, in the years before Mikhail Gorbachev gained power, took many a hard-line position where Soviet actions abroad were concerned, especially in Afghanistan and Nicaragua. In his 1995 autobiography, In Confidence, he made it clear that he was unhappy to see the Soviet Union disintegrate. But it should be remembered that as a diplomat, he was committed to dialogue over confrontation, wherever and whenever he thought it possible, and that commitment helped the process which ultimately decreased and finally ended the dangerous tensions of the Cold War.

The Russian site RT.com offers these tributes from Dr. Kissinger, who so many times faced the Ambassador across a negotiating table, and Donald Kendall, a close friend of President Nixon’s:

Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger remembers Dobrynin when, during the Cold War, he was working in Washington DC, heading the Russian Embassy there. “First he was my professional partner,” says Kissinger, “and then gradually, he became my friend.” Even though, he says, the Soviet politics of those times which the ambassador was standing by, often went against the US policies, “he was always trying to achieve peace, to reduce tensions and to stand by a more peaceful life on the planet,” says the former US Secretary of State. “I think of him with respect and warm-hearted feelings,” concludes Kissinger.

“I hope Dobrynin will get the memorial that he deserves,” said Donald Kendall, former head of the PepsiCo in an interview to ITAR-TASS news agency. He suggested that both Russia and the United States should put a monument to Dobrynin, as a sign of honor and respect for his achievements.

Kendall is convinced that Dobrynin’s “fantastic diplomatic skills” have several times “saved the relationships” between Moscow and Washington. “I have stressed this many times, that if in those times there would have been a different ambassador in Washington, then there could have been a real war between the two countries.”

“All This Happened”

January 4, 2010 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Richard Nixon, Russia, Vietnam | 3 Comments 

Conrad Black critiques President Obama’s first year with a blow-torch, and then says his agenda pales in comparison to past presidents, notably RN:

Richard Nixon entered office with a plan to open relations with China, extract the U.S. from Indochina without bringing down the non-Communist government in Saigon, and pursue better relations with the USSR, arms control, and a peace process in the Middle East. All this happened.

Christmas Coming In From The Cold

December 24, 2009 by David R. Stokes | Filed Under Afghanistan, Cold War, History, Intelligence, International Affairs, North Korea, Russia, U.S. History, Vietnam | 1 Comment 

On Christmas day 20 years ago, Nicolae Ceausescu – long time dictator of Romania – was, along with his wife Elena, executed by firing squad just days after fleeing Bucharest, while his tyrannical regime unraveled before the eyes of a watching world. His demise and the surrounding events are etched in the memory of those of us who watched it all unfold via various news reports.

The look on the once strong-man’s face as a massive crowd began to boo during a speech on December 21st, was one of the defining moments of the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. The scene of his helicopter flying him out of the city and his preoccupation during the interim with looking at his watch (which had been equipped with a tracking device for his security people, the gadget – unbeknownst to him – having been disabled by his captors) – these events moved with breakneck speed two decades ago this week.

And while much of the world rekindled almost forgotten traditions of faith and family, due to fresh-found freedom that Christmas of 1989, many Americans celebrated with televisions left on (volume muted), so as not to miss a story that was so compelling.

The Cold War was, in fact, ending.

It was a fitting season of the year for yet another piece of compelling evidence that the schemes of Marx, Lenin, and so many others, were indeed bankrupt and bore the fruit not of promised utopia, but rather tyrannical horror. One reason for this calendar-driven appropriateness was the irony that so many important Cold War stories had Christmas season components.

The French, following a World War II exile from their imperial hegemony in Indochina, landed there once again just before Christmas in 1945. That didn’t work out so well for them in the long run. Come to think of it, it didn’t help us much either.

Just in time for Christmas in 1968, and as astronauts prepared to send a Biblical message of peace to all of us on “the good earth,” 82 Americans were rejoicing in their freedom, though with bodies still racked by torture-produced pain. They had been “guests” of the “Democratic” People’s Republic of Korea for about 11 months. The men of the USS Pueblo had been taken captive that previous January and were hostages to Cold War politics and diplomacy. I had a conversation a while back with Harry Iredale, whose cover on the Pueblo (an intelligence gathering vessel) was his work as an oceanographer. He talked to me in great detail about the seizure of the ship and their brutal treatment.

On Christmas Eve, 1979, the Soviets invaded a place called Afghanistan, to prop up a faltering Communist regime in that neighboring nation. That didn’t work out for them, either – or again for that matter – for us. Paraphrasing Mark Twain’s quote, history may not repeat itself, but it surely rhymes.

A couple of Christmases later, in 1981, the Polish government was enforcing martial law, trying to break the back of something called Solidarity. That movement was reminiscent of what had happened in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and with the same result – a Soviet inspired crackdown. But there was something different about what was going on in Poland. Maybe, many thought, this was the beginning of something bigger, something that might morph into real freedom.

Eight years later, the Romanian despot was dead, the Berlin Wall was becoming a lengthy pile of stone-pocked dust, and the Soviet system was on the ropes, first trying to reinvent itself; then conceding defeat with barely a whimper. And on Christmas Day in 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR, and the hammer and sickle flag was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time.

Yes, there are a lot of Cold War stories that coincide with the season that speaks of peace on earth and good will toward men.

This Christmas there is another such story. Though the Cold War is now a too-distant memory in light of all that has transpired since in our ever-dangerous world, there is a vital effort underway to ensure that the period from 1945-1991 is never ignominiously relegated to the ash heap of history.

The Cold War Museum began many years ago with the vision of Gary Powers. You might recognize him through his full name: Francis Gary Powers, Jr. Of course, students of the Cold War, and certainly anyone who lived through it, remember that Gary’s father, Francis Gary Powers, was flying one of our U-2 Spy planes on May 1, 1960, only to be shot down over Soviet territory. He became a prisoner, sometimes pawn, and an iconic and brave figure from that era.

In a day and age when most Americans would think of U-2 as referring to an Irish rock band, there was a time when the men who piloted those magnificent planes played a vital role in national and international security. For example, we would have found out far too late in the game about missiles in Cuba in 1962, without the reconnaissance photos taken from a U-2 aircraft.

Founded in 1996, the Cold War Museum is a very real memorial to honor Cold War Veterans and preserve the period’s history. For years, a mobile exhibit has traveled around the country and world displaying historical artifacts (more than $3,000,000 worth), including some from the Berlin Airlift, U-2 Incident, Cuban Missile Crisis, USS Liberty, USS Pueblo, and Space Race. In addition, the museum has over $500,000 worth of Soviet, East German, and former Eastern Bloc flags, banners, and uniforms.

After many years of tireless effort and various offers and negotiations, Powers recently announced the acquisition of a permanent home for the Cold War Museum at Vint Hill in Northern Virginia. The significance of this site selection was highlighted by Mr. Edwin “Ike” Broaddus, Chairman for Vint Hill Economic Development Authority:

We are pleased to offer The Cold War Museum a home. It is highly appropriate for the museum to locate at Vint Hill, the former Vint Hill Farms Station used during the Cold War, by the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the US Army to safeguard the United States against a surprise nuclear attack.

Vint Hill is part of The Journey Through Hallowed Ground national heritage area and in close proximity to the Manassas National Battlefield Park, the National Museum of the Marine Corps and the historic towns of Leesburg, Manassas and Warrenton, Virginia, existing major tourist destinations.

The Cold War Museum is a 501c3 charity, a Smithsonian affiliate, and worthy recipient of any support the public may be inclined to offer during this season of giving. This new home for the museum is, indeed, a Christmas gift to our nation’s efforts to remind and remember.

The museum’s board of directors includes some storied names reminiscent of that period in history, for example: Sergei Khrushchev (son of Nikita Krushchev), David Eisenhower (grandson of the 34th President of the United States and son in law of the 37th President), and Thomas C. Reed (Former Secretary of the Air Force).

As for Gary, he has interesting plans for 2010, involving a trip to Russia marking the 50th anniversary of the shooting down of his father’s plane. In fact, he is organizing a tour for those who might be interested (May 1-9, 2010), complete with a visit to the prison where his father (who died in 1977) was held for 21 months until his release in exchange for Soviet spy, Rudolf Abel.

As for the end of 2009, it is worthy of note that this has also been the 60th anniversary of the writing of 1984, by George Orwell, as well as the 25th anniversary of the year in the once-ominous title, one that was supposed to be synonymous with totalitarian, “Big-Brother-is-watching” government.

Who Is The Heart Of The Polar Bear?

November 11, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Nixon Center, Russia | 1 Comment 

The Nixon Center’s Dimitri Simes and Paul Saunders have a new op-ed in The New York Times on the Putin-Medvedev relationship.

Nixon Center President In Time Magazine

October 31, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under News media, Nixon Center, Russia, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

Nixon Center President Dmitri Simes has a new op-ed in Time Magazine, in which he argues that the Obama administration needs to make talking with Russia a priority in order to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions:

The U.S. needs to start taking Russia seriously if it wants Moscow’s help on Iran. The Administration insists that its “reset” of relations with Russia is a major priority. Unfortunately, as in many other policy areas, the President and his team try so hard to satisfy their critics that they appear unwilling to make critical choices, doing just enough to raise hopes but not enough to realize them. The Administration, for example, announced in mid-September that it was unilaterally dropping plans to base advanced missile-defense interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic. Critics said Obama had given away the East European store to Russia in the vague hope of getting assistance on Iran. But a month later, literally on the same day that the U.S., Russia and others were negotiating with Iran in Vienna, Vice President Joe Biden was in Warsaw confirming plans to deploy Patriot ground-to-air missiles in Poland, and a U.S. official said in Tbilisi that “the process of Georgia’s deeper integration into NATO is very important.” No statement was likely to trouble Russia more.

The following weekend, when Obama called Medvedev to look for support on Iran, he received a polite but noncommittal reply. After the call, Russia’s top negotiator, Sergei Ryabkov, publicly urged “maximum patience” and “additional incentives” for Iran, neither of which is attractive to Washington. A senior official in Moscow told me that if the U.S. permanently stations Patriot batteries in Poland, Russia may proceed with deliveries — which had been suspended — of S-300 antiaircraft missiles to Iran. Such systems could significantly increase the cost of any air strikes. “Obama is beginning to repeat the Bush pattern,” the official said, “where deeds do not match words.”

Working with Russia to block Iran’s nuclear program will not be easy. Obama will have to do much better than he did when trying to win Russian support for Chicago’s Olympic bid: he called Putin two days before the crucial vote, when Moscow was already committed to Rio, and offered nothing in return to the rather unsentimental Russian Prime Minister. Sadly, this too little, too late approach to Moscow on Iran’s nuclear program may force the Administration to make precisely the decision it hopes to avoid: between a nuclear Iran and a new and dangerous war in a critical region.

Ted Sorensen’s Alternate History

October 31, 2009 by Robert Nedelkoff | Filed Under Cuba, International Affairs, Interviews, National Security, Presidents, Richard Nixon, Russia, U.S. History | 2 Comments 

This week Theodore “Ted” Sorensen, who was John F. Kennedy’s closest aide from 1953 until the president’s assassination a decade later, appeared at Canada’s University of Western Ontario in London to speak about his career and to promote his recently published autobiography Counselor. While there, he was interviewed by Ian Gillespie of the London Free Press. Naturally, the 81-year-old Sorensen is asked what his most vivid memory is of the Thousand Days, and just as naturally, he replies that it was the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. He speaks of the enormous weight he felt, as a “34-year-old kid,” when drafting JFK’s letter to Soviet leader Nikita Khruschchev – a document which, he knew, might make the difference between peace and nuclear annihilation. The article continues:

Sorensen says things might have turned out quite differently if Richard Nixon had defeated Kennedy in the presidential election campaign of 1960.

“In that same fall of 1962, when Kennedy showed the kind of patience, discipline and wisdom that I mentioned (in the book) and resolved the Cuban missile crisis without firing a shot, Nixon was having a self-destructive campaign for governor of California,” he says. “Imagine if he had been in the White House and faced with the challenge that faced Kennedy?”

Well, as tens of millions of TV viewers know, last month Seth MacFarlane had no trouble imagining what would have happened; in the season-premiere episode of his Family Guy series, precocious infant Stewie Griffin and his canine sidekick Brian, with the help of an alternate-realities machine Stewie’s invented, visit several worlds differing from our own. With a push of the button, the baby and dog find themselves in the twisted, crumbling ruins of their hometown, Quahog, Rhode Island. “What happened?” Brian asked. Stewie consults the machine and replies, with his authoritative British accent: “This is what would have happened if Nixon had been president in the Cuban Missile Crisis.”

In-deed, as Dr. Zachary Smith used to say long ago. Last year, I read the transcript of an interview, as yet unpublished, which had just been conducted with a pundit whose words often appear in the columns and on the airwaves of the US and UK.

The pundit was asked about the most tragic events in the career of President Nixon. In his reply, he emphatically said that RN’s defeat by JFK in 1960 was one of the most tragic events in American history. Asked to explain, the journalist (whose identify might surprise the reader, but who will remain unnamed, since the interview has yet to be published) expressed the view that, had RN assumed the Presidency in January 1961:

a) the Bay of Pigs operation would have received full air support, thus resulting in the overthrow of Fidel Castro’s regime;

b) as a consequence, there would have been no Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, and thus no Cuban Missile Crisis;

c) the resulting setback in Soviet power and prestige would have forced Khruschchev to agree to detente a decade before Dr. Henry Kissinger’s diplomacy set it in motion and thus might have hastened the end of the Cold War as early as the 1970s.

As for Sorensen’s (and Macfarlane’s) suggestion that having Richard Nixon in the White House in October 1962 would have produced disaster, it’s worth noting that the President handled himself very well when faced with unexpected and dangerously escalating events during the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973.

On Reforming Russia

October 28, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Nixon Center, Russia, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

Nixon Center President Dimitri Simes and Executive Director Paul Saunders argue that Russia’s fragility is predicated on its corruption, which starts at the top:

Corruption and insider dealing can have tragic consequences in Russia, as they did in an August explosion at the Sayano-Shushenskaya dam in Siberia, when over seventy people were killed due to inadequate maintenance. Putin himself described as “irresponsible and criminal” an apparent maintenance contract with a fraudulent firm set up by top managers. Beyond limiting investments in safety and maintenance, however, irresponsibility and corruption have also strongly discouraged investment in other key areas. Russian firms happily squeeze out foreign investors but don’t themselves put money into new equipment, training, or research and development. Despite recent increases, state investments in education, health, and science and technology are also inadequate for sustainable economic growth and to diversify beyond energy exports.

Here it is useful to compare Russia to China. China is less free than Russia according to Freedom House, and has a number of similar problems, but is considerably more attractive to foreign investors. The huge scale of China’s market is a major inducement, but Beijing’s greater willingness to accept international rules and its much more strategic approach to cultivating foreign investors—whose presence China’s leaders view as essential to meeting their development goals but energy-rich Moscow has seen as easily replaceable—also make a big difference.

Russia’s Energy Vulnerabilities

October 14, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Russia, The National Interest | 1 Comment 

Nicholas Gvosdev, the senior editor at The Nixon Center’s magazine The National Interest and a professor at U.S. Naval War College, argues that the West should rethink its energy policy with Russia:

1) Russia’s dependence on central and Eastern European transit countries limited Russia’s ability to wield the “energy weapon” against its former satellites, because Russia could not afford to alienate its Western European customers. (A related assumption was that Russia would be forced to subsidize the energy purchases of its immediate neighbors, such as Ukraine, in order to keep the transit lines open, meaning that the United States and its European partners could count on a major Russian subsidy to these economies.)

2) Russia’s overall dependence on Europe as its main customer locked Russia into a dependence on the West for the export income needed to power its economy. Where else did Moscow have to go? (Of course, some of the logical alternatives for Europe for energy supply—not fantastic schemes of central Asians directly connecting to Europe, but more practical exploitation of existing yet underdeveloped projects in the Mediterranean, north and west Africa—never reached any level of urgency in Washington.)

Russian strategists recognized these vulnerabilities—so why, then, should we be surprised that they are taking concrete steps to change their position? Pushing forward with the Nord Stream line to link northern Russian gas sources directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea, so as to reduce Russia’s vulnerabilities via the existing transit countries is a logical and entirely predictable development. So too making the argument to the Germans (and the French, and the Italians, and others) that it benefits them to have a new direct link to Russian sources of supply, free of the possibility of disruptions caused by friction in Russian bilateral relations with countries like Ukraine or Poland. (And Germany is happy to resell Russian gas via the pipeline links eastward to countries like Poland or Ukraine—but the Germans will demand a higher price and be less willing to accept IOUs.)

And the ongoing plans for shipping more natural gas eastward—to hungry markets, especially in China—changes Russia’s gameplan even further. If Westerners become reluctant to invest in Russia, China is more than eager to make up the difference. And soon Russia will have the ability to shift gas and oil from one vector to another. The West wants to reduce its dependence on Russia? No problem. Redirect the energy eastward. But this also gives Russia the ability to decide that it might want to reduce the energy it sends westward. Perhaps not to well-paying customers in parts of the EU, the ones which have good economic ties to Moscow and prize good relations with Russia—but we can easily think of other countries that can’t pay higher prices, and those who can’t pay the ticket don’t get admitted to the dance.

Perhaps the possibility of a normalization of relations between the United States and Iran—or at least something along the lines of the Libya approach—might change the game by allowing the West to fully access Iran’s immense energy reserves (and finally opening the closed back door to effective and efficient transit of resources from central Asia to global markets). But is such a rapprochement likely? And why would Russia agree to support renewed U.S. efforts to pressure Iran to try and quickly resolve the nuclear standoff?

The strategic assumptions made during the 1990s about Russian energy are becoming increasingly invalid as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century. Some uncomfortable readjustments in our strategy might be the consequence.

Finding Common Ground For Peace

September 30, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Richard Nixon, Russia | Leave a Comment 

In May 1972, RN was the first American President to visit Moscow.

In what he called a working visit,  RN and the Soviet leadership agreed to cooperate on science and technology, expand trade, and limit nuclear strategic arms.

His message to the Russian people was sincere and principled: “a pledge to continue the quest for peace among all nations.”

Nixon, The War On Drugs, Russia, And Afpak

September 28, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Afghanistan, Afpak, Nixon Center, Richard Nixon, Russia | 1 Comment 

Russia’s Drug Czar, Victor Ivanov, was at the Nixon Center last week to discuss the harrowing nature of the drug-trade in Afghanistan. A reality — he contends –that could lead to the rise of a narco-state and further threaten global stability:

According to Ivanov, Russia is the “main victim” of Afghanistan’s drug trafficking, with ninety percent of its addicts using Afghan opiates. There is a growing number of young users in the country, and Afghanistan’s stockpile of heroin – enough to produce over one trillion doses – threatens generations to come. But though Russia may feel the brunt of the effects of the drug trade, it “carries a fundamental threat to the whole world,” including the United States. Heroin profits – about 100 billion dollars each year – support corruption and organized crime, create political destabilization, destroy young democracies (such as Afghanistan itself), and fund terrorism.

For Ivanov, the venue of the Nixon Center was of no coincidence as RN knew the devastating impacts of the drug trade, and was the first to wage war on it forty-years ago this year:

Two weeks ago at the meeting of the Russian Federation’s Security Council, its Chairman, President Dmitry Medvedev, charted out the main vector of the national antidrug policy. While increasing the severity of punishment for drug lords for wholesale trafficking, it is necessary to launch an unconditioned humanization and democratization of the state’s policies towards drug addicts, who are, after all, no more than ill people.

Along with that, being here, at the Nixon Center, is good reason to recall that the “War on Drugs” was declared exactly 40 years ago by President Richard Nixon. And that decision was certainly no coincidence.

In 1969 American society faced a massive growth of not only cocaine and marijuana consumption, which entered the United States across the border with Mexico, but also of heroin consumption, which gushed into the country from Indo-China as a consequence of the Vietnam War.

As a result, in five years since 1969, the number of heroin addicts in America increased tenfold. As American newspapers wrote then, “the disgusting war came back to our homes as a boomerang”.

Scrapping Missile Defense Worked?

September 25, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Barack Obama, International Affairs, Nixon Center, Russia, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

Via the National Interest:

President Obama’s decision to scrap the missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic has attracted a lot of criticism and claims that he is caving in to Russian pressure. Mikhail Gorbachev, writing in the New York Times, argues that nothing could be further from the truth. In actuality, Obama’s “concession” was greeted with a reciprocal move by Russia, in agreeing to a UN Security Council resolution “seeking to strengthen the international commitment to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.” So give-and-take in international relations really does work, at least when it comes to Russia.

As such, Gorbachev thinks Washington and Moscow should continue to work together to curb nuclear proliferation in states like North Korea and Iran. For the United States to convince the world community that Pyongyang and Tehran shouldn’t have nukes, it needs to demonstrate that it too is committed to destroying nuclear weapons: “if it is acceptable for 5 or 10 countries to have nuclear weapons as their ‘ultimate security guarantee,’ why should it not be the case for 20 or 30 others?” Obama can start this charm offensive by negotiating an update to the START treaty, which expires in December. If America and Russia show they want to rid the world of nuclear weapons by dismantling their own stockpiles, other nations won’t be far behind in joining us.

Nonetheless, there’s nothing wrong with having an insurance policy against nuclear weapons. But we should manage missile defense in conjunction with Russia. Moscow faces many of the same threats we do. “Let the experts from both countries have a frank discussion that would reveal which threats are real and which are imaginary,” says Gorbachev. This would help us “avoid misguided projects like the Polish-Czech missile shield, and could help move us from a state of mutual deterrence to a goal of minimum nuclear sufficiency for self-defense.” Although this is a “big agenda,” Gorbachev thinks America and Russia need a big agenda to initiate a “change in the strategic relationship between the two major nuclear powers—in their own interests and in the cause of world peace.”

Gvosdev: President Obama Has No Russia Game

September 24, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Iran, Russia, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

The National Interest’s Nicholas Gvosdev argues that President Obama doesn’t have a coherent diplomatic strategy with Russia vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear program. In other words, he made a big concession and is now hoping for the best:

What we’ve gotten so far from the Kremlin is not substantive help over Iran in return, but a Russian commitment that Iskander short-range missiles will now not be deployed in Kaliningrad as a response. So Moscow can argue two things: 1) the Iranian threat isn’t that bad after all, if the United States is canceling a program that before was seen as so urgent for the defense of Europe and the West, and 2) Russia has already responded, trading one missile deployment for another.

And if Russia does not intensify pressure on Iran, then what? The Obama team re-activates the BMD program in eastern Europe—after admitting that it doesn’t think that the technology in hand can meet the threat?

This could have all been avoided—and handled much better—if there were clear organizing principles in terms of how to prioritize the threat posed by Iran, and consistent, reliable threat assessments that would enable Washington to firmly and decisively put the matter to its friends and partners. But there are not. Thus, when the president says at the United Nations that there should be “new coalitions that bridge old divides” in tackling issues like the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states like Iran, there is no mechanism in place to build them. Neither is there a better understanding of what trade-offs Washington would be prepared to make with Russia to ensure full Russian participation in and compliance with the needs of such a coalition. The BMD system was cancelled on the lack of its own merits—and Moscow knows this. To try and then get concessions from Russia on Iran in the absence of both a clear negotiating framework and without a sense of the costs and benefits involved seems another example of “U.S. officials hoping for the best.”

Admitting A Mistake, Not Making A Concession

September 18, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Nixon Center, Russia, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

Nixon Center Executive Director Paul Saunders argues that the administration isn’t likely to receive anything in return from Russia for canceling defensive weapons systems in Eastern Europe.

Why? Russian President Dimitry Medvedev is willing to accept that it was just a mistake, after resisting the assertion that the systems were meant to deter Iran:

What the United States wants, of course, is Moscow’s support in dealing with Iran. And Mr. Obama specifically mentioned “our shared efforts to end Iran’s illicit nuclear program” in his public remarks. Whether Washington will ultimately get Russia’s help, however, is far from certain: Moscow has a pragmatic but not warm relationship with Tehran, it fears the destabilizing effects of an Iranian nuclear weapon but does not see itself as a likely target, and it benefits from Iran’s continuing isolation, especially from international energy markets.

More to the point, just as neither the Obama nor the Bush administrations accepted that U.S. missile-defense plans were aimed at Russia, Russia never accepted that missile defense was linked to Iran. From this perspective, the administration’s unwillingness to admit that it is giving something away makes it easier for Moscow to pretend that it is not getting anything. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said as much last week, when he argued that if the United States were to drop the plans, it would be correcting a mistake and not making a concession. Taking that position after the Obama announcement would be a mistake for Russia, but it would be far from the first.

Missiles, Crocodiles, And Doves

September 18, 2009 by David R. Stokes | Filed Under Book Review, Europe, History, International Affairs, Iran, Russia | 2 Comments 

Cue the doves in places like Prague, Warsaw, Moscow, Tehran, and Caracas. Peace is at hand. Peace in our time. Central Europe, the region that has provided the kindling for so many of the conflicts that have burst forth into full flame for nearly 100 years, is once again safe from its protectors. Pardon me while I pause to fan myself as I tear up. We have been once more delivered – we, as in all humanity, that is – delivered from the mean old policies of Dubya, and company. The good guys know better. Trust them.

Pardon the preacher in me (it is, in fact, my day job), but I can’t help but think of a scripture, one that has an ominous ring to it, in light of the recent decision by the Obama administration to back away from the previously proposed and planned nuclear missile shield in and around the Czech Republic and Poland.

For when they shall say, Peace and safety; then sudden destruction cometh upon them… – I Thessalonians 5:3 (KJV)

One might call what we are seeing these days Yogi Berra-like foreign policy, as in “It’s déjà vu all over again.” We are underestimating Iran and appeasing Russia – all in the same fell swoop. Remarkable!

Okay, one more time. The year is 1938, and there are some very bad people who are being underestimated by some very, supposedly bright, but actually just incredibly naïve people. Though it happened more than 70 years ago it is still relevant. Its relevance is reinforced each and every time those who play with matches and kindling ignore the obvious-to-anyone-with-a-brain lessons. The story will cease to be relevant when the world finally figures it out. My advice is: Don’t hold your breath.

In fact, the long ago, yet up-to-date, fiasco is known now simply by the city-name-as-a-metaphor, Munich – apologies to that wonderful Bavarian city, a place unfortunate enough to have been an international and diplomatic crime scene. David Faber, the grandson of former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, and a former Conservative Member of Parliament (1992-2001), has written a fresh, factual, engaging, definitive, and, well, haunting account of what happened back then.

The book is called, Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II.

Appeasement was never really a bad word until it became forever identified with the foreign policy failures in Great Britain under the premiership of Neville Chamberlain. The word itself simply means to pacify or soothe. Most of us understand that there is a measure of this required for peaceful and civilized living and discourse.

But when appeasement met Adolf Hitler, it was manipulated, twisted, scorned, and ultimately dismissed. To put it in the words of Sean Connery playing a character in the 1987 movie The Untouchables, Mr. Chamberlain had brought a knife to a gunfight in Munich. A knife crafted out of a very thin sheet of paper. But our leaders are doing even better – they are throwing the knives away.

The appeasement of the 1930s, gave way to the resolve of the 1940s, but it was a lesson learned the hard way. Is history repeating itself?

I think a better case can be made that history may be reversing itself. Back then, our nation moved from isolation and denial toward eventual engagement. It was a progression that was somewhat understandable – after all, who wants war? Now however, it seems that some are determined to move us from resolution and vigilance – the qualities that have, indeed, kept us safe for the past eight years – toward appeasement.

Think of it this way: It’s one thing to cut Neville Chamberlain some slack for what he did back then with his deliberate policy of appeasement. Many people then had been seduced into a sense of sleepy underestimation of Hitler and his henchmen. After all, even former Prime Minister David Lloyd George had visited the dictator at Berchtesgaden a couple of years earlier and was clearly smitten. He returned home, calling his Nazi host “the greatest living German” and “the George Washington of Germany.” He even had a device installed at his home in Surrey – one that would lower a large picture window into the ground, creating “the feel of a covered terrace.” It was something that had captivated him at the Eagle’s Nest.

Then there was the other Nevile, now largely forgotten in the appeasement story, Nevile Henderson (he spelled his name with only one “L,” unlike the PM, the only apparent difference between the two men). He was the British Ambassador to Germany at the time and was fond of saying things about the Nazis like:

Far too many people have an entirely erroneous conception of what the National Socialist regime really stands for. Otherwise they would lay less stress on Nazi dictatorship and much more emphasis on the great social experiment which was being tried out in Germany.

These days, you could sub out the words “National Socialist” and “Nazi” and “Germany” and insert the names of guys like Putin, Castro, Chavez, et al – and it might sound eerily familiar to some current diplomatic-speak coming out of Washington, or the U.N. But I digress.

Oh, and we must not forget good old Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, better known as the Earl of Halifax, or Lord Halifax. He was Chamberlain’s Foreign Secretary. He had been to Germany, as well – as a hunting guest of Hermann Göring. All of this is chronicled fascinatingly in Faber’s book.

Of course, Winston Churchill – a voice in the wilderness of those days – said, famously: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile – hoping it will eat him last.”

But again, this was new territory for all of them. In fairness, they had no clue at first that the rules of geopolitics and diplomacy were quickly changing, such a revolution being driven by a mad man. They all saw the light, eventually. And even Winston Churchill, who had been so solitarily tough on his Conservative party brothers over the whole appeasement issue, understood – graciously so – that Chamberlain and company were sincere in what they tried. Speaking at his Downing Street predecessor’s funeral in November of 1940, and as events by then had cruelly proved Neville Chamberlain so sadly wrong, Churchill waxed philosophical:

It fell to Neville Chamberlain in one of the supreme crises of the world to be contradicted by events, to be disappointed in his hopes, and to be deceived and cheated by a wicked man. But what were these hopes in which he was disappointed? What were these wishes in which he was frustrated? What was that faith that was abused? They were surely among the most noble and benevolent instincts of the human heart–the love of peace, the toil for peace, the strife for peace, the pursuit of peace, even at great peril, and certainly to the utter disdain of popularity or clamour. Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged. This alone will stand him in good stead as far as what is called the verdict of history is concerned.

Now, however, things are both the same and different. We are certainly bearing witness to the forming of threatening storm clouds. And it’s all being largely ignored or minimized by those who should know better. History, yet to be written, will not, however, cut current leaders – who are apparently convinced that today’s threats aren’t substantive or substantial – any such Churchillian slack.

Why? Because we ought to know better. Our experience, sense of the past, not to mention just plain old common sense should scream to this moment: “Crocodiles eat doves!”

Finding Common Ground Early On

September 9, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Richard Nixon, Russia | Leave a Comment 

In the UK’s Daily Telegraph, Jack Masey — an author and USIA (United States Information Agency) staffer during the famous “Kitchen Debates” at the American exhibition in Moscow in 1959 — underlines the long term impact of early cultural exchange with the Soviet Union:

During its six-week run, more than 2,700,000 Soviets visited “A Corner of America” in Sokolniki Park. Today, the 1959 exchange of national exhibitions is viewed as one of the most important cultural encounters of the Cold War.

But whether or not the United States succeeded 50 years ago in changing the hearts and minds of Soviet fair-goers, one thing is abundantly clear: we made contact with people we hardly understood and they with us. And, more frequently than not, we found common ground.

Castro, Nixon, And The Revolution

September 3, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Cuba, Richard Nixon, Russia | Leave a Comment 

Cuban leader Fidel Castro pictured with Vice President Nixon at The White House in April 1959 following his takeover of Havana earlier that year.

“If Nixon wins our revolution won’t last,” said Cuban President Fidel Castro just before the 1960 election. Last week — and nearly 50 years later — the island’s state controlled media, in a tribute to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, took another gratuitous swipe at RN:

“The Kennedy family, in particular the assassinated President, John F. Kennedy, were representative of a new generation of Americans confronting the old and dirty politics of men in the mold of Nixon…The Kennedy family’s (role) in Barack Obama’s electoral victory should not be overlooked. Without that moral, political and financial support, the dirty saga of the Bush and Nixon clans would be continuing.”

Considering their dear leader — a fatigue wearing altruist — is no practitioner of “dirty politics,” RN could have indeed been an obstacle to the exportation of El Presidente’s empyrean utopia.

The same utopia which uprooted an entire social class, which created one party rule, which censored opposition media, which jailed political and ideological opponents, including former ally Huber Matos, a rebel Army Commander, who Castro accused of being an agent for “reactionary forces.” Matos — like many others — was summarily beaten and confined to a bedless unlit cell, serving “every minute” of his 20-year sentence.

Writing at the American Thinker, author Humberto Fontava recounts Castro’s butcher-in-arms Nikita Khrushchev, who expressed his pleasure with the 1960 election outcome with a snicker:

“We ended up getting exactly what we’d wanted all along,” snickered Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs, confirming Nixon. “Security for Fidel Castro’s regime and American missiles removed from Turkey. Until today the U.S. has complied with her promise not to interfere with Castro and not to allow anyone else to interfere with Castro. After Kennedy’s death, his successor Lyndon Johnson assured us that he would keep the promise not to invade Cuba.”

Nixon Now

August 18, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under China, Republican Party, Richard Nixon, Russia | 1 Comment 

From the 1972 campaign, this commercial showcases RN’s  consecutive diplomatic successes in China and Russia.

RN went on to win 49 states and the votes of 47,168,710 Americans that November.

Dump Saakashvili

August 10, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Nixon Center, Russia, The National Interest | Leave a Comment 

Writing at The National Interest, Nixon Center President Dimitri Simes argues against supporting Mikheil Saakashvili in his conflict with Russia, contending that the Georgian President is a “tin-pot autocrat” out of step with American interests and values:

Reports from the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe’s (OSCE) observers on the ground, independent journalists and, most importantly, a number of senior Georgian officials who later broke with the Saakashvili regime, all confirm that it was the Georgian president who personally ordered a tank assault on the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and, specifically, on the Russian peacekeeping unit located there. This conclusion is widely shared by CIA and Pentagon intelligence analysts. It is difficult to explain why Mr. Biden sounded unaware of this while accompanied to Georgia by officials from the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Pentagon.

Nor was Saakashvili caught in some kind of a trap. On the contrary, for many months the Russian government warned that independence for Kosovo—changing the borders of Serbia, a sovereign democratic state, against its will—would be a precedent for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Senior Russian officials stated both publicly and privately, in discussions with their U.S. counterparts, that Moscow would not immediately recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states in response to Kosovo’s independence, but that it would be receptive to “requests” from both enclaves for greater integration with Russia. A larger Russian economic and military presence quickly followed.

Saakashvili responded to this with high-profile and high-risk harassment of Russian peacekeepers, arresting them, seizing their equipment, and humiliating them in public. Both Georgian- and Russian-controlled South Ossetian forces stepped up artillery attacks. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and later President Dmitry Medvedev, sent a clear message that Tbilisi would not be allowed to re-establish control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force. Russia ceased compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, enabling it to move more armored units into southern Russia and conducted major military maneuvers not far from the border. During one incident between Georgian and South Ossetian forces, two Russian combat aircraft flew over a Georgian position to demonstrate to Tbilisi that Moscow was not a paper tiger.

Despite this, Saakashvili was apparently convinced that he could press Moscow harder and harder with impunity. As both Georgian and Russian officials later told me, Saakashvili was not only openly dismissive in his conversations with Vladimir Putin, but went so far as to tell a senior Russian official visiting Tbilisi that he should convey to Russia’s president that if Moscow stood in the way of Saakashvili’s plans in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Georgian army would teach Russia a lesson, driving Russian troops to back to Rostov, hundreds of miles from South Ossetia.

The Georgian president demonstrated his contempt for Russian power and resolve in the strategy that he chose in trying to occupy South Ossetia. Rather than sending tank columns around Russian forces in Tskhinvali to block the Roki Tunnel, the only highway between Russia and the enclave, and to present Moscow with a fait accompli, Saakashvili overrode this recommendation of some of his advisors and recklessly ordered a frontal assault on the Russian peacekeeping detachment. At that point, Moscow had a choice between accepting humiliation and responding with force. How could Saakashvili have been surprised at Moscow’s decision to fight—and fight hard?

Contrary to some allegations in the West and particularly the United States, the Russian military operation was measured and, with some exceptions, proportionate. Russian aircraft attacked Georgian military targets. To the extent there was collateral damage, it appeared limited, unintentional, and usually close to Georgian military targets. Despite the virtual collapse of Georgian forces, Russian troops did not attempt to occupy Tbilisi or remove the Georgian president from power by force. Not so long ago, the United States invaded Panama and removed President Manuel Noriega from office with a case against him no stronger than Russia’s grievances vis-à-vis Saakashvili.

Show Some American Hospitality

August 6, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Nixon Administration figures, Russia | Leave a Comment 

Nixon Center Vice Chairman and National Interest President Robert Ellsworth (who served as President Nixon’s NATO Ambassador and Under-Secretary of Defense), explains how we should deal with the two Russian submarines that surfaced off the Eastern Seaboard:

In the great sweep of history, the deployment of two nuclear-powered Russian submarines to within two hundred miles of our east coast will surely go down as a minor gesture whose significance will be measured by the United States’ response.

No response would be a strategic blunder, telling the world more about our strategic competence than anything else.

The correct response would be to show our strength through our hospitality.

We should immediately invite the crews of the two Russian boats to visit our great naval base at Norfolk, Virginia. Here they could resupply themselves with fresh stores of fruits and vegetables; could join our local soccer teams in a “futbal” tournament; could enjoy the latest Hollywood movies; and—last but not least—could write up brilliant reports, including photographs, of some portions of the vast U.S. naval base which is Norfolk.

Here are the headquarters of NATO’s supreme allied commander, the commander of the United States Atlantic Fleet, the home base of the U.S. 2nd Fleet, NATO’s Strike Fleet and many other commands.

A Russian submarine visit at this time, far from the Russians’ home port on the cold and stormy coast of northern Russia, would be massively covered by the global media. The message of strength through hospitality including much if not all of the awesome scope of the U.S. and NATO Atlantic fleets would go about to the world, first and foremost to the American and Russian publics but also to Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Anchors Aweigh!

Another Nixon To China Opportunity

August 3, 2009 by Jonathan Movroydis | Filed Under Barack Obama, China, Nixon in the News, Richard Nixon, Russia | 1 Comment 

Last week Vice President Joe Biden said that a weakened Russia will bend to the United States. The "great polar bear’s" economy is essentially "withering," it has a dwindling population base, and an anemic banking sector that might not be able to withstand the next 15 years. Russia is also faced with external dilemmas in the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea and less than subservient former Soviet bloc countries.

Russia also faces a China problem, and a turf war that President Obama can capitalized on. The Guardian reports:

while China and Russia have much in common, including a mutual fear of separatism and Islamic radicalism, there are also signal differences. Despite last week’s exercises, and a visit to Russia by Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, in June, politicians in Moscow harbour a deep-seated fear of China – in particular, of Chinese encroachment.

Russian TV recently claimed that Beijing has drawn up a secret plan. According to this top-secret blueprint, China is determined to grab back Russia’s remote, but vast, far east region. China’s strategy includes persuading migrants to settle in Russia, marry local women and steal or co-opt local businesses.

Russia’s far east has always been the most strategically vulnerable part of Moscow’s fissiparous imperium, in what is the world’s biggest country. Some 6,100km (3,800 miles) and an eight-hour flight from Moscow, the far east is home to just 6.5 million Russian citizens. Next door, across the Amur river in north-eastern China, there are 107 million Chinese. Given this demographic imbalance, there is a primordial fear in the Russian imagination that China will eventually try to steal back the Europe-sized far east of Russia – a region rich in mineral resources, trees, coal and fish. The salmon alone are an attractive target. A quarter of the world’s Pacific salmon spawn in the volcanic Kamchatka peninsula. According to the Russian TV scenario, Beijing is furtively plotting to undo the Russian colonisation of the Pacific coastal region, started in the 18th century by tsarist-era adventurers. The area’s original inhabitants were Chinese. These early nomads eked out a meagre living while dodging the tigers that still haunt the Sikhote-Alin mountains.

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